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The economic structure of the livestock marketing system has 
undergone considerable change during the past quarter of a century. 
In most instances the rate of change has been gradual but steady 
rather than sudden or dramatic. Thus, the impact on marketing insti­
tutions s marketing and production patterns and marketing practices 
becomes more apparent when viewed in historical retrospect. 
There has been a general trend toward decentralization of markets 
and the movement of processing facilities nearer to livestock production 
areas. Likewise, shifts in population and expanded economic growth 
particularly in certain areas of the South and along the Pacific Coast 
have generated changes in the meat distribution sector. While other 
structural and technological changes may be of equal or greater impor­
tance over the long pull or in the aggregate, livestock producers are 
affected more directly by the changes in organization and location of 
market centers and processing facilities. 
In an article published in the 1954 Yearbook of Agriculture, 
Shepherd, referring to decentralization as one of the most important 
features of the changing structure of the nation's livestock and meat 
marketing system, makes the following observations 
The concentration, equalization and dispersion of the 
physical goods that used to take place at the central markets 
is now spread all over the country—decentralized—and the 
price—determining and title—transferring process is spread 
along with it.l 
•'•Geoffrey S. Shepherd. Changes in structure. U. S. Department of 
Agriculture. Yearbook of agriculture 1954: 54. 1954. 
2 
Shepherd suggests that improvements and refinements in the live­
stock grading system along with a more extensive and accurate market 
news system offer, perhaps, the greatest promise for coping with 
problems arising from the decentralization of livestock markets.^ 
Livestock auctions have emerged as an important market outlet in 
the present structure of the livestock marketing system. The increasing 
importance of auctions roughly parallels the decline in relative 
importance of the terminal livestock markets. The proportion of cattle 
sold through terminal markets has declined from approximately 90 percent 
in 1926 to 59 percent in 1956. During the same period the proportion 
2 
of calves sold at terminals declined from 86 percent to 25 percent. 
An estimated 30,125 thousand head of cattle and calves were sold at the 
3 
nation's 2,322 livestock auctions in 1955. Thus, the number of cattle 
and calves marketed at auctions in 1955 was about one-third more than 
the number sold at the terminal markets. The number of hogs and sheep 
and lambs sold at auctions in 1955 was about 63 percent and 67 percent, 
respectively, as large as the number sold at the terminals. The number 
\lbid., p. 59. 
n 
Ibid., p. 56. The proportion for 1926 was taken from the graph 
in Shepherd's article showing the proportion of livestock sold at 
terminal markets from 1923 through 1951; the proportion for 1956 was 
calculated from two U. S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural 
Marketing Service publications: (l) Livestock receipts and disposition 
at public markets 1956: 4. February 1957. and (2) Meat animals 
farm production, disposition and income, by states, 1955-1956: 6. 
April 1957. 
Gerald Engelman and Betty Sue Pence» Livestock auction markets 
in the United States. U. S. Department of Agriculture. Agricultural 
Marketing Service. Marketing Research Division. Marketing Research 
Report 223: 13-14. 1958. 
3 
of auctions has increased rapidly from about 200 in 1930 to a peak of 
slightly more than 2,500 in 1955. Auctions are more numerous in the 
North Central and Southern regions. In 1955, there were 1,044 auctions 
operating in the North Central region and 598 in the Southern region.* 
These two regions accounted for about 70 percent of the nation's 
auctions. 
The expansion in numbers of auctions did not begin as early in 
the South as in some of the other regions. But at the present time, 
auctions are the most important single market outlet for all market 
classes and species sold in the South. A region-wide survey in 1950 
quantified the relative importance of auctions in the South's livestock 
marketing system. "With a few minor exceptions more than half of 
every kind and class of livestock marketing were sold at local 
2 
auctions." Approximately 55 percent of the producers accounting for 
58 percent of the reported sales of cattle and calves sold their 
livestock at local auctions. In most instances auctions have replaced 
other marketing agencies or altered the existing flow through which 
livestock moved from the producer to the end user. However, in some 
cases the auctions tend to function as an additional stage between the 
producer and the terminals, packing plants or feeder buyers. The 
extent of purchases by buyers for reshipment and resale to terminals 
or other auctions both inside and outside the area is relatively large 
•'•Ibid., p. 10. 
^Jack D. Johnson. Livestock marketing in the southern region. 
Southern Cooperative Series Bulletin 20: 74. 1952. 
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at some auctions in the Appalachian area, especially during fall peak 
of marketings. 
Statement of the Problem 
In most instances the establishment of auctions represents an 
improvement in the livestock marketing system of the Appalachian area. 
This was especially true in early days of their development. Prior to 
the establishment of auctions, some of the large farmers consigned 
their cattle for sale at the Jersey City, Baltimore or Lancaster 
terminal markets. Other large farmers sold directly to traveling 
buyers representing large packer or feeder interests. The majority of 
small producers in the area sold to local dealers and truck buyers 
because their annual production was too small to absorb the high cost 
of shipping to distant markets. And, the number of reasonably 
homogeneous animals for sale generally was too small to attract the 
attention of the buyers from outside the area who supposedly paid 
higher prices. The fact that farmers preferred to market only toward 
the end of the grazing season further complicated the problem. Many 
producers felt that most local dealers were receiving excessive 
remuneration for performing their functions in the marketing process. 
As the number of auctions continued to expand in the area, persons 
concerned with the efficiency of marketing began to question the 
advisability of more auctions. They raised such questions as: Will the 
number of animals consigned for sale be sufficiently large to attract 
enough buyers to assure reasonably competitive bidding? Will the 
buying firms have enough buyers to visit most of the sales or will they 
5 
nave to omit certain sales? Are certain marketing practices such 
as selling in multiple-sized lots or purchases by the auction firms 
aiding or reducing price competition at the market? All of these 
questions point up the fact that the pricing problem is of major con­
cern in analyzing the effectiveness of auctions. 
Pricing problems at auctions may be classified as: (l) Price 
relationships among animals classified on certain physical character­
istics at a particular auction sale; (2) Relation of prices for 
comparable animals between auctions in different locations, with 
different operating practices and other internal or external factors; 
(3) Relation of auction prices generally to those at alternative outlets 
or to the general level of prices for comparable animals at the national 
level-
Scope and Objectives 
This investigation is limited to an analysis of cattle prices at 
selected auctions in the three-state area of East Tennessee, Virginia 
and West Virginia, referred to as the Appalachian area. No attempt is 
made to make a comparative analysis of prices at these auctions with 
those at any other market. The specific objectives of this study are: 
(1) To determine the price-grade differentials for animals of 
comparable breed type and market class at each of the selected 
markets; 
(2) To analyze differences in the level and variability of prices 
for comparable animals between markets; 
(3) To analyze the association between the level and variability of 
prices and certain structural aspects of the market, such as: 
6 
(a) the nature of the marketing consist, (b) the number and type 
of buyers purchasing; 
(4) To analyze the influence of (a) variations in the number and 
relative importance of the various market classes included in the 
total consignment, (b) purchase pattern and relative number bought 
by types of buyers, and (c) certain operating procedures and 
practices employed by the respective auctions on the level and 
variability of prices. 
Review of Literature 
Researchers in the Land Grant Colleges and the U. S. Department of 
Agriculture began studying livestock auctions during the 1930's.* 
Attention was directed toward auctions initially as part of the 
over-all interest in the extent and impact of the "direct market" 
movement on the existing structure of the livestock marketing system. 
Apparently the major objectives of many of the early auction studies 
were to quantify the volume of livestock sold at auctions, including 
the kinds of animals and the seasonality of marketings, and to provide 
a general description of operational procedures and marketing practices. 
Some of the reports also contained general appraisals of the auctions 
and the problems confronting them. Randell and Mann, reporting the 
results of a nationwide survey of auctions, stated that traders and 
*Donald W. Gooch. The bibliography on marketing of livestock, 
meat and meat products. U. S. Department of Agriculture. Biblio­
graphical Bulletin No. 15. 1951. This publication lists 35 refer­
ences to studies of livestock auctions. 
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dealers were the principal promoters of auctions.^ As part of their 
study, they surveyed a sample of producers and found more than 75 
percent of them had a favorable attitude toward auctions. "From this 
study it appears that the auction method of marketing is likely to 
2 
continue as an important part of our livestock marketing machinery." 
With increased funds provided under the Research and Marketing 
Act of 1946, marketing research was expanded with major emphasis 
placed on finding ways and means of improving the efficiency of the 
marketing system to halt the rising trend in marketing margins. 
Research in the agricultural price analysis field also has been 
expanded since 1946. But relatively few of the studies have grappled 
with pricing problems at the local market level. In a recent article 
Breimyer deplores the lack of price analysis studies at the local 
market levelî 
. . .over-trust in the workings of the price 
determining mechanism has dimmed interest in examining the 
actual performance of pricing in individual sales. . . 
partly for this reason, the recent expansion of marketing 
research has found little room for research into price 
determination at point of first sale.3 
According to Breimyer and others, the major defect of some recent 
C. G. Randell and L. B. Mann. Livestock auction sales in the 
United States. Farm Credit Aministration Bulletin No. 35: v. 1939. 
This is one of the best and most comprehensive of the early auction 
studies. 
^Ibid., p. vii. 
^Harold F. Breimyer. On price determination and aggregate price 
theory. Journal of Farm Economics. 39: 683. 1957. Breimyer cites 
Karl Fox as being among those apologizing for over-aggregation in 
some price analysis studies. 
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price analysis studies has been "over-aggregation." The two major 
weaknesses of over-aggregation are: first, "it is directed to 
questions too far removed from actual events about which producers, 
marketers and consumers want answers" and secondly, "aggregation 
equilibrium analysis connotes an efficiency, if not beneficience, 
of the marketing and price process that is not justified."* 
Recognizing the essential role of uniform grade standards in an 
efficient livestock marketing system, marketing researchers in several 
states have focused their attention on developing new grade specifi­
cations which would be subject to more objective measurement than the 
official standards in use. Other workers have measured the relative 
accuracy of livestock buyers in translating carcass grade standards 
into livegrade estimates and the ability of buyers to estimate 
p 
accurately the carcass yield of live animals. 
In an Iowa study, Clifton and Shepherd developed tentative grade 
specifications for slaughter steer carcasses based on carcass weight, 
carcass length and thickness of the fat on the eye muscle.^ Using 
1Ibid. 
2 The North Central Livestock Marketing Research Committee in 
recent years has placed considerable emphasis on problems involving 
grade standards and the extent and accuracy of their application; this 
bulletin summarizes some of the studies. It also is known as North 
Central Regional Publication 53. Elliot S. Clifton. Pricing accuracy 
of slaughter cattle, veal calves and lambs. Indiana Agricultural 
Experiment Station. Bulletin 611. 1954. 
^Elliot S. Clifton and Geoffrey S. Shepherd. Objective grade 
specifications for slaughter steer carcasses. Iowa Agricultural 
Experiment Station. Bulletin 402: 540. 1953. 
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the proposed grade standard, they were able to place about 90 percent 
of the sample carcasses in the same grade as placed by the government 
graders. They found a correlation (R^ = .78) between grade as determined 
by the government carcass graders and carcass grade estimates based on 
the measurements taken on the three variables. 
Dowel1 and Engelman in a study of the relative accuracy of a 
packer buyer in estimating carcass grade and yield of beef cattle 
reported that the buyer had a standard error of estimate of 1.85 per­
cent for yield estimates and .384 for grade estimates.^ Since these 
results were obtained from the estimates of only one buyer, the 
representativeness of the results cannot be determined. Moreover, the 
results might have been different if another carcass grader had graded 
the carcasses. For example, Phillips and Pearman reported that only 35 
percent of the slaughter cows purchased by a packing firm at four 
Kentucky auctions were placed in the same grade by the packer buyer and 
2 two government graders grading the same animal. The buyer's carcass 
grade estimate agreed with the grade placed on the carcass by an 
official carcass grader only 57 percent of the time. In contrast, the 
carcass grade estimates by one of the graders was the same as the final 
carcass grade for 71 percent of the animals estimated. In the Kentucky 
-'•A. A. Dowel 1, Gerald Engelman, Evan F. Ferrin and Phillip A. Ander­
son. Marketing slaughter cattle by carcass weight and grade. Minnesota 
Agricultural Experiment Station. Technical Bulletin 181: 18. 1949. 
The research technique employed in this study has become one of the most 
popular techniques for measuring the relative accuracy of livestock 
pricing. 
^C. D. Phillips and James L. Pearman. Accuracy of the present 
method of pricing slaughter cows. Kentucky Agricultural Experiment 
Station. Bulletin 611: 6. March 1954. 
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study, as in most other studies of a similar nature, there was a general 
tendency to underestimate the carcass grade and yield of animals in the 
top grades and overestimate animals in the lower grades. The errors 
in estimation reported in these studies probably are less than the 
"true" errors in the market because the conditions and environment 
under which the estimates were made are more conducive to accurate 
measurement than those faced by the average buyer in performing his day-
to-day chore of purchasing livestock, particularly at auctions. 
Another technique for estimating the relative accuracy of live­
stock pricing has been to compare the prices at specified markets within 
an area with those prevailing at certain large terminals. This tech­
nique assumes that prices at the large terminals reflect the best 
approximation of the "true value" of the species, market class and grade 
of livestock under study in an "ideal market." After adjustments are 
made for transportation costs and other differences in marketing costs 
and charges, the deviations in prices at area markets from the "norm" 
established at the terminals are defined as measuring the degree of 
pricing inaccuracy. Using this technique, McPherson made a comparative 
analysis of prices for selected classes and grades of cattle at three 
Florida- auctions and concluded that prices paid at the auctions for the 
1 
top grades of cattle were not commensurate with their "true value." 
He suggested that the small number and erratic supply of animals of 
this quality sold at the auctions were the major reasons for the pricing 
K. McPherson. How well do auctions discover the price of 
cattle? Journal of Farm Economics. 38: 43. February 1956. 
.11 
discrepancies. "The results indicate (but do not prove conclusively) 
that large auctions provide a more accurate price discovery mechanism 
than small auctions."^ 
Purcell compared cattle prices at selected Georgia auctions with 
prices at the large midwest terminal markets and reached essentially 
2 the same conclusions as McPherson. Prices received for slaughter 
calves were relatively higher than prices for any other class of cattle 
sold at Georgia auctions. 
Williamson, in a study of the effects of grade, market location 
and season upon prices paid for cattle and calves at 17 North Carolina 
auctions found generally significant price differences between grades, 
regions and season; but a regression equation using these three 
variables failed to explain a large part of the total price varia-
3 bility. The coefficient of determination for the regression equation 
ranged from a low of .05 for beef-type slaughter calves to a high of 
.58 for dairy-type steers. "The large amount of unexplained price 
variability indicates that prices of animals having a common grade, 
region and season classification varied considerably."4 Williamson 
*Ibid., p. 43. 
Joseph C. Purcell. Comparative analysis of cattle prices on 
Georgia auctions and midwest terminal markets. Georgia Agricultural 
Experiment Station. Bulletin No. 26 (New series). 1956. 
3 
J. C. Williamson, Jr. Cattle prices at North Carolina auction 
markets. North Carolina State College. Department of Agricultural 
Economics. A-E Information Series No. 51. September 1956. This study 
was, in effect, a pilot study for a larger Southern Regional Livestock 
Marketing project. 
^Tbid., p. 33. 
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reported prices paid for higher grade animals at North Carolina auctions 
compared favorably with prices at Baltimore and Chicago terminal markets 
during the spring season but were significantly lower in the fall. 
Eight southern states participated in the Southern Regional Live­
stock Marketing study of price-grade differences at local auctions. The 
Louisiana station has issued several reports of analysis of prices of 
slaughter calves at one large auction in that state. Woodin reports 
that the price increases were not uniform or consistent between succes­
sively higher one-third grades, especially between those levels of 
quality which separate whole grades.* Price variability within a whole 
grade and even within a third of a grade was quite wide. The grade 
scale used in the regional study assigned a unit value to each one-third 
grade beginning with the value of one as top prime and ending with 
twenty-one as bottom canner. The critical level referred to by Woodin 
is between those two numbers that represent the top one-third of a lower 
grade and the bottom one-third of the adjacent higher whole grade. 
Using a multiple regression equation with grade, dressing per­
centage and weight as independent variables, Frickie was able to account 
for about 77 percent of the variation in slaughter calf prices at a 
<2 
large Louisiana auction. Grade was by far the most important variable 
*M. D. Woodin. Cattle prices at auction markets. Louisiana 
Rural Economist. 18, No. 2: 3-5. May 1956. 
2 Dudley B. Frickie. Relationship of grade, dressing percentage 
and weight to price of slaughter calves in Louisiana. Louisiana 
Agricultural Experiment Station. Department of Agricultural Economics. 
Circular 191. 1956. The use of only one market and one market class of 
cattle limits the general applicability of Frickie's result. 
13 
associated with price variations. On the average, variations in grade 
accounted for 52 percent, dressing percentage 17 percent and weight 8 
percent of the price variability for slaughter calves. Price differen­
tials between adjacent top quality grades tended to be smaller than 
between adjacent grades at the lower end of the quality scale. The 
standard error of the price estimate ranged from $0.91 to $1.62 and 
averaged $1.29 per hundred pounds of liveweight. 
Traylor used the same set of data as Frickie to analyze changes 
in the level of prices during the course of a sale.* He also investi­
gated the effect of pen-lot sales versus individual-lot sales on prices 
for slaughter calves. Traylor's analysis revealed that, "Price 
increased as grade improved, but decreased as the proportion of animals 
bought by packer buyers increased and as time elapsed." The most 
common price pattern for comparable animals was for prices to start 
relatively low, increase during the middle of the sale, then decline 
towards the end of the sale. Traylor attributes this phenomenon, at 
least in part, to the attendance pattern of the various types of buyers 
at the sale. Local slaughterers were relatively important buyers at 
the Louisiana auctions even though their average size purchase was 
rather small. He contends that such buyers attempt to make their pur­
chases in a relatively short time. When they have completed their 
purchases, they leave. As the sale progresses, the larger packer buyers 
^Harlon D. Traylor. An analysis of two types of variation in 
cattle prices at auction markets in Louisiana. Louisiana Agricultural 
Experiment Station. Department of Agricultural Economics. Circular 
182. 1955. 
2Ibid., p. 33. 
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represent an increasingly larger proportion of the remaining buying 
powers. 
Traylor's analysis of the relative merit of pen-lot selling was 
limited by the small number of observations on such sales; his results 
were inconclusive. 
The purpose of this section has been to present in a reasonably 
ordered fashion a periscopic spectrum, so to speak, of the type of 
research studies that have been conducted in the general problem area 
of livestock pricing. No claims are made for all-inclusiveness or 
completeness of coverage. The studies included in this review were 
selected as representative of the different types of approaches and 
research techniques that have been used in the search for workable 
solutions. The specific problems considered and the research methods 
used in the Louisiana and North Carolina studies are more directly 
applicable to the problem considered in this thesis. 
15 
AN ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF CATTLE PRICES 
The theoretical model for a competitive market is usually defined 
as a "perfect" market.All of the rigorous assumptions contained in 
the formal model of perfect competition are seldom, if ever, met in 
real economic life. Yet, with slight modifications the model provides 
important criteria for appraising the economic efficiency of certain 
agricultural industries that exhibit inherent characteristics which 
approximate the requirements of the model. The criteria used to 
evaluate the relative efficiency of the marketing system in accurately 
pricing livestock and meat products in most instances were specified by 
models centered around the concept of an "ideal" market." 
The "Ideal" Market Concept 
Basically, the "ideal" market concept is only a less rigorously 
defined, modified version of the "perfect" market concept. The model 
generally contains the following essential features. The United States 
livestock and meat industry is assumed to be a closed system. The 
industry has an interdependent national marketing structure with no 
important isolated or independent areas. The production-consumption 
balance is relatively stable for the major geographic areas. Price 
^Geoffrey S. Shepherd. Marketing farm products. 3rd ed. Iowa 
State College Press, Ames, Iowa. 1955. In Chapter 2, Shepherd defines 
the "perfect" market as the proper model for a competitive market and 
provides an excellent description of the model. 
2 
McPherson, op. cit. McPherson employs criteria based on the 
concept of an "ideal" market and the companion concept of an "ideal" 
price in making a comparative analysis of cattle prices at three 
Florida auctions. 
differentials for comparable grades and classes of cattle tend to 
equalize in time and space after adjustments are made for transfer 
costs. Thus, a major market point in the general surplus area may 
be employed as a "basing-point" in making a comparative analysis of 
cattle prices at other points. 
In practice, researchers usually have chosen the Chicago or 
Omaha terminal markets as the "ideal" market for slaughter cattle.^ 
These markets were selected because they are located in the nation's 
largest meat surplus production area and are the largest single 
markets for slaughter cattle. The cattle sold at these markets are 
consigned by producers throughout the surplus production area to 
experienced commission firms. The markets are attended by buyers 
representing the national packers and large regional packers through­
out the country. Experienced order buyers represent some firms that 
are either too small to maintain a permanent buyer or who only occasion­
ally make purchases at the market. The prices registered for slaughter 
cattle at these "ideal" markets are considered to be "ideal" prices 
2 
and are used as "norms" to which prices at other points are compared. 
^Kansas City is often chosen as the "ideal" market for feeder 
cattle. All of these markets are excellently located with respect to 
transportation and communication, which makes them easily accessible in 
an economic sense. Moreover, these market centers are the hub of the 
livestock marketing news service, both governmental and private. Thus, 
the mass of price data available for these markets increases their 
popularity as reference points for area pricing problems. 
2 This assumption implies that the commission men and the buyer 
representatives are well-matched "economic antagonists" in that their 
experience, knowledge, alternatives and bargaining power are essentially 
equal. It implies also that the potential monopolistic power held by 
either side cannot be exercised because of the policing of their 
activities by agents of the Packers and Stockyards Division, U. S. 
Department of Agriculture. 
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The basic assumption is that the aggregative forces of supply and demand 
operative at these "ideal" markets at any point in time reflect the 
best estimates of the "true value" of the slaughter cattle. Moreover, 
the price differentials established between grades and classes of 
cattle supposedly reflect the beef preferences of consumers. 
The "ideal" market and its companion concept of an "ideal" price 
also have been applied to beef carcasses and adapted for use in some 
carcass-grade and yield studies.* In those cases, the "ideal" price 
specified in the model generally is the wholesale price quotation for 
beef carcasses of a given class and grade in the New York Wholesale 
o 
Meat Market. In its usual form the model assumes that the demand for 
slaughter cattle is directly derived from the demand of consumers for 
beef and that the time relationship is simultaneous with regard to 
production and income. Beef production is treated as equivalent to 
consumption. Moreover, by assuming that processing and distribution 
margins remain relatively constant, live animal prices may be related 
directly to meat supplies and consumer incomes. Thus, the live animal 
price for a given grade and class of cattle would be approximately 
equal to the weighted average value of the meat times a relatively 
*Dowell, Engelman, et al, op. cit. In the Minnesota study the 
errors made by the buyer in estimating the grade and yield of selected 
cattle were evaluated on the basis of "ideal" carcass prices. The 
imputed value of the difference between the buyer's estimate and the 
official grader's determination was translated into a liveweight 
price basis and interpreted as a measure of pricing inaccuracy. 
2 Since there is no generally accepted procedure for selecting 
an exact price from within a range of prices, the choice of an "ideal" 
price often is subject to question and debate because the selection 
could affect the significance of the results. 
18 
constant yield factor minus a nearly constant processing and distri­
bution margin.* 
Some Limitations of the "Ideal" Market Model 
The criteria provided by the "ideal" market have useful and 
important application for aggregative price analysis of those 
industries with structures approximating the requirements of the 
economic model for perfect competition. But several economic analysts 
have challenged the usefulness of the model in providing meaningful 
answers, especially when applied at local or area market levels or 
more specifically at the stages of the marketing process successively 
nearer to the producers' point of original sale. 
The validity of several of the key assumptions in the model, as 
usually formulated, is subject to question. Breimyer, for example, 
challenges the assumption of constant margins in livestock price 
analysis studies: "While the constancy or slow trend in margins so 
often assumed may be true over a number of years, it does not hold 
within short time periods . . . for commodities still subject to a 
sizable degree of competitive pricing." The farm price of choice 
grade cattle declined $4.15 per hundredweight from the first to the 
fourth quarter of 1955, and approximately 60 percent of the decline was 
*James B. Hassler. Forecasting prices of slaughter cattle and 
hogs. Univ. California. College of Agriculture. Giannini Foundation 
of Agricultural Economics. Mimeographed Report No. 195: 3. 1957. 
o 
Breimyer, op. cit., p. 690. 
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associated with a widening of marketing margins.* In a further obser­
vation on margins for livestock and meats, Breimyer concludes, "The 
2 
greater the increase in supply, the wider the margin." 
If, as Breimyer charges, the processors' margins for cattle and 
beef are positively correlated with changes in marketings of slaughter 
cattle - usually seasonal - the net effect on cattle prices in a local 
area would be a function of the variability in marketings in that area. 
Both absolute and relative changes in numbers marketed could be impor­
tant in influencing the amplitude of price changes. Unless the changes 
in supply were reasonably large and lasted sufficiently long to arouse 
the profit anticipation of firms not normally active in that marketing 
area to the point where the firms would shift orders to purchase to 
that area, the level of prices in that area would be determined by cost 
structure and profit anticipation of the buyers or firms that regularly 
patronize the local area markets. Any comparative analysis of prices 
between markets or areas based on average annual prices, especially if 
the annual price is unweighted, would tend to distort or cover up the 
true relationship. 
^Agricultural Marketing Service. Beef marketing margins and 
costs. U. S. Department of Agriculture, Miscellaneous Publication 
No. 710: 3. 1956. 
^Breimyer, op. cit., pp. 691-692. He attributes this reaction 
to the desire on the part of the entire meat trade for stability in 
both prices and volume of business: "When marketings increase, the 
packer is reluctant to expand his kill and will do so only if pro­
spective margins or profits are large. Margins not only narrow and 
widen, but change more than costs; and as a consequence, packers' 
profits move up and down radically." 
The "ideal" market model implicitly assumes that packers or 
feeder interests can and do make almost simultaneous shifts in their 
purchase plans to those markets where "net" prices are down. Similarly, 
livestock producers shift their consignments to higher prices markets. 
The aggregative effect of such actions supposedly produces a form of 
arbitrage which automatically adjusts prices to a spatial equilibrium 
solution. Large national or regional packers with several plants could 
make such adjustments more easily than small or area packers who service 
smaller trade areas. Limited empirical observations suggest that 
many packing firms tend to concentrate their purchases at certain 
market centers over long periods of time. Competitive firms buying 
cattle and selling carcasses in the same areas may be more interested 
in relative prices than in absolute prices in the short-run. The lack 
of established contacts also may restrain a packer from shifting his 
purchase plans. Uncertainty undoubtedly plays an important role in 
the decisions packers must make in the dynamic meat industry. 
The assumption that "good" steers at Chicago are the same as 
"good" steers at Montgomery is not readily accepted throughout the 
livestock and meat industry. To a large extent cattle are bought on 
the basis of personal inspection.* As the proportion of beef sold on 
the basis of Federal grades increases, the individual packer's risk 
of loss from errors on the part of the cattle buyer in estimating grade 
^Packer and order buyers, before placing bids on cattle at large 
terminals, frequently ask such questions as the following: Where did 
these cattle come from? Who fed them? How long were they on feed? 
Slaughter cattle finished on grass consistently sell for lower prices 
than comparable cattle finished on grain. 
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increases.* Because of this, packers whose orders are based on 
delivery of Federally graded carcasses are likely to restrict their 
orders only to those centers where they have "reliable" contacts. 
In most studies, transfer costs between market areas were computed 
on the basis of railroad tariffs plus additional average charges. 
Generally, costs other than transportation were considered fixed, 
irrespective of the location of the markets compared. Transfer costs 
computed in this manner probably underestimate the true costs. The 
proportion of livestock and meat transported by rail has declined 
steadily throughout the country. At the present time the railroads 
transport very little livestock or meat in many market areas. The 
inflexibility and slowness of rail traffic are usually given as the 
explanation for the decline in livestock and meat movement by rail. 
Many southern packers have their own fleet of trucks or negotiate 
privately with individual truckers when such services are required. 
Significant improvement in the general areas of livestock grading 
and market news would make the "ideal" market concept more realistically 
applicable to the livestock and meat industry. The end result should 
be better resource allocation and greater consumer satisfaction. 
Auctions in an Integrated Marketing System 
The basic function of a livestock auction is to provide a physical 
and economic environment in which the ownership of livestock may be 
*The Federal grader, despite his objectivity of purpose, must 
make his grade determination on the basis of subjective grade standards. 
The fact that many purchasers still insist on selecting their orders 
from "graded" carcasses suggests that purchasers do not always accept 
the judgment of the grader. 
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transferred in an efficient and orderly manner from the consignor to 
the buyer, present or represented at the sale, who bids the highest 
price for the animals at public outcry. As the quality of the environ­
ment at an auction approached optimum levels, prices received for live­
stock at that market would tend to reflect their true value.* The 
failure of a market to provide the proper environment would be reflected 
in two ways: (a) relatively lower prices and (b) the relative volume 
of purchases by traders for the purpose of resale through other markets. 
o 
Most auctions service only a limited trade area. The production 
and marketing pattern within the area tends to determine the degree and 
extent of fluctuations in weekly receipts, particularly for certain 
market classes and grades of cattle. A specific auction may provide 
a relatively good market for certain classes and grades of cattle and 
at the same time provide a relatively poor market for other classes as 
reflected in either lower and more variable prices or increased buying 
activity on the part of speculative traders.~ 
Optimum conditions would be those specified by the "ideal" market 
model, particularly for the economic environment as applied to (a) 
numbers and types of buyers, (b) volume and seasonal stability of con­
signments of specific classes and grades of cattle and (c) other 
characteristics which would foster competitive conditions. 
o 
Johnson, op. cit., p. 90. This study revealed that 85 percent of 
the producers in the Appalachian area sold their livestock at markets 
located within 30 miles of their farms. 
3 
In the jargon of the southern auction circles, the term "traders" 
market is a derogatory definition of an auction which represents a 
radical departure from the concept of an "ideal" market. On the other 
hand, a "good" auction refers to a market where legitimate packers or 
order buyers normally purchase all slaughter livestock on a 
"competitive" basis. 
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Thus, the relative position occupied by an auction on the 
marketing scale from the initial producer to the ultimate processor or 
feeder is determined to a large extent by the ability of the auction 
management to secure relatively large and stable consignments and a 
sufficiently large number of buyers representing competitive firms to 
insure competitive bidding.^ 
Analytical Model for Evaluating Cattle Prices at Auctions 
If the true value of cattle sold at an auction could be derived 
accurately, a direct comparison between these values and the prices 
paid at the market for comparable animals would reflect the degree of 
pricing inaccuracy. In practice the true value of an animal is 
seldom, if ever, known. Moreover, the time involved and the cost of 
3 
securing such data would be prohibitive. It would be extremely 
difficult to evaluate all of the important inherent characteristics 
of an animal and the conditions associated with the method, time and 
place of marketing which affect the value of cattle. 
Many auction operators feel it necessary to purchase livestock 
for resale at their market in order to increase the volume of sales so 
as to attract a desirable entourage of buyers. However, in trying to 
protect their interest in such animals, and those of other traders who 
may be aiding in the process, they may inadvertently contribute to 
pricing inaccuracy. Certainly such a practice is subject to criticism 
on the part of many buyers and producer consignors. 
^The valid comparison would be between the actual price and the 
net value of the animal after proper deductions were made for 
marketing, processing and distribution costs. 
3 The most thorough and authentic analysis would require following 
the animal through all stages of the marketing process from the point 
of first sale until the meat was priced and sold to the ultimate 
consumer. 
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Since for several reasons it was not feasible to use a more 
complete model in this study, the procedure followed in the analysis 
was to identify certain factors believed to affect the value of an 
animal; to classify and segregate the animals on the basis of these 
selected factors; and to determine whether differences between animals 
were reflected in price differences at the auction. The nine factors 
considered to affect the value of an animal were divided into two 
groups and classified as either regression variables or stratification 
variables.^ Each group contained some factors that were inherent 
characteristics of the animal. 
Factors employed in stratification 
Market. Disregarding other considerations, the location of a 
market in relation to production areas, slaughtering facilities and 
major consumption areas would be expected to influence the level of 
livestock prices at that market. As previously pointed out, it is a 
common supposition that the larger livestock markets are better pricing 
centers than the smaller markets. The eight markets comprising the 
sample consisted of four large and four small markets. The size of a 
market, like the size of any firm, may be measured in several different 
ways» For example, auction markets may be classified on the basis of 
the total value of livestock sales, which is a rather common measure, 
particularly where all charges are based on a percentage of sales value. 
^Specific definitions for the regression and classificatory 
variables are included in the Research Procedure section which follows; 
but in general, normal definitions apply. 
However, in this study the size classification of the markets was based 
on the total number of cattle and calves sold annually, since the 
primary purpose was to investigate the pricing of cattle and calves. 
Certain comparisons are made between large and small markets at several 
stages in the analysis. One of the principal objectives in stratifying 
the markets by size was to investigate two hypotheses relating to the 
size of the market: (a) Any actual differences between animals, with 
respect to the characteristics employed to distinguish them, are 
reflected more clearly in the prices paid at the large markets than at 
the small markets; and (b) The average level of cattle prices for a 
specific class and quality of animals is higher and more stable at the 
large markets than at the small markets. While these two hypotheses 
are implicitly assumed as part of the recommendations for improving the 
efficiency of the livestock marketing system, very few attempts have 
been made to verify them. 
Market class. Slaughter cattle and calves are separated into 
seven classifications. Sex, age and weight are the principal criteria 
used in classifying the animals as either veals, calves, steers, 
heifers, cows, stags or bulls. Stags and bulls were not considered in 
this study. The wholesale meat trade treats the carcasses from the 
various market classes as separate commodities for pricing purposes. 
The same technique was followed in this analysis. 
Breed type. Many buyers consider breed type in pricing an animal. 
Animals classed as beef type often sell for higher prices than 
comparable grades of animals classed as dairy type. Generally, the 
price differences because of breed type are wider for steers and 
heifers than for the other classes. These price differences are 
usually justified on the basis that dairy-type animals are more likely 
to produce carcasses with an objectionable yellowish fat covering, and 
the loins and rounds from beef-type animals are usually meatier than 
those produced by dairy-type animals. 
Type of buyer. The number of buyers purchasing livestock at a 
specified market has been an important consideration in many market 
oriented pricing studies. But the influence that the type of buyer may 
have on cattle prices has received practically no research attention. 
Perhaps a major reason for this omission has been the difficulty of 
obtaining such data. One of the hypotheses tested in this analysis is 
that the type of buyer, as well as the number, influences the level and 
variability of prices. Differences in the competitive structure of the 
market measured in terms of the number and type of buyers purchasing are 
expected to account for a major share of the price differences between 
markets for homogeneous animals. One of the principal reasons for 
considering the type of buyer was to examine more carefully the role 
and influence of the participation by auction personnel in the pricing 
process. 
Regression variables 
Grade. Slaughter cattle and calves within a market class are 
differentiated on the basis of the quality of the carcass they are 
expected to produce. The United States Official Grade Standards for 
slaughter cattle and calves provide a basis for sorting animals into 
reasonably homogeneous groups. The criteria used in the grade 
standards are conformation, finish, quality and sometimes age. The 
grade term applied to either the animal or the carcass is the most 
widely used expression of the relative quality of an animal or a car­
cass. Generally, there is a positive correlation between cattle prices 
and grades. Differences in grade are expected to account for the major 
share of the differences in prices of animals observed in this study. 
Carcass weight. The carcass weight of an animal represents the 
main product produced by an animal from which the slaughterer derives 
his revenue. Within a given class the weight of the carcass may affect 
the price. For example, the heavier veal carcasses often sell at lower 
prices. Carcass weight is an estimate derived by multiplying the weight 
of the animal by the estimated dressing percentage. Since carcass 
weight is, in effect, a cross product of weight and dressing percentage, 
its influence on price may be expressed by these two variables in the 
equation. Carcass weight equivalent prices are useful in making 
grade-price comparisons for animals with similar weights. 
Dressing percentage. This term expresses the relationship between 
the expected weight of the carcass and the liveweight of the animal 
from which it was derived. It is an important consideration in cattle 
price determination. On a reasonably competitive market, differences 
in dressing percentage estimates should account for most of the differ­
ence in prices between animals of the same class, grade and weight. The 
amount of "fill" an animal carries is one of the major considerations 
in making an estimate of the dressing percentage. Principally because 
of the biological make-up of an animal, a rather high correlation is 
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expected between grade and dressing percentage and to a lesser extent 
between these two variables and weight. 
Liveweight. The liveweight of an animal enters into his pricing 
in two ways. First, a purchaser may be interested only in animals 
within a certain weight range. Secondly, he may revise both his tenta­
tive grade and dressing percentage estimates on the basis of the known 
weight. For example, if the buyer estimates that an animal will weigh 
800 pounds s yield 52 percent and produce a carcass that would be graded 
"low good," he would likely revise his estimate upward if the animal 
actually weighed 850 pounds. 
Time. Livestock prices change both from year to year and within 
the year. Because of these changes, the time at which animals are 
sold has an important bearing on the prices they command. Not only 
does the general level of livestock prices vary from season to season, 
but the price differentials between the different grades and classes 
also vary seasonally. Price-grade differentials are expected to be 
narrower for animals sold during the spring visits. 
Statistical methods used^ 
Stratification. The initial step in the statistical analysis was 
to stratify, or aggregate, the individual animal or sales lot data 
into homogeneous strata groups on the basis of market (8), type of 
iThe statistical techniques and procedures are explained in 
greater detail in the sections where they are specifically applied in 
the various stages of the analysis. 
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buyer (4) and market class-breed type (?)." As a result of the 
stratification process, 153 strata groups of animals were formed 
representing all possible combinations containing eight or more 
observations. The minimum number of observations was set at the low 
level in order to retain as many strata groups as possible yet provide 
a minimum degrees of freedom for testing purposes in the multiple 
regression analysis. Actually, only 10 strata groups contained fewer 
than 12 observations. 
Multiple regression model. An unweighted multiple regression 
equation of the form Y - b_ + b.Xi + b0X_ + b X~ + b X. + b X was 0 1 1 ^ ^  3 -i 44 55 
fitted to the data. The five regression variables, previously 
mentioned, were used as independent variables. The equation estimates 
the relationship between the actual prices paid for the animals and the 
five independent variables included in the equation. An equation was 
computed for each of the 153 strata. In addition to the regression 
coefficients, other statistics computed were the variance of the 
individual regression coefficients, the coefficient of determination 
(R ) and the residual variance. Assuming that the model provides a good 
estimate of the "true value" of the animals observed in this study, the 
differences between the estimated price and the actual price may be 
considered an approximate measure of pricing imperfection. Under this 
XSince mixed-type veals and dairy-type cows were the only two 
non-beef breed classes of animals retained in the regression analysis, 
the term market class-breed type often is abbreviated to market class 
and used interchangeably. Generally, mixed and dairy-type animals were 
deleted because of the small number of observations within a strata 
group. 
30 
assumption the residual variance may be employed to measure the relative 
degree of pricing accuracy between the various strata classifications, 
such as markets and types of buyers.1 
Single variable model. As a special case, an analysis similar to 
the above was performed using a redefined model which included only 
grade as the independent variable. This phase of the analysis was 
performed to determine the amount of variation in price associated with 
the one variable believed to be most important in price determination 
and to test, on the basis of a less complex model, whether one 
regression equation would apply to all strata combinations. 
Variance techniques. Both the simple and the multiple regression 
models assume equal price differentials between all grades. As a check 
on the validity of the assumption, the average differential between 
adjacent grades and the within-grade variances were computed: pooled 
t-test procedures were used in making certain tests of significance. 
Residual analysis. In an attempt to find additional explanations 
for the unexplained variation remaining from the multiple regression 
model, the differences between the estimated price and actual price of 
each animal or lot sold were calculated. Graphic methods supported by 
statistical tests were used to study the association between these 
residuals and other factors, not previously considered, such as the 
number of animals in a sales lot and classified weight groupings. 
"4n practice, the residual variance would exaggerate or overesti­
mate the degree of pricing inaccuracy since practical considerations 
such as time and cost tend to prohibit the inclusion of all variables 
that may be possible sources of variation. Furthermore, failure to 
formulate the precise structural relationship between the variables 
including a larger and more complex model would create an additional 
source of error. 
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RESEARCH PROCEDURE 
The primary data included in this analysis were collected from 
a survey of livestock marketings at eight selected auctions in the 
Appalachian area. The data were edited, coded, punched and verified 
on IBM cards. Most of the statistical calculations were made on IBM 
computing and tabulating machines. 
Sampling Procedure 
A stratified-randorn sampling procedure was used in selecting the 
markets for study.^ Individual animal data were obtained on all cattle 
sold on the days sales observations were made, excepting small baby 
calves and bulls. 
Selection of markets 
A preliminary survey was made of all auctions in East Tennessee, 
Virginia and West Virginia to obtain information on the annual number 
of cattle sold and the general marketing practices followed. All 
markets that sold an average of less than 100 cattle and calves per 
weekly sale were eliminated from the population. All markets with 
average weekly sales of at least 100 but less than 300 head of cattle 
and calves were classed as small markets; the remaining markets with 
*The eight markets used in this analysis were included in the 
sample (stratum 3) of 32 markets selected for a regional study of 
price-grade differentials for slaughter cattle at southern auctions. 
Professors R. L. Anderson (North Carolina State College) and R, A, 
Bradley (Virginia Polytechnic Institute) served as statistical con­
sultants to the Regional Technical Committee and recommended the sample 
design. The Experimental Statistics Department at North Carolina State 
College supervised the selection of the sample. 
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average weekly sales of 300 head or more were classed as large markets. 
Four markets were selected from each of the size categories. 
Location of sample markets 
The sample selected consisted of two markets in each size category 
in Virginia, one large and two small auctions in West Virginia and one 
large auction in East Tennessee. Figure 1 shows the approximate 
location of auctions operating in the area; the sample markets and those 
operating under supervisory provisions of the Packers and Stockyards 
Act are identified by separate legend. 
Time period covered 
The observations were taken on eight sale days at each of the 
markets during the period from September 1953 through May 1955. The 
fall observations were made in September-October and the spring obser­
vations were made in April-May. The number of slaughter cattle sold 
at auction generally is larger during those months of the respective 
seasons. Within each season the observed sales were spaced two weeks 
apart."*" The dates on which sales were observed at the sample markets 
are given in Table 1. 
Data Collection Methods 
In addition to the specific information collected on each lot 
of cattle sold, observations were recorded regarding the operational 
^In the fall of 1953 the sales observations were spaced four 
weeks apart because of conflicts in the graders' time created by prior 
commitments for their time to grade in special feeder calf sales. 
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Figure 1. Location of Auctions in the Appalachian Area 
34 
Table 1. Date of Visit to Appalachian Auction Markets, 1953-1955 
Fall 1953 Spring 1954 Fall 1955 Sprinq 1955 
Market Sales Visit no. Visit no. Visit no. Visit no. 
number day 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
17 Friday 9/25 10/23 5/7 5/21 9/10 10/22 4/22 5/6 
18 Monday 9/14 10/26 4/26 5/10 9/13 10/25 4/25 5/9 
19 Monday 9/21 10/19 5/3 5/17 9/6 10/25 4/18 5/2 
20 Wednesday 9/16 10/21 4/28 5/12 9/15 10/27 4/27 5/11 
21 Monday 9/14 10/19 4/26 5/10 9/13 10/25 4/18 5/2 
22 Wednesday 9/16 10/21 4/28 5/12 9/15 10/27 4/20 5/4 
23 Friday 9/18 10/23 4/30 5/14 9/17 10/29 4/22 5/6 
24 Wednesday 9/16 10/21 4/28 5/12 9/8 10/20 4/20 5/4 
procedures and general economic activity at the market. Impromptu 
interviews were held with certain auction personnel, livestock buyers, 
truckers and producers. A prepared schedule was used in obtaining and 
recording information from auction operators. The management data were 
obtained by personal interview. 
The individual animal or sales lot data were obtained by having 
an experienced livestock grader, accompanied by the market researcher 
in charge, visit the auction on designated sales days. The grader 
classified the animals with respect to market class and breed type and 
estimated their grade and dressing percentage. He usually called his 
scores to the economist who recorded them on special forms. The 
^Copies of the management schedule and the form used to record 
the animal data are included in Appendix Tables 42 and 43. 
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economist also provided general assistance by stirring or holding the 
animals as the need arose. 
Arrangements were made to have the cattle grader make his estimates 
in the cutting and sorting or grading pen usually located on the 
"incoming side" of the scales. At most markets such pens were reasona­
bly large and well lighted so that the animals could be seen more clearly 
and at different angles by the grader. The objective was to provide the 
best environment possible for the grader to make his observations with­
out unduly upsetting the normal operating procedures at the market. The 
animals were usually identified prior to the time they were let into the 
grading or sorting pens. They were assigned to pens as they were let on 
to the scales for weighing. By having the grader perform his functions 
in the grading or sorting pens, it was relatively easy to obtain the 
actual weights and pen assignments which were recorded on the individual 
animal data sheets. This procedure provided an additional means of 
maintaining accurate identity of the animals throughout the marketing 
process. The pen number proved useful in sorting the animal data sheets 
in preparation for recording price and buyer information. 
While the sale was in progress, the researcher observed the 
activity in and around the sales ring. Particular attention was paid 
to the motions, actions and statements of the buyers, the ring men and 
the auctioneer. Intimate conversations were held with selected buyers -
while seated beside them - concerning the relative merits of certain 
animals, the activities or association of other buyers, or a general 
appraisal of the auction and its operation. Little tidbits of 
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information gained in such a manner were useful in attaining a broader 
knowledge and understanding of buyer activity at auctions. 
Data on the prices paid for the animals and the buyer purchasing 
them were taken from the auction's records. The auction management 
classified the buyers and identified the firms they represented. Con­
firmed information from other sources was used to verify, and at times 
to modify, the information supplied by the management. 
Individual Animal Data 
The following information was obtained on each lot of cattle and 
calves consigned from sale."*" In cases where two or more reasonably 
homogeneous animals were sold together as a single lot, the grader 
assigned an average estimate. The grader made all discretionary 
decisions in appraising the physical characteristics of the animals. 
Market class 
Each sales lot was assigned to a market class on the following 
basis: (l) veal calves - all calves exhibiting veal characteristics 
weighing 250 pounds or less; young, lightweight baby calves were 
excluded from the veal classification; (2) slaughter calves - all 
young animals not over one year old and weighing less than 500 pounds, 
excepting veal calves; (3) steers - all castrated male animals not 
exhibiting stagginess, except veal and slaughter calves; (4) heifers -
all female animals that have not calved and were not in an advanced 
^A few animals were missed because of difficulties in grading, 
etc., at some of the large markets during the fall observations when 
two scales and two checking-in crews were used. 
stage of pregnancy, excepting veal and slaughter calvesf barren females 
showing age were classed as cows; (5) cows - all female cattle in an 
advanced stage of pregnancy or that had had one or more calves and older 
barren females. 
Breed 
On the basis of personal judgment the grader used the following 
criteria to assign a breed-type score to the animals, (l) Beef type -
all animals with three-fourths or more beef breeding. (2) Dairy type -
all animals having three-fourths or more dairy breeding characteristics. 
(3) Mixed breeds - all animals not classed as either beef or dairy type. 
Whenever possible, the grader obtained the breeding history of the 
cattle from the owner before scoring the doubtful animals. 
Grade 
All animals sold were graded on the basis of the U. S. Department 
of Agriculture's Official Grade Standards for Slaughter Cattle and 
Calves, as amended, December 1950.^ In making his grade estimate, 
the grader subdivided the whole grades into one-third grades. For 
example, an animal qualifying for the good grade was designated as 
either top, average or low good. The only exception to this procedure 
was that the cull grade, applicable only to veal and slaughter calves, 
was not further divided into one-third grades. 
-Many of the animals included in this study that were placed in 
the commercial grade would have graded in the standard grade if the pres­
ent standards had been operative at the time these data were gathered. 
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Dressing percentage 
The grader estimated the dressing percentage of each animal or 
sales lot to the nearest one percent. This estimate was one of the 
most difficult to make accurately. The yield estimates for animals 
with an apparent excess fill were discounted toward the lower end of 
the range of expected yield. 
Weight 
The animals were weighed by the auction weighmaster on regularly 
tested and approved livestock scales. The usual weight-break interval 
was five pounds. Most scales were equipped with a stamping device for 
imprinting the actual weight on a triplicate scale ticket. One copy 
of the scale ticket was given to the consignor. The weights recorded 
for each lot were obtained from the stamped ticket.The average 
weight of animals sold in large graded pen lots was usually taken 
from the pen sheets at the time price data were recorded. 
Prices 
The prices recorded were those paid by the buyer as shown on the 
auction's records. Except at the small markets during the spring 
visits, most of the price and buyer data were obtained on a visit to 
the auctions a few days after the sales were observed. In some cases 
the auctions allowed the researcher to borrow the records until he 
had finished recording the data. 
*A few animals were sold on a per head basis at the Virginia 
markets. In most cases the weighmaster weighed such animals on request. 
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Buyer 
Each lot of cattle sold was identified with the buyer making the 
purchase. The buyer information recorded included the name of the 
buyer, his buyer-type classification and whenever possible the firm he 
represented.* Buyers were classified on the following basis; (l) 
packer buyer - a person employed by a packing plant to purchase cattle 
and/or calves at the auction. In some cases independent buyers who 
substituted for regular packer buyers were classed as packer buyers, 
especially if the purchases were charged directly to a packer's account 
and the management considered the individual in question as the packer's 
buyer. (2) Local slaughterer - a person who buys cattle and/or calves 
for slaughter and resale in the local community. Local slaughterers 
consist mainly of locker plants, small wholesale and retail butchers. 
(3) Order buyer - an independent buyer who makes purchases for a 
second party who normally is not represented at the market. The basis 
for making the purchases and the fees for the service usually are pre­
determined. (4) Management - an auction operator or his representative, 
usually anyone connected with the market in an official capacity. 
Purchases may be made for speculative purposes, to support the market, 
on order or for any other purposes. (5) Trader or Speculator - a 
person who buys cattle and/or calves at auction with the intention of 
^Sorne speculators and psuedo-order buyers are quite reluctant to 
divulge the firms they represent or indicate what they expect to do with 
their purchases. They consider such information as "business secrets" 
and guard them jealously. As mentioned before, little tidbits of infor­
mation obtained from other sources proved to be a valuable aid in break­
ing down the barriers thrown up by some of the reluctant individuals. 
reselling for a profit. Some of the buyers in this classification 
purchase cattle for resale to out-of-state packers on a carcass grade 
and yield basis. Others "jockey" livestock between auctions. (6) 
Farmers and others - this group primarily consists of farmers and small 
buyers who, because of the limited information available, could not be 
properly assigned to another classification. This group will be 
classed as farmers in the remainder of this thesis. 
As the study progressed, it became extremely difficult to accurately 
classify certain buyers as either order buyers or speculators. A 
similar problem arose in distinguishing between certain packer buyers 
and local slaughterers. In order to minimize the errors caused by mis-
classification, buyers previously classed as packers and local slaugh­
terers were pooled into a singular group and are referred to as packers 
in the remainder of this report. Order buyers and speculators were 
pooled and reclassified into a new group and referred to as order 
buyers in following sections. 
Controls Imposed to Assure Uniform Estimates 
Recognizing the essential virture of uniformity of estimates in 
making cattle price comparisons, several measures designed to assure 
reasonable homogeneity of the data were employed in this study. Among 
the measures used were: (l) qualified graders were employed in each 
state to classify and grade the animals; (2) an experienced, pro­
fessional grader was employed as a supervisory grader to train and 
supervise the performance of the state graders; (3) a grader orientation 
school lasting several days designed to improve the graders' efficiency 
and to promote uniformity of estimates was held each season immediately 
before the observation periods began; (4) a common set of definitions 
for classifying the animals, buyers and markets was adopted and adhered 
to in recording and reporting the data. Since the definitions used have 
been described in previous sections, they will not be repeated here. 
The cattle graders who graded and classified all cattle sold at 
the Virginia and West Virginia auctions were qualified graders with 
several years' experience in grading livestock at auctions. The graders 
were regularly employed as graders by the State Department of Agriculture 
in the respective states. It was not possible to effect a similar 
arrangement in Tennessee because no official livestock grading service 
is provided in that state. A staff member of the Tennessee Animal 
Husbandry Department, experienced in grading livestock and meat, was 
employed to do the grading at the Tennessee auctions. 
A professional livestock grader with more than 15 years' experience 
and a veteran employee of the Virginia Division of Markets was employed 
as supervisory grader for the regional study. His main functions were 
to conduct grader orientation schools and to supervise the field per­
formance of the graders at the sample auctions. He spent at least one 
day with each grader in the field during each observation period. On 
his visit he graded independently the same animals graded by the state 
grader and forwarded his report to the regional coordinator. The 
supervisory grader's estimates were compared with the individual 
grader's estimates on the same animals; and, when adjustments were 
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required, they were made on the basis of the supervisor's estimates.* 
The major purposes of the orientation schools were (l) to bring 
all of the graders together to review the official standards, (2) to 
review the criteria used in classifying the animals and (3) to practice-
o 
grade animals for joint comparisons. The principal goal was to 
improve the accuracy and uniformity of the graders in estimating grade 
and dressing percentage. At the schools all graders made independent 
estimates of the grade and yield of selected lots of cattle and calves. 
Their scores were recorded and tabulated so that individual and group 
comparisons could be made on the spot. Arrangements were made to allow 
the graders to see the carcasses of the animals they had graded. The 
government carcass grader usually cooperated by scoring the carcasses 
on a one-third grade basis so live-grade estimates could be compared 
with carcass-grade scores. During the school the graders visited 
nearby auctions and graded selected lots under "operating conditions." 
In a few cases it was possible to obtain the carcass results of the 
animals graded on such visits which were used to check on the relative 
accuracy of the estimates. By the end of the school the graders' 
estimates had improved in both accuracy and uniformity. Carcass grades 
were obtained for most of the animals graded at the New Orleans school 
held in the spring of 1955 and were compared with the live-grade 
*The procedure used in making adjustments in the grade and 
dressing percentage estimates are explained in a later section. 
The four schools were held at different locations in order that 
(a) the graders could compare their estimates with a different carcass 
grader, (b) they could see the differences in the general run of cattle 
in an area and (c) to level-out travel inconveniences. 
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estimates. The results showed that 85 percent of all the graders' 
estimates deviated less than two-thirds of a grade from the carcass 
grade. 
Coding of the Data 
A single sheet mimeographed form was prepared on which to record 
all information relating to each individual animal or lot sold of 
cattle lot.* The form was arranged and coded so that the grader could 
record the desired information with the minimum amount of writing and 
the data could be punched directly from the sheets, saving an inter­
mediate transfer of the data. 
Markets 
Each market was assigned a number. The large markets included 
in this analysis were numbered 17, 20, 21 and 24. The small markets 
were numbered 18, 19, 22 and 23. 
Breed 
In classifying the animals by breed type, they were coded as 
follows: Beef - 1, Dairy - 2 and Mixed - 3. 
Market class 
The coded values assigned to the various market classes were: 
Veal calves - 1, Slaughter calves - 2, Steers - 3, Heifers - 4 and 
Cows - 5. 
*A copy of the form used is included in Appendix Table 42. 
44 
Grade 
A numerical weighting and coding system was developed to include 
all possible grades for the market classes included in this study. 
Each one-third grade was numbered consecutively beginning with top 
prime (l) and ending with low canner (21). 
Dressing percentage 
Dressing percentage expresses the ratio of the expected carcass 
weight to the liveweight of an animal. The grader recorded his 
estimate to the nearest whole percentage. 
Type of buyer 
At the time the observations were taken, all buyers were classi­
fied into six separate types. However, for this analysis they were 
reclassified into four type groups and coded as follows: Packer and 
Local Slaughterer buyers - 1, Order buyers and Traders - 2, Management -
3 and Farmers - 4. 
Data Adjustments 
Two types of adjustments were made on the data included in the 
statistical analysis. In a few cases the grade and dressing per­
centage estimates of a regular grader were standardized to those of 
the supervisory grader in order to make them more uniform and 
comparable. The prices of all animals included in the analysis were 
adjusted by the Wholesale Meat Price Index, issued by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. 
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Grade and dressing percentage estimates 
The decision whether to adjust grade or dressing percentage 
estimates was made independently. Two criteria were used in deciding 
whether to adjust the estimates. First, the t-statistic was computed 
on the basis of paired comparisons of grade estimates for lots of animals 
graded by both the supervisor and the regular grader assigned to the 
sample market. Separate analyses were made for each market class of 
cattle and calves. The 'Student' t-test was applied to the results. 
No adjustments were made in the grade estimates unless the t-statistic 
was significant at the five percent probability level. Secondly, no 
adjustments were made unless the average difference in the estimates 
by the grader and the supervisor was at least one-third grade. When 
adjustments were necessary, they were made in one-third grade units. 
The adjustment factor was applied to all animals of a particular class 
graded by the individual grader that season.* 
The procedure followed in adjusting dressing percentage estimates 
were the same as those fcr grade adjustments except no changes were 
made unless the average difference amounted to at least one percent, 
and all changes were in units of one percent. The adjustments made on 
both grade and dressing percentage estimates are shown in Figure 2. 
Since under the grade code a higher number reflects a poorer grade, a 
negative adjustment (-1) means that in relation to the supervisor 
*Since it was necessary to have a four-week elapse of time 
between visits during the fail of 1953, the supervisor made observations 
on each grader each visit. The decision to adjust was made for each 
visit that season; and, if adjustments were made, they applied to the 
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Figure 2. Adjustments Made on Individual Graders' Grade.and Dressing 
Percentage Scores 
the individual grader graded the animals in that particular class 
one-third grade too high. A one-percent negative adjustment of 
dressing percentage means that the individual grader, in comparison 
with the supervisor, overestimated the animal's expected yield by one 
percent. 
Prices 
During the two-year period covered by this study, the eight 
days on which the sales were observed at the eight sample markets fell 
within ten months. In both fall seasons some sales were observed 
during the months of September, October and November; spring sales were 
observed during the months of April and May each year. The procedure 
for adjusting prices was as follows: (a) the Index of Wholesale Meat 
Prices as issued by the Bureau of Labor Statistics was recorded for 
each of the specified months; (b) the ten monthly values were summed 
and averaged; (c) the original monthly values were converted to an 
adjusted index value by dividing each monthly entry by the ten-month 
average; (d) the reciprocal of each "adjusted" monthly index value 
was computed and used as a multiplier in adjusting all prices at a 
market during a visit. The adjusted index values ranged from 94 to 111. 
Thus, most of the price adjustments were relatively small. 
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AUCTION OPERATIONS IN THE APPALACHIAN AREA 
Some general observations regarding the marketing practices, 
the animals sold and the buyers purchasing the animals included in 
the analysis are described in this section. The purpose is to provide 
a general background to enable the reader to better understand the 
environment of the problem. 
Size of Market 
The size of a market is often determined by the number of head of 
livestock handled at the market* In this study, the markets were 
classified as either large or small on the basis of the total number 
of cattle and calves sold in a year prior to the initiation of the 
research. Four of the eight markets were classified as large markets 
and four were considered to be small markets. The total number of 
animals observed in each market class together with the size desig­
nation of each market is shown in Table 2. If the markets were ranked 
on the basis of the number sold in each market class, the ranking of 
some markets would be sufficiently different to change their size 
classification. For example, market 24 merits the large size classifi­
cation principally because of the large number of veal consignments. 
Market 23, on the other hand, ranks among the top four markets in the 
number of steers and heifers sold during the observed sales. 
Seasonal Differences in Consignments 
The average number of animals sold in the fall sales was more 
than twice as large as the number sold in the spring. However, the 
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animals Veals Calves Steers Heifers Cows 
17La 6,299 2,435 1,125 1,130 574 1,035 
18S 908 673 73 30 38 94 
19S 1,689 679 413 146 179 272 
20L 3,815 1,227 812 630 340 806 
21L 3,223 704 525 968 423 603 
22S 1,511 430 305 414 160 202 
23S 2,390 829 379 462 322 398 
24L 4,040 2,363 403 294 318 662 
All markets 23,875 9,340 4,035 4,074 2,354 4,072 
aL indicates a large market; S indicates a small market. 
seasonal difference for some classes was quite large. The seasonal 
differences in numbers sold were smallest for veal calves; the pro­
portion of total consignments consisting of cows showed least changes 
between seasons. As shown in Table 3, the average number of cattle 
and calves sold at the large markets was nearly three times greater than 
the average number sold at the small markets. However, the proportional 
distribution by class was essentially the same, irrespective of the size 
of the market. 
Normal Marketing Practices 
Some of the marketing practices observed at the markets tend to be 
peculiar to auction operations in the Appalachian area. While a few of 
the practices common to auctions in the area may contribute to pricing 
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Average number per sale 
234 91 163 
18 8 13 
18 9 14 
18 16 17 
54 19 36 



















































efficiency, others probably adversely affect the level and variability 
of cattle prices at the markets. 
Weighing practices 
Practically all of the animals sold were valued, or priced, on 
the basis of the weight of the animals at the time they were received 
at the auction. Because of this practice, a buyer is unable to use 
the appearance of the animal at the time it is sold as an indicator of 
probable dressing percentage. Buyers objected more strenously to this 
practice than any other followed at the auctions in the area. The 
impact of the practice is greater on the occasional buyer who buys only 
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a small number of lots than it is on regular buyers who frequently 
purchase large numbers and have a historical average yield experience 
to use as a standard. In addition, the practice tends to penalize 
producers who have hauled longer distances and those consigning animals 
with the least amount of fill. 
Buyers in the area, like those elsewhere, sometimes doubt the 
accuracy of the scales. The scales at the markets were checked 
regularly by an official State agency. Perhaps the major source of 
errors in weight, particularly where several classes are weighed on the 
same set of scales, is caused by the failure of weighmasters to reset 
the scale balance at frequent intervals. Another source of bias in 
weights may be introduced by the weighmaster in reading the "break" of 
the scales, either in favor of the producers or the buyers. A crude 
check for bias in weighing where the animals are weighed on scales with 
a five-pound interval may be made by comparing the ratio of the draft 
weights ending in five with those ending in zero. If no bias exists, 
the ratio will approximate 1:1. This ratio was approximated in this 
study as 51 percent of the weights ended with zero. There was no 
obvious departure from the ratio at either of the markets. 
Penning of animals 
The animals usually were penned on the basis of market class, 
weight groupings and breed characteristics. For example, lightweight 
beef steers generally were penned separately from the older, heavier 
weight beef steers. Likewise, the dairy-type steers were penned 
separately. In the selling operation all animals within a pen were 
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sold before sales began from another pen. Buyers queried on this 
practice favored it over the method of jumping from one class to 
another, one weight to another, etc., which exists at those markets 
where the order of sale is dependent upon the time of arrival or where 
each consignor is assigned pens. 
Grading 
Veal calves were graded in the regular scales at all markets 
except market 18. Veals were not graded at that market since all 
animals were sold individually. At five of the markets the veals were 
graded by state employees. All veals of the same grade and weight range 
were penned together and sold as a lot. Besides speeding the selling 
process, managers favored the practice of grading because it enabled 
them to solicit orders for veals by telephone thereby introducing 
additional competition in the market. While the graders normally did 
not officially grade any class other than veals, they did suggest what 
animals should be pooled together and sold as a lot. 
Size of lot 
The average number of animals sold per sale was 1.8, which 
reflects the prevalance of the practice of selling animals in groups at 
auctions in the area. The average size of lot varied by season, class 
and market. The number sold per lot average 1.6 in the fall and 2.5 
in the spring. Considering all classes, the average size of lot varied 
from 1.0 at market 18 to 2.6 at market 24. The average size of lot was 
largest for veals, followed by slaughter calves and steers. The number 
of veals sold per lot averaged from three to five at most markets, but 
the average size of lot was 14.2 at market 17 and 26.0 at market 24. 
Approximately 50 percent of the veals sold at market 17 and 75 percent 
of those sold at market 24 were sold in lots containing 50 or more 
animals. Practically all of the cows were sold as single animals. The 
association between size of lot and price is examined at a later stage 
of the analysis. 
Characteristics of Marketing"*" 
Complete sales data were obtained for 23,875 animals sold during 
the sales observed at the sample markets. The number and the 
characteristics of animals sold varied between markets and seasons= 
Breed 
The animals were classified as either beef type, dairy type or 
mixed type. With respect to breed type, 51 percent of the animals were 
classed as beef, 38 percent mixed and only 11 percent dairy. The 
variation in the proportion of beef-type animals by market class ranged 
from a low of 19 percent for veals to a high of 89 percent for steers. 
Seventy-four percent of the veals were considered to be mixed type; 
approximately 36 percent of the cows sold were classified as dairy type. 
The production of milk for manufacturing purposes is a major enterprise 
on many farms in the Southwest Virginia and Eastern Tennessee areas. 
Large numbers of mixed-type veals are produced and sold in the area as 
a result of breeding the cows to beef-type bulls. Dairy cow and mixed 
•*-The definitions used in classifying the animals with respect to 
breed type are presented on p. 37. 
54 
veal consignments were relatively larger at markets 17 and 24, which 
were located in that area. 
Market class 
On the basis of market class, the animals were distributed as 
follows: veals, 39 percent; slaughter calves, 17 percent; steers, 17 
percent; heifers* 10 percent; and cows, 17 percent. There was no 
apparent difference in the market class distribution between large and 
small markets. However, there was a sharp seasonal difference in the 
class distribution. The great dependence placed on pasture grazing 
as the major feed supply for cattle produced in the area is reflected 
in the wide seasonal variability in slaughter calf, steer and heifer 
consignments. As shown in Table 3, the average number of steers 
sold in the fall visits was nearly nine times larger than the number 
sold in the spring visits. There was, on the average, no more than a 
load of steers at the markets during the spring sales observed. 
Weight 
Within a market class the average weights were different for each 
breed, grade and season. Generally, the beef-type animals weighed more 
than the other breeds. The average weights were from 7 to 13 pounds 
heavier in the fall season, varying with the market class. In nearly 
all cases average weight increased as grade improved. The average 
weights by grade are presented in Table 4 for the market classes and 
breed types considered in the regression analysis. 
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Prime 201 225 273a - — - -
Choice 207 205 377 845 574 - -
Good 197 191 357 838 649 1040 -
Commercial 186 176 348 762 664 1031 1035 
Utility 199 163 342 672 638 932 985 
Cutter" 173 161 333 639 609 879 882 
Canner - - - 529 550 815 778 




auction operator classed this group of calves as "heavy" 
^Cull grade for veals and calves. 
Grade 
The average grade for each class differed by season and breed. 
The average grade for cows, top cutter, was essentially the same in 
both seasons. But the grades of all other classes averaged about one-
third higher in the spring than in the fall. The average grade of 
beef-type animals was more than a full grade better than for dairy-type 
animals. Beef steers averaged nearly two full grades better. There 
was little difference between the average grade of mixed veals and 
calves and similar animals of beef breeding. However, the average grade 
for beef-type animals in the other classes was approximately a whole 
grade superior to that of the mixed type. The grade distribution by 
market class, all breeds combined, is shown in Table 5. 
Dressing percentage 
The average estimates for dressing percentage varied by class, 
breed type, season and grade. However, the variation in averages was, 
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as expected, more closely associated with grade. The difference in 
average dressing percentage between classes for beef and dairy-type 
animals ranged from about six percent for veals and steers to a low of 
four percent for cows. But, as previously indicated, beef-type animals 
were usually at least a whole grade better than dairy-type animals. 
Dressing percentage estimates averaged about one percent higher during 
the fall observation period. The fact that except for veals the 
average grade was generally about one-third of a grade better in the 
fall season probably accounts for most of the seasonal difference in 
yield. While it was not possible to obtain the actual yield for the 
individual animals observed, several buyers contacted in the course 
of the study reported that the dressing percentage estimates were in 
line with their yield experience. Moreover, the estimates were 
reasonably consistent with those reported in other studies. 
Table 5. Proportion of Animals in Specified Grades by Market Class 
Grade 
Market Prime and 
class choice3 Good Commercial Utility Cutter" Canner 
Percent in grade 
Veals 29 29 26 11 5 None 
Calves 10 31 37 17 5 None 
Steers 6 26 38 26 3 1 
Heifers 5 23 34 28 8 2 
Cows None 2 10 29 31 28 
All classes 14 24 28 20 9 5 
aPrime and choice grades were pooled since there were only 54 
animals graded prime, of which 41 were veals and 11 were calves. 
^The lowest grade for veals and slaughter calves is cull; the 
proportion graded as "Culls" is included under the "Cutter" column in 
this table. 
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Buyer Purchase Patterns 
The identity of the buyer purchasing each animal or lot of animals 
was established at the time the price data were recorded officially. 
Buyers also were classified with respect to their type of operation, 
and in most cases the name of the firm represented was obtained. 
Average value of purchases 
The sales value of the cattle and calves observed in this study 
averaged nearly $25,000 per sale. The average value of purchases per 
sale by type of buyer is shown in Table 6. Packer purchasers accounted 
for 44 percent of the sales, on the average. Packer buyers were 
relatively more important at the larger auctions, accounting for approxi­
mately 50 percent of the purchases as compared to nearly 40 percent at 
the smaller markets. 
Table 6. Value of Cattle and Calves Sold and Percent Purchased by Type 
of Buyer 









Packer $ 696,433.30 $10,881.77 44 
Order 611,885.15 9,560.71 38 
Management 93,433.87 1,459.90 6 
Farmer 186,067.98 2,907.31 12 
All buyers $1 ,587,820.30 $24,809.69 100 
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Market class 
Forty-seven percent of the animals were bought by packer buyers, 
36 percent by order buyers, 7 percent by the auctions and 10 percent by 
farmers. However, these proportions varied by market, market class and 
season. Packer buyers purchased the largest proportion of all classes 
of cattle and calves, excepting steers, but their relative purchases 
were more pronounced for veals. Interestingly, auction management was 
much more active in purchasing veals than in any other class. As shown 
in Table 7, nearly half of all the steers sold were purchased by order 
buyers. Undoubtedly, some of the steers were purchased for feeding 
purposes rather than for slaughter. The ratio between packer and order 
purchases was approximately the same for slaughter calves, heifers and 
cows. Farmers were relatively more active in steers and purchased 
about equal proportions of slaughter calves and heifers. 
Grade 
Except for steers, packer buyers purchased 50 percent or more of 
the animals in all classes that were graded in the top three grades. 
The proportion of each quality level purchased by each type of buyer is 
shown in Table 7. The numbers opposite "all buyers" refer to the pro­
portion of a given class that was graded into the respective quality 
levels. The data in the extreme right hand column shows the proportion 
of respective classes purchased by the different types of buyers. 
Actual numbers of animals purchased by each type of buyer by grades and 
market classes are included in Appendix Table 44. 
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aPrime, choice and good grades for all classes excepting cows; 
good and commercial grades for cows. 
^Utility grade for cows; commercial and utility for all other 
classes. 
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Seasonality of purchases 
The proportion of animals of a given class purchased by the 
different buyers varied seasonally. The pattern was not the same for 
all classes. For example, the proportion of veals, heifers and cows 
purchased by packers was higher in the spring. Farmers' purchases 
accounted for a considerably larger proportion of steer and calf sales 
in the spring than in the fall. While the percent of veals purchased 
by management buyers showed a downward trend, the proportion bought 
within a year was highest in the fall season. Veal purchases by order 
buyers exhibited a slight upward trend during the course of the study, 
but the tendency was to purchase relatively larger numbers in the fall. 
The data in Table 8 show the percent of animals in each class purchased 
by type of buyer. The seasonal change in prices is reflected in the 
average carcass-weight equivalent prices also contained in the table. 
Average prices 
The average liveweight and carcass weight price paid for each 
class purchased by type of buyer are shown in Table 9. This table also 
shows the average proportion of each class purchased, the average grade 
and the average dressing percentage (yield) by type of buyer. The 
effect of differences in average dressing percentage is accounted for 
when prices are expressed in carcass weight equivalent prices, allowing 
for more direct price-grade comparisons. These data show that packers 
purchased the highest average grade of veals and calves at lower 
average carcass prices than the area average»* On the other hand, 
A higher grade score indicates a lower grade. 
Table 8. Distribution of Buyer Purchases by Market Class and Visit3 
Packer buyers Order buyers Management Farmers 
Carcass Carcass Carcass Carcass 
Visit Percent weight Percent weight Percent weight Percent weight 
no. bouqht price bouqht price bouqht price bouqht price 
Veals 
1 47.3 38.80 32.2 38.34 20.3 44.78 0.2 22.54 
2 47.9 38.91 27.1 38.17 23.5 44.29 1.5 24.12 
3 65.2 36.77 23.9 38.13 10.4 36.77 0.5 34.13 
4 69.3 41.17 16.7 39.76 12.5 38.28 1.5 35.31 
5 71.5 35.74 19.6 34.06 7.2 35.34 1.7 24.51 
6 52.2 36.23 37.0 35.79 9.0 32.68 1.8 27.27 
7 56.3 39.90 42.4 40.85 4.3 34.62 1.0 18.90 
8 59.0 40.30 35.8 39.58 4.2 40.61 1.0 34.98 
Calves 
1 56.3 26.96 26.7 26.35 10.0 35.30 7.0 26.88 
2 35.9 24.83 31.5 26.65 4.8 23.90 27.8 27.16 
3 42.0 32.81 23.6 30.02 0.8 32.74 33.6 38.04 
4 50.4 35.61 31.1 31.82 5.9 34.00 12.6 33.80 
5 45.1 25.32 46.3 26.94 1.4 25.99 7.2 26.06 
6 36.5 25.95 44.5 26.25 4.6 25.99 14.4 28.37 
7 20.6 31.39 47.6 33.09 3.2 31.15 28.6 33.94 
8 40.2 34.24 28.4 36.15 1.0 35.60 30.4 39.09 
Steers 
1 34.4 30.36 52.6 28.70 1.7 29.39 11.3 29.08 
2 32.0 28.00 34.9 27.60 5.5 27.58 27.6 30.33 
3 25.8 36.88 53.4 36.02 6.1 35.97 14.7 38.05 
4 18.6 34.78 54.9 33.57 3.0 33.16 23.5 39.57 
5 19.5 32.39 63.0 31.06 3.6 30.68 13.9 30.83 
6 21.0 30.92 47.9 30.49 7.3 30.34 23.8 30.92 
7 32.2 35.84 22.6 37.96 - - 45.2 39.67 
8 25.7 35.29 14.9 35.14 5.4 39.22 54.0 41.57 
3The data were computed using all animals in a market class irrespective of breed-type. 
Table 8. (Continued) 
Packer buyers Order buyers Management Farmers 
Carcass Carcass Carcass Carcass 
Visit Percent weight Percent weight Percent weight Percent weight 
no. bouqht price bought price bought price bought price 
Heifers 
1 42.6 25.66 40.8 23.09 2.4 21.32 14.2 24.93 
2 53.0 23.72 29.7 23.02 3.0 20.19 14.3 21.52 
3 53.7 31.45 27.2 28.76 5.5 29.21 13.6 30.29 
4 54.2 29.13 27.5 28.03 3.0 24.48 15.3 27.86 
5 39.5 24.29 39.9 24.05 2.6 23.14 18.0 23.08 
6 36.9 24.87 42.5 21.73 3.5 23.11 17.1 22.00 
7 47.0 30.89 19.2 28.92 2.0 26.29 31.8 31.33 
8 57.2 29.85 18.8 28.37 4.5 30.77 19.5 30.39 
:>ws 
"l 58.0 20.12 34.5 18.64 5.4 20.11 2.1 17.97 
2 39.4 17.52 46.4 17.42 5.9 16.56 8.3 17.65 
3 52.3 26.19 35.5 24.79 0.5 17.68 11.7 25.20 
4 62.9 25.46 23.9 24.83 3.2 24.80 10.0 24.91 
5 39.5 18.43 48.1 18.50 4.6 17.86 7.8 18.74 
6 39.4 16.39 43.3 16.07 4.6 15.74 12.7 17.24 
7 66.9 25.38 22.8 25.39 4.3 24.67 6.0 25.00 
8 62.3 25.51 29.8 24.67 0.6 23.96 7.3 25.73 
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Table 9. Average Grade, Yield and Price of Animals by Market Class 
and Type of Buyer - Pooled over All Visits 
Weighted Average 
Class and No. of Percent Weight Price 
type buyer animals bought Grade Yield Live Carcass Live Carcasi 
Veals 
Packer3 5543 59.4 8.7 55.3 187.2 103.5 $21.23 $38.42 
Order 2673 28.6 8.9 54.7 189.7 103.7 20.96 38.34 
Management 1018 10.9 9.4 53.8 192.2 103.4 21.45 39.86 
Farmer0 106 1.1 13.7 48.4 174.9 84.7 13.63 28.15 
All buyers 9340 100.0 8.9 54.9 188.3 103.3 21.10 38.46 
Calves 
Packer 1660 41.1 9.6 53.5 339.3 181.6 14.21 26.55 
Order 1536 38.1 10.6 52.3 344.3 179.9 14.11 27.00 
Management 183 4.5 10.0 53.0 308.4 163.3 14.96 28.24 
Farmer 656 16.3 11.4 51.4 368.2 189.3 14.88 28.93 
All buyers 4035 100.0 10.3 52.6 344.5 181.4 14.32 27.19 
Steers 
Packer 1055 25.9 10.0 53.7 799.2 429.3 16.49 30.71 
Order 1981 48.6 11.2 52.5 772.8 406.0 15.86 30.19 
Management 194 4.8 10.4 53.1 826.7 439.1 15.74 29.64 
Farmer 844 20.7 11.7 51.7 658.3 340.4 16.39 31.70 
All buyers 4074 100.0 10.9 52.7 758.4 400.0 16.12 30.57 
Heifers 
Packer 1047 44.5 11.3 51.0 657.1 335.2 13.36 26.19 
Order 826 35.1 11.6 50.9 632.4 322.1 12.10 23.76 
Management 74 3.1 11.7 50.6 601.3 304.3 12.10 23.92 
Farmer 407 17.3 12.5 50.2 608.0 305.0 12.41 24.74 
All buyers 2354 100.0 11.6 50.8 638.2 324.4 12.73 25.04 
Cows 
Packer 1953 48.0 16.0 45.6 889.4 405.9 9.47 20.75 
Order 1600 39.3 16.3 45.5 900.0 409.5 8.66 19.04 
Management 173 4.2 16.9 44.1 880.6 388.5 8.14 18.44 
Farmer 346 8.5 16.3 45.4 811.8 368.2 9.03 19.90 
All buyers 4072 100.0 16.2 45.5 886.6 403.4 9.06 19.91 
^Includes local slaughterers. 
^Includes speculators. 
^Includes others not classified. 
packers paid higher than average prices for heifers and cows that were 
essentially the same grade as the area average. Management paid higher 
than average prices for veals and calves of essentially the same grades 
as the average consignment. Management paid the lowest price for steers, 
considering quality, than any other buyer. Farmers paid at least one 
dollar more per hundred for steers of lower quality, 
Concentration of purchases 
The number of buyers purchasing at a market generally was about 
twice as large in the fall as in the spring. A large part of the 
difference in number of buyers between seasons, and in most cases be­
tween markets within a size group, was accounted for by increases in 
the number of farmers purchasing. An average of 50 buyers purchased 
at the large markets in the fall and 20 in the spring. The number of 
buyers purchasing at the small markets averaged 27 in the fall and 17 
in the spring. The number of buyers at a market tended to be positively 
Table 10. Percent of Animals Bought by Five Largest Buyers by 
Market and Visit 
Market 
Visit All 
visits 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
17 37 36 84 86 63 65 89 82 61 
18 97 83 93 95 89 96 93 87 77 
19 75 74 88 93 80 50 79 87 75 
20 47 39 84 82 63 61 91 87 62 
21 44 39 72 58 37 42 55 69 44 
22 44 55 76 87 64 59 95 86 65 
23 54 27 53 68 54 38 62 53 53 
24 80 76 96 95 69 76 97 96 86 
All 
markets 52 47 82 84 62 58 79 87 -
related with the number of cattle and calves sold. As a general rule, 
most of the animals were purchased by the five largest buyers. As shown 
in Table 10, the average proportion bought by the five largest buyers 
ranged from 44 percent at market 21 to 86 percent at market 24. Both 
of these markets were classed as large markets. The proportion pur­
chased by the five largest buyers tended to be slightly greater at the 
small markets. These larger buyers purchased a considerably higher 
proportion of the marketings in the spring than in the fall. Perhaps 
the large number of veals sold in a relatively few large sized lots 
accounts for a major share of the difference. 
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REGRESSION OF GRADE AND PRICE 
Grade generally is considered the most important variable affecting 
the value of cattle within a market class. This section includes an 
analysis of the association between grade and price for the animals 
included in this study. In the first stages of the analysis the data 
were examined by graphical methods. A series of scatter diagrams were 
prepared relating the price received to the respective grade for each 
sales lot. The grade-price data for animals in the various market class 
and market strata were plotted on separate graphs.* The scatter 
diagrams showed a pattern of positive relationship between grade and 
price. A linear relationship was indicated, in most cases, by the dis­
tribution of the data around a "free-hand fitted" straight line. 
However, there was considerable variation about the line and the 
relationship appeared to be different among the market classes and 
between markets. Since it was not possible to determine these relation­
ships precisely from the graphs, least squares regression techniques 
were used to derive more definitive and meaningful measures of the 
association between grade and price. 
o 
Single Variable Linear Regression Model 
The general regression model chosen for the analysis postulates a 
Since the majority of the animals observed were classed as beef 
type, only seven market class-breed type combinations were included in 
the statistical analysis. The seven combinations included beef-type 
veal calves, slaughter calves, steers, heifers and cows plus mixed-type 
veal calves and dairy-type cows. 
^Bernard Ostle. Statistics in research. The Iowa State College 
Press, Ames, Iowa. 1952. The statistical theory and computational 
procedures used in this section were taken from Chapter 6. 
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linear functional relationship between price and grade of the form 
Y = P0 + + £ where: 
Y is the price per hundredweight, 
X is the coded grade of a lot of livestock sold on a market,^ 
is the Y intercept representing the hypothetical price of an 
animal of grade 0, 
is the effect of a unit change in grade and 
£ is the random error which measures the lack of fit of the linear 
relationship between price and grade. This random variable is normally 
and independently distributed with zero mean and variance o^. 
The parameters of the model were estimated by single variable 
linear regression equations fitted by the method of least squares, 
yielding the equation A 
Y = bo + bjxj. 
where bQ and b^ are estimates of (30 and j3]_ respectively.^ In addition 
to the equations other important statistics computed were: the coef­
ficient of determination (R^) which indicates the proportion of variation 
explained by the regression; the estimated residual variance (s^e); and 
the estimated standard error of estimate (se)» 
Estimation Equations 
A total of 153 least squares estimation equations were calculated 
representing all possible combinations of the stratification variables, 
*Each one-third grade equals one grade point (1.0); grade quality 
declines as the numerical coded value (1...21) increases» 
^The function of b0 is to allow for a non-zero price at the origin. 
i.e., types cf buyers, market class-breed groups and markets.^ A 
complete list of the equations together with the standard error (se) 
9 2 
and the R values were placed in Appendix Table 46. 
An estimated price for an animal or sales lot can be derived by 
inserting a coded grade value in the applicable estimation equation. As 
an example, consider the following four equations for estimating the 
price of mixed-type veal calves. The first equation is for veals pur­
chased by packer buyers at market 17, which is a large Virginia auction. 
The second equation applies to veals purchased by order buyers at the 
same market. The third equation estimates the price paid for veals by 
packer buyers at another large Virginia auction, and the fourth equation 
applies to veals purchased by packer buyers at a small market in West 
Virginia, The estimated price for mixed veals of average choice grade 
and top utility grade are as follows. 
3 Estimating equations Average choice Top utility 
(1) Y = 29.43 - .9433X $24.71 $17.17 
(2) Y = 31.73 - 1.2605X 25.33 15.34 
(3) Y = 28.25 - .9326X 23.59 16.13 
(4) Y = 35.09 - 1.4570X 27.80 16.15 
•'•The maximum possible number of equations was 224. The maximum 
was reduced to 153 because (a) all types of buyers (4) were not repre­
sented at all markets (8), (b) all market class-breed combinations (7) 
were not purchased by all types of buyers, and/or (c) there was an 
insufficient number of observations in the strata. 
2 
For convenience, appearance and consistency, the coefficient of 
determination is symbolized as R^ for both the single and the multiple 
regression equations. 
^The coded value of average choice grade is 5; top utility is 13. 
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Practically all of the mixed-type veals observed in the study 
fell within the quality level of the range of grades assumed in the 
preceding illustration. The estimates indicate that price differences 
between markets were much narrower for the lower quality animals. It 
should be remembered that these estimates are valid only for animals 
within the range of grades actually observed. Moreover, prices 
estimated from the equations are only estimates and are subject to error. 
The error is a function of the residual variance (s^ ).^ Generally 
speaking, the variance of an estimated price would become smaller as 
the grade of the animal considered approached the average for the 
strata in which the animal was classified. 
Price Variation Explained by Regression 
In regression analysis the coefficient of determination, denoted as 
2 R in this analysis, is a measure of the variation explained by the re-
2 o 
gression. More precisely, the R in this section expresses the pro­
portion of total variation in price explained by the regression equation. 
The single variable regression equations with grade as the only 
independent variable failed to explain a large part of the price varia­
tion for the animals included in the analysis. The relatively poor 
performance of the equations does not necessarily refute the hypothesis 
that grade is the most important variable affecting the price of cattle. 
-*-R. Lo Anderson and T. A. Bancroft. Statistical theory in 
research. McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, New York. 1952. See page 203 
for the exact expression for the variance of an estimated or predicted 
price. 
2 Also termed multiple correlation coefficient in some texts. 
But the results do indicate that the buyers in making their price 
decisions gave strong consideration to other variables. A significance 
o 
test of the R was made for each of the 153 equations. The test 
indicated that almost all of the equations produced a significant 
reduction in the variation of price.* Despite the large number of 
statistical significances, from a practical viewpoint most of the 
equations did not explain a sufficient amount of variation in price to 
be very useful as an analytical model. 
o 
R values by market class 
Only 23 of the 153 equations explained 50 percent or more of the 
variation in price, and 14 of them were equations describing either 
beef or mixed-type veal calves. Four of the 17 equations involving 
mixed-type veal calves explained more than 70 percent of the variation 
in price. Only one equation for beef-type veals and one for mixed-type 
veals failed to reduce price variation to a significant degree. Both 
of these equations described purchases by farmers at market 17 and in­
volved a small number of animals. The farmers likely purchased the 
animals for feeding purposes rather than slaughter purposes and, in so 
doing, may have paid more attention to the size, condition and color of 
the calf than to the grade. The fact that most of the veal calves were 
graded and sold in pen-lots may account for the larger amount of variation 
in price explained by the equations for veal calves. 
-'•The standard "F" test procedures were used. The R^  values with 
the level of significance indicated are included in Appendix Table 46. 
In many cases the large number of observations in the equations probably 
contributed to statistical significance and in other equations the limited 
number of observations may have been a major reason for non-significance. 
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About two-thirds of the equations involving slaughter calves failed 
to explain more than 20 percent of the variation in price. In fact, the 
O 
R value exceeded 33 percent for only one of the 25 equations describing 
slaughter calves. Moreover, 29 percent of the R2 that tested non­
significant were for slaughter calf equations. 
Slightly more than a third of the R2 values for the steer equations 
exceeded 30 percent. In fact, one-third of the equations for steers 
tested non-significant. 
2 
Only two of the R values for heifer equations did not test signi­
ficant. Four of the 24 equations for heifers reduced the variation in 
price by 50 percent or more. But the R^ values for six of the equations 
were less than 20 percent. 
Figure 3 shows the frequency distribution of the R values by 
market classes. Since the distribution of the R2 values for beef and 
dairy cows was essentially the same, they were pooled into a single 
graph so that all distribution could be presented on a single page. 
About 10 percent of the equations involving cows explained 50 percent 
or more of the variation in price, but 10 of the 48 cow equations did 
not significantly reduce the variation in price. 
R2 by markets 
Considering equations for all buyers and market classes, the 
number of non-significant equations ranged from only one at large market 
21 to eight at small market 22. Thirty percent or more of the R2 
for equations at markets IS, 22 and 24 did not test significant. 
Approximately 50 percent of the equations at markets 22 and 24 explained 
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o 
less than 20 percent of the variation in price. The R value exceeded 
20 percent for all but one equation describing purchases at market 21. 
2 R by type of buyer 
Only four of the 153 equations explained 70 percent or more of 
the variation in price; three of the four were equations describing 
purchases by order buyers. Order buyers also had the fewest number of 
2 
R values less than 20 percent. In contrast, 8 of the 17 equations 
for auction management buyers and 16 of the 37 equations for farmers 
explained less than 20 percent of the variation in price. Figure 4 
shows the frequency distribution of R^ by type of buyer. These data 
indicate that the equations involving purchases by order buyers tended 
to explain variation in price to a greater extent than the equations 
for other types of buyers. Grade was not very important in explaining 
price variation for animals purchased by the auction management; in 
nearly 50 percent of the cases less than 20 percent of the variation 
was explained. Yet the R^ value for equations describing the cows and 
mixed veals purchased by management buyers was often larger than for 
other types of buyers. 
A more intensive analysis of the 31 R^ values that did not test 
significant reveals that of the 17 equations describing purchases by 
management buyers, 9 were not significant. Management buyers purchased 
slaughter calves at three markets and heifers at two markets, and in 
2 
all cases the R values for the equations were not significant. Like-
o 
wise, three of the four R values for equations describing management 
purchases of steers did not test significant. 
74 





0  L  
P A C K E R  B U Y E R S  
N U M B E R  
20. 
J 




O R D E R  B U Y E R S  
0-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 






M  A N  A G E  M E N T  
0-19 20-29 30-3940-49 50-59 





F A R M E R S  
0-19 20-2930-39 40-4950-59 
Figure 4. Frequency Distribution of R Values by Type of Buyer, 
Single Variable Model 
75 
Regression Coefficients for Grade 
An individual regression coefficient for grade may be interpreted 
as expressing the effect of a one-third grade change on the estimated 
price for an animal or sales lot. For example, in the equations 
previously used for illustration a one-third grade change for mixed-type 
veals in equation (l) was associated with a change of $ .9433 in the 
estimated price, and a similar change in grade for veals described by 
equation (4) produced a change of $1.4570 in price. 
Grade coefficients by market class 
As shown in Figure 5, the frequency distribution of the grade 
coefficients tended to be different for the various breed type-market 
class combinations. Since the grade coefficients for beef and dairy 
cows were quite similar, they were pooled in order that all of the class 
distributions could be presented on a single page. One hundred and 
forty-five of the 153 grade coefficients have negative signs. Since 
grade quality declines as the numerical grade code becomes greater, a 
negative sign on the grade coefficient means that price and grade were 
positively related. 
The eight equations with positive grade coefficients, indicating a 
decline in price with an improvement in grade, were distributed by 
market class as follows: steers, three; cows, three; heifers, one; 
and slaughter calves, one. Half of the equations with positive valued 
coefficients described 20 or fewer animal observations; the number of 
observations in all equations with positive regression coefficients 
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was only 215 or about two percent of all observations included in the 
analysis. The value of the grade coefficients with positive signs 
ranked from +.0061 for beef cows purchased by farmers at small market 
number 22 to +.4021 for steers purchased by the management at small 
market 23. Seventy-five percent of the grade coefficients with positive 
signs were in equations describing observations at small markets. How­
ever, two of the three grade coefficients for steer equations with 
positive signs referred to purchases by packer and order buyers at large 
1 
market 24. The value of the grade coefficients with positive signs 
was such that a whole grade change would not have affected the estimated 
price by more than 65 cents per hundredweight in five of the eight 
equations and would have exceeded $1.00 in only one case. 
In all but four of the equations describing purchases by either 
beef-type or mixed-type veal calves, an improvement in quality by a 
whole grade change would have resulted in an estimated improvement in 
price of $2.00 or more. The estimated difference in price for a whole 
grade change in quality exceeded $3.50 for the four equations with the 
largest grade coefficients involving mixed veal calves. In the majority 
of the slaughter calf equations, the estimated price difference for a 
full grade difference in quality ranged from $1.00 to $2.00 per hundred­
weight. A full grade change in quality would have produced an estimated 
change in price for steers of less than $1.00 in nearly a third of the 
"While market 24 was classed as a large market, it ranked sixth 
among the markets in the number of steers sold, (Table 2, p. 49.) 
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equations. But in most cases a full grade change in quality of steers, 
heifers and cows would have produced a $1.50 to $2.00 change in estimated 
price. 
Distribution of coefficients by markets 
The grade coefficients tended to be slightly higher at the larger 
markets, although no sharp distinction was evident. The modal value of 
the regression coefficients was from 40 to 60 cents at most markets, 
meaning that a whole grade change in the quality of an animal would have 
resulted in a price change of approximately $1.25 to $2.00 per hundred­
weight. However, the regression coefficients for about 30 percent of 
the equations for animals sold at markets 19 and 21 were such that the 
price difference between whole grades would have ranged from about $2.50 
to more than $3.50. 
Grade coefficients by type of buyer 
The grade coefficients for equations describing purchases by packer 
and order buyers indicate that they generally differentiated between 
grades in the prices paid to a greater extent than either management or 
farmer buyers. Seventy-five percent of the grade coefficients with 
values of $1.00 or more were associated with animals purchased by order 
buyers. The values of the grade coefficients indicate that in most cases 
farmers would differentiate between adjacent whole grades by more than 
$2.00. Only a third of the grade coefficients for farmers and manage­
ment buyers had values exceeding 60 cents. Figure 6 shows the 
distribution of the regression coefficients for grade by type of buyer. 
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Residual Variation 
As previously indicated, the residual variance (s e^) was computed 
for each regression equation. The variances were transformed into 
standard errors (sg) so that the unexplained variation in price could 
be expressed in dollars and cents terms for easier interpretation. 
The standard errors are shown with the equations in Appendix Table 46. 
A standard error is a measure of the variation in price around the 
estimated regression line and the interpretation placed on it is 
analagous to that normally applied to the standard deviation. 
An over-all look at the standard errors shows that 61 percent of 
the values ranged from $1.50 to $2.49; eight percent were less than 
$1.50 and four percent exceeded $3.50. About 65 percent of the values 
for beef and mixed-type veals and 83 percent of the values for steers 
ranged from $2.00 to $2.99. Eighty-eight percent of the standard 
errors for equations involving heifers and beef cows were valued from 
$1.50 to $2.49, and approximately 67 percent of the standard errors 
for dairy cows ranged from $0.70 to $2.00. The variation in the 
value of the standard errors was widest for slaughter calves. There 
was no apparent association between the value of the standard error and 
the size of the market. However, the number of relatively large 
standard errors was greatest at those markets where veal calf marketings 
represented a larger share of the total number of sales. Management 
buyers had more relatively small as well as more relatively large 
standard errors than any other type of buyer. 
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Analysis of Variance of Regression Coefficients 
The analysis of the regression equations and related statistics, 
to this point, has suggested the presence of certain general 
differences among the different strata. But it has not been determined 
whether these apparent differences were sufficiently small to allow the 
groups to be pooled into a smaller number of classificatory groups. If 
the strata could be justifiably pooled$ a sharp reduction would be made 
in the number of regression equations, and related statistics, required 
to adequately describe the data. 
Two statistical hypotheses concerning the regression coefficients 
were tested to determine whether the data in the various strata could 
be legitimately pooled. The two hypotheses tested were: (l) One 
regression equation can be used to describe all observations, and 
( 2 )  A l l  r e g r e s s i o n  l i n e s  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  d a t a  h a v e  t h e  s a m e  s l o p e ,  i . e . ,  
Pi — « * — {3^. The first hypothesis is more general in that both the 
slope and the intercept of the regression line are considered. 
The methods and procedures in performing the calculations and in 
making the tests as outlined by Ostle* are reproduced in Table 11, and 
an example of the procedures followed using the data for market 21 is 
provided in Table 12. 
Can one regression line be used for all observations? 
Because of the nature of the problem, it is extremely unlikely 
that all of the observations could be justifiably pooled into a single 
*Ostle, , pp. 133-138. 
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large sample. However, if it is possible to pool all observations 
within one of the three classificatory variables* a considerable 
reduction can be made in the number of equations required to describe 
the data. The analytical procedure followed in testing the hypothesis 
was to examine the possibility for pooling the observations (l) for 
all types of buyers purchasing the same market class of animals at 
each market, (2) for each type of buyer purchasing the same market class 
of animals at all markets and (3) for each type of buyer at each market 
for all animals irrespective of market class,^ The test applied was 
(ST-S1)/2(k-l) 
F = -g- —--- » 
SJL/CS nj_ - 2k) 
j=l 
where: 
ST refers to the residual sum of squares from fitting one 
regression equation for all of the data in the k groups and 
Si refers to the pooled residual sum of squares from fitting 
o 
one equation for each of the k groups. The hypothesis that one 
regression line could be used to describe all observations was re­
jected if the F-ratio was significant at the five percent level of 
probability. 
The strata combinations examined for possibilities of pooling in 
the order considered may be defined as (l) pooling over buyers, (2) 
pooling over markets and (3) pooling over classes» 
S^ee Table 11 for the necessary- calculations to derive the 
essential statistics required for the test® 











1 n^-1 A1 B1 Cl CI-BI/AI n^ -2 
2 n2-l A2 B2 c 2  C2—B2/A2 n2~2 
k nk-i Ak Bk ck ck-Bk/»k n%-2 
CW=& Ci 
i=l 




















groups k-1 AM=AT-AW BM=BT~BW CM=CT-CW S3=CM-B /^AM k-2 Sa/(k-2) 
Total & ni~l 
i=l 
AT BT cr ST=CT-B^ /AT $ nj-2 
i—1 
Ai=§^(X.^-X.)^ = corrected sum of squares of X 
3=1 13 1 
Bi=zf"(X- 4-X. ) (Yjj-Yj) = corrected sum of products 
j=l J 
nj[ — 2 
C j= Z  ( Y . )  =  c o r r e c t e d  s u m  o f  s q u a r e s  o f  Y  
j=l 1J 
ST=S1+S2-fS3+S4 A?=& (X..-X)2 
i-l j-1 J 
%=& 21 (X -X)(Y..-Y) S4=ST-(S1+S2+S3) 
1=1 j=l 1J 




10stle, op. cit.. p. 135. 
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Table 12. Analysis of Variance of Regression Coefficients, Market 21 
Buyer 
breed Degrees Degrees 
class of S%2 Sxy Sy^  ssE of Mean 
code freedom freedom sauare 
1 1 1  76 819 -672.31 1562.81 1010.91 75 13.48 
1 1 2  201 1071 -185.70 794.22 762.02 200 3.81 
1 1 3  357 1658 -950.76 1972.97 1427.77 356 4.01 
1 1 4  201 1059 -701.26 1301.76 837.39 200 4.19 
1 1 5 205 2083 -889.54 1051.92 672.05 204 3.29 
12 5 114 927 -369.73 513.69 366.22 113 3.24 
13 1 48 372 -432.52 882.24 379.36 47 8.07 
2 1 1 33 361 -418.16 823.36 338.99 32 1.15 
2 12 123 746 -238.42 933.25 857.05 122 7.02 
2 13 219 1624 -1064.46 1797.58 1099.87 218 5.05 
2 14 58 284 -159.99 327.41 237.28 57 4.16 
2 1 5 63 481 -315.05 456.38 250.03 62 4.03 
2 2 5 44 295 -174.83 298.03 195.42 43 4.54 
2 3 1 31 219 -231.60 485.98 241.06 30 8.04 
3 13 12 29 -22.70 77.15 59.38 11 5.39 
4 12 24 200 -160.59 569.34 440.40 23 19.15 
4 13 63 371 -316.23 954.53 684.99 62 11.05 
4 14 47 345 -207.94 566.37 441.03 46 9.59 
4 15 40 196 -128.85 255.22 170.53 39 4.37 
4 2 5 12 86 -43.73 49.50 27.27 11 2.48 
10499.02 1951 5.38 
Within 
groups 1971 13226 -7684.37 15673.73 11209.09 1970 5.69 
Among 
groups 19 8556 -10342.30 18277.48 5775.95 18 320.89 
Total 1990 21782 -18026.67 33951.23 19032.29 1989 9.57 
Example of tests of hypotheses 
1. Hq: One regression line can be used to describe all observations. 
=41.74** (d.f. = 38 and 1951) 
Conclusion: Reject hypothesis. 
2. H0: All regression lines have the same slope, i.e., pi= . . «jB^. 
F= 21*3! =6.95** (d.f. = 19 and 1951) 
5.38 
Conclusion: Reject hypothesis. 
Potential for pooling buyers» Conceptually, at least, the 
expected differences between types of buyers purchasing the same 
market class of animals at a market would be smaller than the 
differences among other possible combinations of the classificatory 
variables. If the observations for all types of buyers could be 
pooled into a single equation for each market class observed at an 
individual market, the number of equations would be reduced from 153 
to a maximum of 56. Because certain classes were not observed at 
some markets and at other markets certain classes were purchased by 
only one type of buyer, the test could be applied to only 50 possible 
combinations. Of the 50 groups investigated, 27 were significant at 
the one percent level and three others were significant at the five 
percent level of probability. Thus, the hypothesis was rejected for 
30 of the 50 groups tested. The 20 groups which failed to test 
significant were distributed among classes and between markets in 
such a fashion that the buyers for any market class of animals could 
not be pooled at all markets. However, the potential for pooling was 
greater for beef or mixed veals and heifers than for the other market 
classes. For example, except at markets 18 and 23, the hypothesis 
would not have been rejected for groups involving beef-type veals. 
Non-significance was noted for mixed-type veals at markets 19, 20, 
23 and 24.* Four of the seven possible combinations involving heifers 
*Since only one type of buyer purchased mixed-type veals at 
market 22, the test could not be applied. However, if the hypothesis 
was not rejected and the decision was made to disregard the type of 
buyer classification, at least one equation would still be required un 
less the class could be pooled either over all markets or with other 
classes within a market. 
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one group involving slaughter calves and steers and three groups for 
beef cows and dairy cows did not test significant. 
Potential for pooling across markets. With a few exceptions, 
the results of the tests to determine whether an equation for each 
type of buyer and market class would apply to the respective obser­
vations at all markets showed significance at the one percent level 
of probability. Thus, pooling the data in this manner could not 
be statistically justified. The groups involving purchases of slaughter 
calves and dairy cows by management buyers did not test significant. 
Two of the remaining non-significant combinations described purchases 
of beef and dairy cows by farmers. The hypothesis that a single 
equation could be used to describe observations on heifers purchased 
by order buyers at all markets would not have been rejected by the 
statistical criteria. 
Potential for combining all observations at each market. The 
possibility of using only one equation to describe all purchases by 
each type of buyer at each market was investigated. Since the 
management at market 17 did not purchase any animals and a specific 
type of buyer purchased only a single market class of animals at 
three of the markets, the test could be applied to only 27 possible 
combinations. Except for purchases by the management at market 20, 
all groups tested highly significant.1 The hypothesis was rejected 
^Relatively few purchases were made by the management, and the 
animals mostly were feeder animals purchased on order. 
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since the results show that poolings in this manner would not be 
justifiable on the basis of the statistical criteria employed.1 
Are the slopes of all regression lines the same?2 
The second hypothesis tested may be stated in the form of the 
above question. To accept the hypothesis means that the slope of the 
regression lines - the values of the regression coefficient for 
grade - were not significantly different among the strata groups con­
sidered at the chosen level of probability. If for a specified 
combination of strata groups the first hypothesis is rejected and the 
second hypothesis is not, the interpretation is that the significance 
noted in the first instance may not be attributed to differences in 
the slope of the regression lines compared. Alternately, the most 
probable reason for significance in such cases is that the level of 
the regression lines - the intercepts - were different among the 
strata groups under investigation. 
The significance test for the hypothesis was 
S2/(k-l) 
F = — 
k 
SX/(2 ni - 2k) 
j=l 
where: 
The denominator of the ratio is the same as used in testing the 
The results were not surprising since it is a generally 
accepted fact that the meat industry clearly distinguishes between 
market classes of cattle and calves. 
^Ostle points out that this test (and succeeding ones not 
considered here) are usually considered if the first hypothesis is 
rejected because of the interest in knowing the reason for the 
significance. 
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first hypothesis and 
Sg is thn residual sum of squares obtained from fitting a 
common slope and k intercepts to the data for each of the k groups.* 
The groups were tested for significance in the same order followed 
in testing the first hypothesis. 
Potential for pooling buyers. Fourteen of the 50 groups 
examined tested significant, which was slightly less than half the 
number significant for the first hypothesis. This means that there 
was a significant difference in the slope of the lines for the buyers 
included in the market-market class groups compared5 and these 
differences contributed to the significances observed in testing the 
first hypothesis. Moreover, the hypothesis is rejected with the 
conclusion that the observations within the significant groups cannot 
be justifiably pooled. Market 19 was the only market at which there 
was a significant difference in the slope of the regression line for 
the different types of buyers purchasing either beef or mixed veals. 
There was not a significant difference in the slope of the line among 
the types of buyers purchasing slaughter calves at any market, excepting 
markets 21 and 22. Similarly, market 21 was the only place at which 
a significant difference was detected in the slope of buyers purchasing 
heifers. There was a significant difference in the slope of buyers 
purchasing steers at all markets, excepting market 24. Markets 17, 23 
and 24 were the only markets where there was not a significant 
difference among the different buyers purchasing beef cows. On the 
*S2 is formed by subtraction, i.e., S2 = (S]+S2) - S^. 
other hand, the slope of buyers purchasing dairy-type cows was not 
significant except at market 17. Thus, if adjustments were made for 
possible differences in intercepts, the hypothesis that all buyers 
purchasing beef-type veals, mixed-type veals, heifers and dairy cows 
at an individual market, except in the two instances previously 
noted, would not have been rejected on the basis of the results of 
the statistical test criteria. Alternately, the potential for 
pooling all observations within these classes, irrespective of type of 
buyer, was greater than for slaughter calves, steers and heifers. 
Potential for pooling across markets. The slope of the regression 
lines describing packer buyers' purchases of slaughter calves, steers, 
heifers, beef cows and dairy cows were significantly different between 
markets. VJhile the F-ratio for mixed-type veals purchased by packer 
buyers approached significance, that group and the group representing 
beef-type veals did not test significant at the five percent probability 
level. Differences between the slope of the regression lines relating 
grade and price for steers, beef cows, dairy cows and mixed veals 
purchased by order buyers tested significant at the markets observed. 
But the slopes for beef-type veals, slaughter calves and heifers 
purchased by order buyers did not test significantly different, although 
the F-value approached significance at the five percent level for the 
first two classes mentioned. The hypothesis would not have been 
rejected for half of the classes purchased by management buyers. While 
there was a significant difference between the slopes for steers, beef 
cows and mixed veals purchased by the management, the F-values were 
considerably smaller than those for packer and order buyers and none 
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were significant at the one percent level. Except for steers, the 
differences in slopes between markets were not significant for any 
market class purchased by farmers. In summary, exactly half of the 
groups tested significant, indicating that on the basis of slopes alone 
the pooling of the groups in the manner considered could not be 
justified on the basis of the statistical criteria. 
Potential for pooling market classes. The slopes of the 
regression lines were significantly different among the market classes 
purchased by packer buyers at all markets.^ But the fact that the 
observations aggregated without regard for market class tested 
significant was not surprising since the meat trade distinguishes 
carcasses from the different classes not only in a physical sense but 
also in the nature of prices. Markets 18 and 22 were the only markets 
at which the slopes for the various market classes purchased by order 
buyers did not test significant. In fact, none of the buyer groups 
tested significant at market 18. Where it was possible to make the 
test, the difference in slopes among market classes purchased by 
management buyers was not significant at any market except number 24. 
The non-significance pattern applied to purchases by farmers at all 
markets other than market 21, indicating a tendency on their part to 
maintain approximately the same grade-price differential, irrespective 
of the class of animals purchased. 
Since packer buyers purchased only one class of animals at 
market 18, it was not possible to test the significance for packer 
purchases at that market. 
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MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF CATTLE PRICES 
While grade is considered the most important variable affecting 
the price of cattle and calves, other variables undoubtedly exert an 
influence on cattle values. As shown in the preceding section, the 
regression model with grade as the single independent variable failed 
to explain an appreciable amount of the variations in price for animals 
observed in this study. Moreover, the amount of price variability 
"explained" varied considerably among the classification groups studied. 
The analysis in this section is based on a more complex statistical 
model including, in addition to grade, certain other variables that on 
the basis of economic logic and prior empirical observations were ex­
pected to affect both the level and the variability of prices for cattle 
and calves sold at auctions. The additional variables included in the 
model were carcass weight, dressing percentage, liveweight and a linear 
time trend (visit number).1 
Multiple Regression Model 
The method of multiple regression analysis affords a technique for 
determining the effect of selected independent variables (X^) on the de­
pendent variable (Y). The regression coefficients (b^) derived in multple 
regression analysis are estimates of the change in value of the dependent 
variable given a unit change in a specified independent variable, 
•'•Since the reasons for including the selected variables were 
stated in the procedure section, pp. 26-28, they will not be restated 
at this point. 
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assuming no change in the remaining independent variables. The linear 
multiple regression model selected was 
Y 
= P0^ lxl^ 2)^ 3x3^ 4X4^ 5X5+« 
The parameters of the model were estimated by least squares 
regression equations of the form 
Y =b^ biXi+bgX2+b3Xg+b^ +b^  
where 
is the coded grade of a lot of livestock sold on a market 
(l, 2, 3...21); an increasing numerical value is associated with a 
decline in grade quality; 
Xg is weight of carcass (in pounds); 
X3 is dressing percentage (in percent); 
X4 is liveweight of animal (in pounds); 
Xtj is coded value for visit (l, 2...8). 
The coefficients are estimated by b^ where 
b0 is the Y intercept representing the hypothetical price of 
animal of zero grade;1 
bj is change in price associated with a unit change in grade 
(one-third grade); 
bg is the change in price associated with a pound change in 
carcass weight; 
bg is the change in price associated with a one percent change 
*The function of b0 is to allow for a non-zero price at the 
origins 
^Grade quality declines as the coded grade value increases. 
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in dressing percentage; 
fc>4 is the change in price associated with a one pound change 
in the liveweight of the animal ; 
is the change in price associated with a change in the order 
of visits (1,2...8), 
The random error (6 ) measures the lack of fit of the linear 
relationship between price and the five independent variables (X^, X^... 
Xc,) and is assumed to be normally and independently distributed with 
p r\ 
zero mean and variance cr . The population cr is estimated by the 
sample residual variance (s2e). 
Computational Procedures 
The stratifications outlined in the single variable model of the 
preceding section were kept intact for the multiple regression analysis. 
The analysis included the estimates of the regression coefficients (b^), 
the coefficient of determination (R2), and the residual variance (s2e). 
The statistical significances of the regressions were tested by the 
usual analysis of variance.1 The standard t-test procedures were used 
to determine the significance level of the individual regression 
coefficients (b^). All of the computations were originally made on 
i . „ Sum of squares due to regression/k 
4 (k, n-k-1) =- ——
Residual sum of squares/ (n-k-1) 
where k is the number of variables (five in this case) and n is the 
number of observations in the regression group. 
2t (n-k-1 ) = bj/ \ fc$\ s2e Where c^ is the diagonal element 
for the ith group of th'e inverse of the matrix of the sum of squares and 
cross products. 
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the IBM 650. at North Carolina State College. The 153 derived 
equations representing all possible combinations of types of buyers, 
breed classes and markets are shown in Appendix Table 50, along with the 
R2, the degrees of freedom and the residual variance (s2g). The pooled 
equations for each of the major stratifications are shown in Table 13. 
Illustrative Equations 
The estimated price (Y) for an animal or sales lot can be derived 
by assigning a value to each of the independent variables (X^). The 
equations for the same stratification groups used to illustrate the 
simple regression model were selected as examples for the multiple 
2 
regression model. The same equation numbers have been assigned. 
Price estimates based on the five-variable equations were generally 
slightly less than those estimated from the single variable equations. 
Equation o 
number bl3 &2 *>3 b4 b5 Y 
(1) -5.80 -1.029** -.395** +.668** +.207** +.265** $24.64 
(2) -20.65 -.541 -.080 +.914* + .011 +.637** 24.28 
(3) -62.74 -.053 -.300* +1.676** + .121 + .051 22.70 
(4) +81.81 -1.046** +.690** -1.153** -.344** +1.278** 25.76 
Most of the processing of the data after the sums of squares 
and cross products were obtained was done at the VPI computing center. 
Some of the pooled regressions were computed on an IBM 650 installation 
at the General Electric Plant in Salem, Virginia. 
p 
Equation 1 is for mixed veals purchased at market 17 by packer 
buyers; equation 2 is for mixed veals purchased by order buyers at 
market 17; equation 3 is for mixed veals purchased by packer buyers at 
market 20; and equation 4 applies to mixed veals purchased by packer 
buyers at market 23. 
Q 
**Denotes significance at one percent level of probability and * 
at five percent level. 
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In the four example equations the values assigned to the five 
independent variables in order were: grade, middle choice (5); 
carcass weight, 114 pounds (.57 x 200); dressing percentage, 57 percent; 
liveweight, 200 pounds; and time, fourth visit (4). The values assigned 
to Xg, X and approximated the sample average for mixed-type veals 
of middle choice grade.1 Differences in the estimated prices for the 
four equations were not as large as suggested by a cursory examination 
of their structure, indicating the existence of a compensating effect 
2 
among the independent variables. An investigation of all 153 equations 
showed a tendency for an inverse relationship between the grade and 
dressing percentage coefficients. 
While packer buyers paid an estimated 36 cents per hundredweight 
more than order buyers for choice grade veals at market 17, they paid 
an estimated $1.04 less than order buyers for low utility grade veals. 
The estimated price paid by packers among markets was lowest for choice 
grade and highest for utility grade veals at market 20. Apparently, 
differences in the values of the coefficients for grade and dressing 
percentage were the major source of variation in estimated prices 
For convenience, only three decimals are shown for the values 
of the regression coefficients; however, in making the calculations the 
values of the regression coefficients as shown in Appendix table 50 
were employed. 
^This phenomenon suggests correlation between the independent 
variables which was investigated and will be presented in a following 
section. 
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Table 13. Value of Regression Coefficient, Degrees of Freedom, Coefficient of Determination 
and Market Class - Pooled Main Effects 
b 
o bia bg *>3 b4 
c 
All classes 
Veals 12.58437 -.60393** .02179 .23628 -.02588 
Mixed veals 8.44449 -.77910** -.06900 .35545** .02438 
Beef calves -2.33599 -.38607** -.14249** .48382** .07218** 
Steers 36.59544 -.54305** .03974** -.34961** -.01911** 
Heifers 22.37470 -.53290** .01982** -.11183 -.00896* 
Beef cows 14.20567 -.49029** -.00454 .03382 .00168 
Dairy cows 2.02773 -.28258* -.00801 .19090** .00548** 
All buyers^ 
Packer 4.21355 -.42237** -.00209 .28569** -.00155 
Order 1.52236 -.45574** -.00495 .34271** .00018 
Management 3.48401 -.51854** .00468 .25102** .00673 
Farmer 28.42444 -.49486** .06233** -.16857** -.03369** 
All markets6 
17 15.61873 -.43032** .02051** .08434** -.01308** 
20 -7.84179 -.29046** .00552 .37641** -.00482 
21 15.07045 
-.55107** .01742** .09415* -.01125** 
24 2.17220 -.24675** -.00354 .29066** -.00197 
18 
-7.59476 
-.14632* - .08362** .82552** .03201** 
19 
-2.00060 -.18823** -.01186 .48478** .00197 
22 -6.51810 -.40900** -.00051 .39298** -.00044 
23 7.84931 -.61946** -.00105 .25447** -.00160 
Grand total^ 5.15825 -.46626** -.00044 .27613** -.00202 
One percent level of significance denoted by double asterisk; 5 percent level of signif 
^Number of observations (N) equals degrees of freedom plus six. 
cPooled over all buyers and markets. 
^Pooled over all markets and market classes. 
ePooled over all buyers and market classes. 
spooled over all buyers, markets and market classes. 














































































































































by double asterisk; 5 percent level of significance denoted by single asterisk, 
of freedom plus six. 
t classes. 
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between markets.^ For equation number three, the value of the 
grade coefficient for the single-variable model was -.932, as compared 
to only -.053 for the five-variable model. A closer examination of the 
equation showed that the linear relationship among variables was greater 
than the average for equations describing mixed-veal purchases. This 
was especially true for grade and dressing percentage and for dressing 
percentage and weight where the correlations were -.91 and +.35 
respectively. 
Since steer prices are of major concern in most cattle pricing 
studies, six equations describing steer purchases were selected to 
illustrate price differences both between markets and between types of 
buyers at the same auctions in the Appalachian area. 
The comparison of differences in the estimated price paid for 
theoretically identical animals by different types of buyers was limited 
to packers versus farmers. Packers and farmers, conceptually at 
least, normally would be expected to differ more widely than other types 
of buyers in their evaluation of the "true worth" of animals, since 
they likely would be appraising the animals for different uses. 
One of the largest packer buyers at market 20 consistently was 
an active, and often successful, bidder on the good and commercial grade 
pens of veal calves. Competitive buyers noticing his apparent affinity 
for calves of such quality often forced him to pay nearly as much for 
the lower grade calves as commanded by the "top" grade pen. When queried 
on the matter, the particular buyer justified his action on the basis 
that (l) the plant to which he shipped was able to secure practically 
as good prices for the lower quality calves, (2) his "yields" were good 
and (3) generally the number of animals consigned to these pens more 
nearly met the kill requirements of his plant. 
97 
The first two of the example equations relate to steer sales at a 
large Virginia market 20; equations (3) and (4) refer to observations 
at a large West Virginia market 21; and equations (5) and (6) describe 
steer sales at a small West Virginia market 23 at which relatively 
large numbers of steers were sold. The odd numbered equations describe 
steers purchased by packer buyers at the respective markets while the 
even numbered equations refer to steers purchased by farmers. 
bo H1 b2 *>3 b4 b5 
(1) 
A 
Y = +48.40 -.143 +.108* -.647** -.053 + .089 
(2) 
A Y = +6.14 
-.457 -.026 + .237 + .014 + .814** 
(3) 






-.457 +.157** -.980** -.087** +1.178** 




-4.59 -.785** -.096* +.517* + .052 +.397** 
The values assigned to the independent variables Xg, X3 and X4 
approximated the sample average for the respective grades examined; 
the same values were assigned to all sample equations for the respec­
tive grades compared. 
For estimating the prices paid for good grade steers, the following 
values were assigned to the five independent variables: grade, middle 
good (8); carcass weight, 495 pounds; dressing percentage, 55 percent; 
liveweight, 900 pounds; and time, fifth visit (5). The values assumed 
in estimating the prices paid for utility grade steers were: grade, 
^**Significant at one percent and * at five percent level of 
probability. 
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middle utility (14); carcass weight, 345 pounds; dressing percentage, 
50 percent; liveweight, 690 pounds; and time, fifth visit (5). 
The estimated prices computed from the equations were as summarized 
below. 
Market 
number code Packers Farmers Packers » Farmers 
Dollars per hundred pounds 
(l) and (2) 20 $17.89 $18.82 $14.69 $15.97 
(3) and (4) 21 17.72 18.55 14.37 15.36 
(5) and (6) 23 19.65 18.31 14.63 14.62 
The estimated price paid by farmers at the two large markets was 
greater for both grades than the estimated price paid by packers. 
Moreover, the estimated premium paid by farmers increased as the grade 
quality declined. The tendency for the differential to widen with 
declining grade quality also was evident at market 23 in an indirect 
manner as reflected in the practical disappearance of a price differ­
ential for utility grade steers even though packers paid a higher price 
for choice grade steers. 
Some Limitations and Precautions 
Price estimates calculated from the least squares regression 
equations derived in this analysis are subject to error; this error 
is a function of the residual variance (s e). Generally, the variance 
of an estimated price and the confidence interval for the prediction 
of price become smaller as the characteristics of the animal or sales 
lot for which the price is estimated approaches the average for the 
99 
of animals it represents. Conversely, average variances would be 
larger for animals representing the extremes of the range. 
Another important reservation is that price estimates based on 
these equations are valid only if the values assigned to the independent 
variables (X^) lie within the range of characteristics for the animals 
observed in the sample. For example, an estimated price for a 400-pound 
veal calf, a 200-pound steer, a heifer with a dressing percentage of 
70 percent or a top choice grade cow would not be valid, since none of 
the animals observed in the study exhibited such characteristics. How­
ever, the characteristics of the animals included in the analysis did 
vary over a rather wide but normal range for cattle and calves consigned 
to Appalachian auctions. 
No interaction is assumed to exist between the regression variables. 
To some extent interaction probably exists; but it is not believed 
serious, particularly after the data were stratified by market class, 
2 
market and type of buyer. The inclusion of carcass weight as a variable, 
which is a cross product of dressing percentage and liveweight 
(Xg = X3X4), means that each equation contains a non-linear term. How­
ever, a linear relationship was assumed between X^ and Y principally 
because the method of stratification limited the range over which X^ 
•'•Anderson and Bancroft, op. cit., pp. 202-203. 
2 Ostle, op. cit., p. 345. Ostle defines interaction as "the 
differential response to one factor in combination with varying levels 
of a second factor applied simultaneously; that is, the two factors 
combine to produce an added effect not due to one of them alone." 
Also, interaction causes effects to be non-additive. 
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could vary to that of a specific class of animals purchased at an 
individual market by a specified type of buyer. In a practical sense, 
serious departures from linearity were considered unlikely under the 
conditions imposed. 
Complete independence between variables - no correlation - is 
seldom attained in meaningful multiple regression models employed in 
empirical analyses of economic or biological data. A reasonably 
complete model in either field usually involves a complex of correlated 
variables. Certainly the biological make-up of cattle is conducive to 
a relatively high correlation between the major inherent physical 
characteristics which contribute to the economic value of the animal. 
One of the most serious consequences of correlation between inde­
pendent variables is that it reduces the ability of each individual 
regression coefficient in the equation to estimate the precise effect 
of that particular variable on the dependent variable thereby compli­
cating the interpretation of the regression analysis. For example, if 
dressing percentage is highly correlated with grade, there likely will 
not be any wide variation in grade while dressing percentage remains 
constant. Under such conditions the grade coefficient cannot be inter­
preted in the sterotyped fashion without extreme caution because it 
describes a relationship which exists only over a rather limited range. 
While a high correlation between independent variables complicates 
the interpretation of the regression coefficients, its existence does 
not affect the ability of the least squares regression equations to 
estimate the price of a specified animal or sales lot, nor does it affect 
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the reduction in price variation due to regression. In discussing this 
point, Tintner states, "If there is a very close relationship between 
two determining variables. . . it may not be possible to find the 
regression coefficients with sufficient accuracy. The regression equa-
A 
tion remains valid for prediction, i.e., for estimating Y if the X^'s 
are given."* 
A high correlation between two or more variables also causes the 
estimated values of the sample regression coefficients to be relatively 
unstable and sensitive to small changes in the data. An example of this 
phenomenon is suggested by a comparison of the first and third equations 
for steers shown on page 97. Price estimates from these two equations 
were quite similar, yet the estimated value of the grade coefficient 
(b^) was only -.143 for equation (l) and non-significant as compared to 
a highly significant grade coefficient of -.473 for equation (3). On 
the other hand, the dressing percentage coefficient for the first equa­
tion was considerably larger than for the third equation, even though 
both coefficients were highly significant. The structure of the first 
equation indicates that packers differentiated between steers princi­
pally upon the basis of their estimated yield while packers at market 
O 
21 placed significant emphasis on all five independent variables. 
^Gerhard Tintner. Econometrics. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 
New York. 1952. p. 33. 
^Despite the seemingly superiority of equation (3) over equation 
(l), the estimated residual variance was larger for the third equation. 
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Correlation between Regression Variables 
Simple correlation coefficients between the regression variables 
were computed for each of the seven market class-breed groups. The 
resulting coefficients for each group are shown separately in Tables 
14 through 20. 
The individual coefficients were tested for statistical signifi­
cance at either the one or five percent probability level using 
tabular values provided for such purposes.* With the large number of 
degrees of freedom in each group of data, many coefficients tested 
significant even though their r values were quite small. Under such 
conditions, a practical sense of significance could at times be at odds 
with statistical significance. For example, with 1000 degrees of 
freedom a correlation of .081 is considered highly significant; yet, 
in the context of the analysis a correlation of that magnitude may not 
have practical importance. But on the basis of the statistical 
criteria employed, the majority of the correlation coefficients (r) 
tested significant, mostly at the one percent level. Of the 15 possi­
bilities, the number testing significant within each group ranged from 
a low of 10 for heifers and beef veals to a high of 14 for steers. With 
the exception of liveweight for beef veals and slaughter calves and 
carcass weight in the case of dairy cows, all variables were 
*George W. Snedecor. Statistical methods. 4th ed. Iowa State 
College Press. Ames, Iowa. 1946. See Table 73, page 49. This table 
provides values up to 1000 degrees of freedom, which is considerably 
less than the number available for each of the market class-breed 
groups in this analysis, excepting the two veal groups. 
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significantly correlated with the dependent variable price. Grade 
and dressing percentage were most highly correlated with price; live-
weight and carcass weight were least correlated with price. Because 
lower numerical values for grade reflect an improvement in grade 
quality, a negative sign on any coefficient correlated with grade 
indicates a positive relationship. In all other cases a negative sign 
indicates an inverse correlation between the variables under considera­
tion. 
The values of the correlation coefficients between grade and price 
indicate that the linear relationship between those variables would 
account for approximately 55 percent of the observed variation in 
prices of veals, from 25 to 30 percent of the price variations in 
steers, heifers and cows, but only 10 percent of the variation in 
slaughter calf prices. The linear correlation between dressing per­
centage and price would account for about 48 percent of the variation 
in observed veal prices, 18 percëht for steers, 23 percent for heifers, 
27 percent for cows, but only seven percent for slaughter calves. 
Interestingly, the relationship between price and dressing percentage 
for dairy cows was slightly stronger than that between price and grade. 
As expected, the highest correlation among the independent 
variables was between (l) carcass weight and liveweight and (2) grade 
and dressing percentage. Generally, the lowest correlations were those 
involving the time variable. 
Grade was most highly correlated with dressing percentage and 
carcass weight, in that order- for all groups; but, the relative corre­
lation with weight and time varied among the market class-breed groups. 
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Table 14. Correlation Coefficients for Variables Used in Multiple 
Regression Analysis of Prices of Veal Calves3 
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 Y 
X1 1.0000 -.3947 -.8947 -.0365 -.1325 -.7270 
%2 1.0000 .4720 .9137 .0204 .2190 
X3 1.0000 .0809 .1011 .6900 
x4 1.0000 -.0025 -.0686 
%5 1.0000 .3173 
Y 1.0000 
aBeef-type veals. 
Table 15. Correlation Coefficients for Variables Used in Multiple 
Regression Analysis of Prices of Mixed Veals 
X1 X2 X3 X4 
Y 
X1 1.0000 -.5589 -.8624 -.2904 .0214 -.7546 
*2 1.0000 .5830 .9372 -.0320 .3691 
X3 1.0000 .2709 -.0561 .6945 
X4 1.0000 -.0129 .1414 
X5 1.0000 .1569 
Y 1.0000 
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Table 16. Correlation Coefficients for Variables Used in Multiple 
Regression Analysis of Prices of Slaughter Calves 
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 
Y 
X1 1.0000 -.3950 -.7590 -.1798 .1819 -.3131 
x2 1.0000 .4132 .9525 -.0273 .0716 
X3 1.0000 .1214 -.0211 .2652 
X4 1.0000 -.0247 -.0042 
%5 1.0000 .1812 
Y 1.0000 
Table 17. Correlation Coefficients for Variables Used in Multiple 
Regression Analysis of Prices of Beef Steers 
X1 X2 X3 X4 *5 Y 
X1 1.0000 -.4075 -.8490 -.2870 .0622 —.4948 
x2 1.0000 .4954 .9872 -.1912 .2880 
X3 1.0000 .3576 -.0449 .4225 
X4 1.0000 -.1983 .2301 
X5 1.0000 .3200 
Y 1.0000 
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Table 18» Correlation Coefficients for Variables Used in Multiple 
Regression Analysis of Prices of Beef Heifers 
X1 X2 X3 X4 %5 
Y 
*1 1.0000 -.2222 -.8704 -.0255 .0750 -.5315 
X2 1.0000 .2522 .9718 -.0525 
.1886 
X3 1.0000 .0237 -.0316 .4766 
X4 1.0000 -.0456 .0818 
% 1.0000 .2051 
Y 1.0000 
Table 19. Correlation Coefficients for Variables Used in Multiple 
Regression Analysis of Prices of Beef Cows 




X1 1.0000 -.7037 -.8929 -.4722 .0988 -.5623 
X2 1.0000 .7251 .9373 -.0365 .3828 
X3 1.0000 .4469 .0005 .5208 
X4 1.0000 -.0441 .2412 
*5 1.0000 .1905 
y 1.0000 
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Table 20. Correlation Coefficients for Variables Used in Multiple 
Regression Analysis of Prices of Dairy Cows 
X1 X 2 
X 
3 X4 X5 
Y 
X1 1=0000 -.7030 -.8394 -.5342 .0109 -.5181 
X2 1.0000 .7390 .9514 .0963 .0496 
*3 1.0000 .5062 .1206 .5328 
*4 1.0000 .0676 .4044 
x5 1.0000 .2970 
Y 1.0000 
Table 21. Standard Deviation of Regression Variables by Market Class 















Veal calves 3.74 20.02 4.11 33.03 2.13 4.69 
Mixed veals 3.73 21.78 4.08 34.74 2.22 4.70 
Slaughter calves 2.57 33.43 2.92 58.07 2.04 2.61 
Steers 2.63 127.89 2.88 220.84 2.05 2.77 
Heifers 2.79 87.89 3.16 163.32 2.04 3.13 
Beef cows 2.94 93.98 3.92 150.74 2.04 2.35 
Dairy cows 2.43 93.95 3.71 165.52 2.18 2.37 
^Dollars per hundredweight. 
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The correlation between grade and weight was considerably stronger 
for both types of cows and steers than for the other classes, while the 
correlation between grade and time was significant only for slaughter 
calves, beef veals and beef-type cows. 
Liveweight, dressing percentage and grade were significantly 
correlated with carcass weight for all classes. But steers and dairy 
cows were the only class in which carcass weight and time were signifi­
cantly correlated. 
The r values for the correlation between dressing percentage and 
grade ranged from about -.76 for slaughter calves to -.89 for beef-type 
veals and cows; the correlation between dressing percentage and carcass 
weight was highest for cows (r^ - .73) and lowest for heifers 
(rgg = .25). All correlations between dressing percentage and weight 
were positive, indicating a tendency for heavier animals to yield 
higher. 
Partial correlation coefficients (ry], ,3) between price and grade 
with dressing percentage held constant were computed for each of the 
seven market class-breed groups, using the procedure outlined by 
Tintner.* All of the partial correlation coefficients were highly 
significant, indicating that despite the high correlation between grade 
and dressing percentage (r^), the addition of dressing percentage would 
produce a significant reduction in the residual variance over and beyond 
that attributable to the grade effect. The values of the partial corre­
lation coefficients (ryi.3) ranged from -.178 for slaughter calves to 
*Tintner, op. cit., pp. 92-93. 
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-.427 for mixed veals; any value exceeding .115 was significant at the 
one percent level.* 
Standard Deviation of Regression Variables 
The sample standard deviations presented in Table 21 provide a 
measure of the variability in the observed data. Although the standard 
deviation of all regression variables were quite similar for both beef 
and mixed-type veals, they generally were larger than for the other 
classes. The standard deviation for weight and carcass weight, partial­
ly caused by the smaller variation in dressing percentage estimates, was 
considerably larger for steers than for the remaining classes. The 
value of the standard deviation for grade generally was positively 
related to the magnitude of the standard deviation for price. This 
relationship indicates that cattle buyers at Appalachian auctions placed 
strong emphasis on grade in determining the price to pay for animals. 
Interpretations and Summary of Regression Coefficients 
A major function of the individual coefficients of regression 
equations is to provide a means for estimating the effect of a particu­
lar independent variable on the dependent variable. The value of an 
individual regression coefficient measures the average change in price 
(Y) for a unit change in the associated independent variable (X^) when 
the other independent variables are not changed. But as previously 
*M. H. Quenoulle. Associated measurements. Butterworths 
Scientific Publications, London. 1952. See especially pages 44-48 and 
pages 84-88 for an excellent discussion of the testing and interpre­
tation of partial correlation coefficients in multiple regression 
analysis. 
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indicated, any analysis leading to unequivocal implications of the 
behavior of an individual regression coefficient independent of another 
is limited and restricted because of the correlations inherent in the 
animal data included in this study. The preceding analysis of the 
correlation coefficients confirmed the close physical and economic 
relationship, especially between (l) grade, dressing percentage and 
price and (2) between carcass weight and liveweight. Despite the 
existence of correlation, many of the coefficients exhibited a real 
effect as indicated by a significance test of their respective values 
(b^). In interpreting the following results, the reader is urged to 
keep in mind the precautions, restrictions and limitations previously 
outlined.* 
The normal interpretation to apply to the regression coefficients 
in the equations forming the basis of this study may be presented more 
clearly by reference to the first and third example equations for 
steers purchased by packer buyers at two large auctions. 
(l) Y = 48.40 -,143X1 +.lOBX^ -.647Xg -.053X4 +.089X^ 
(3) Y = 38.16 -,473X1 +.055Xg -.388X_ -.028X4 +.467X^ 
Note that in equation (l) the only significant coefficients were 
b2 and bg; all coefficients were significant in equation (3). 
Each coefficient of these equations may be interpreted as the 
estimated effect on price of a unit change in the particular variable, 
*While statisticians have accorded much attention to the problem 
of how to adequately analyse data exhibiting high correlation among 
independent variables in regression, no widely accepted general methods 
of coping with the problem have been developed. 
Ill 
as indicated below, if all other variables were held constant at a 
specified level. 
(a) An improvement in grade quality by one third of a grade (a 
unit decrease in coded value) caused an increase in price of 14 cents 
per hundred pounds for steers described by equation (l) and 47 cents 
for steers purchased at market 21, equation (3). The price difference 
between a full grade, i.e., average commercial to average good, would be 
42 cents and $1.41 respectively. 
(b) An increase of one pound in carcass weight produced a price 
increase of about 11 cents per hundred pounds liveweight price for 
animals described by equation (l) and six cents by equation (3). 
(c) A one percent increase in dressing percentage resulted in a 
price decline of 65 cents and 39 cents, respectively, per hundred 
pounds."*" 
(d) An increase of one pound liveweight produced a price decline 
of five cents and three cents respectively. 
(e) A change from one visit to another caused a price change of 
approximately nine cents for animals described in equation (l) and 
47 cents in equation (3). 
The reader is reminded again that even though these equations 
appear quite different on the basis of individual coefficients, the 
*The negative price change associated with an increase in 
dressing percentage may have been caused by correlation which resulted 
in the carcass weight coefficient assuming a relatively inflated role 
in the equation. For example, the correlation between carcass weight 
and dressing percentage for equation (i) was .58 as compared to .50 
for all steers. 
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estimated prices from these equations for average good grade steers, 
sold on the fourth visit, were $17.89 and $17.72 respectively. Other 
important statistics for these equations, respectively, were: number 
9 
of observations, 49 and 358; R , .672 and .470; and standard error, 
$1.51 and $1.72. 
The distribution of regression coefficients for grade, carcass 
weight and dressing percentage are depicted in Figure 7; the 
coefficients for weight and time are presented in Figure 8. These 
distributions were tabulated from the 153 basic equations, disregarding 
any strata groupings. A negative sign on the grade coefficient indi­
cates a positive price increase with an increase in grade quality, 
since grade quality increased with a declining coded value. But a 
negative coefficient for dressing percentage is contrary to popular 
theory. However, as already mentioned, high correlations create 
sensitiveness and instability among the independent variables which 
could result in changing signs. Negative signs on the carcass weight 
coefficients could reflect either extreme sensitivity or weight 
preferences on the part of the buyers. Since the time variable was not 
very highly correlated with other variables, except in the case of 
beef veals, steers and dairy cows, the sign on this coefficient reflects 
the trend in prices for the various classes at each of the sample 
markets during the two-year period covered by the study. 
As shown in Figure 7, a great majority of the grade coefficients 
were valued at less than $1.00 and carried negative signs, indicating 
that in most cases a full grade increase in grade quality would have 
resulted in a price increase of less than $3.00 per hundredweight. 
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Slightly more than half of the carcass weight coefficients were 
positive, indicating an increasing price for heavier carcasses. But 
in approximately 80 percent of the equations, irrespective of the sign 
of the coefficient, a hundred pound increase in carcass weight would 
have changed prices less than $3.20 per hundred pounds liveweight. 
The values of the dressing percentage coefficients were more 
widely and evenly distributed than the other coefficients, both with 
respect to the size of the values and the signs attached to the coeffi­
cients. However, most of the values, either positive or negative, 
would not have produced a price change of more than $1.00 for a one 
percent change in dressing percentage. 
For practical purposes, the weight coefficients were equally 
distributed with respect to the sign of the coefficients, and a 100-
pound change in liveweight would have affected the level of price by 
less than $3.20 per hundredweight. 
In most cases the time coefficients were small and positive. How­
ever, nearly 15 percent of the equations estimated a decline in price 
during the observation period; but more than half of the coefficients 
with a negative sign were not significant. Moreover, more than half of 
the time coefficients with negative signs were for equations describing 
cows, mostly those purchased by farmers. Of the significant time 
coefficients with negative signs, 80 percent were for cows. 
The number of coefficients testing significant at either the one 
or five percent level were tabulated for each of the variables in the 
153 basic equations. The proportion of coefficients testing significant 
varied according to the variable represented and differed among the 
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various strata groupings. Of the 153 coefficients tested for each 
variable, the proportions testing significant were: grade, 43 percent; 
carcass weight, 42 percent; dressing percentage, 63 percent; liveweight, 
30 percent; and time, 67 percent. The percentages of significant 
coefficients by market class are summarized in Table 22. 
Table 22. Percentage of Significant Regression Coefficients by 
Breed-Class Combinations 
Significant regression coefficients3 
Total Carcass Dressing Live- Time 
equations Grade weight percentage weight (visit) 
Breed-class involved X1 %2 X3 X4 X5 
Number Percentage 
Beef veals 15 53 47 60 40 60 
Mixed veals 17 53 53 65 47 41 
Beef calves 25 48 56 80 36 64 
Beef steers 24 42 58 83 33 88 
Beef heifers 24 46 25 33 21 71 
Beef cows 24 42 33 58 21 75 
Dairy cows 24 25 25 62 21 58 
Total 153 43 42 63 30 67 
^Significant at either one or five percent level of probability; 
all numbers rounded. 
The summary of significant coefficients in Table 23 shows that 
packers placed more real emphasis on grade and yield than the other buy­
ers. Farmers and auction management buyers showed least respect for 
grade. A c'ni-square analysis showed a significantly larger proportion 
of equations with significant grade coefficients at the large markets.* 
*X2 = 3.84 < 4.13) 
.05 
117 
Table 23. Percentage of Significant Regression Coefficients by Type 
of Buyer and Size of Market 
Significant regression coefficients3 
Total Carcass Dressing Live- Time 
Classifi­ equations Grade weight percent­ weight (visit) 
cation involved *1 x2 age Xg %4 %5 
Number Percentage 
Type of buver 
Packer 47 64 53 62 38 72 
Order 52 50 36 67 25 69 
Management 17 18 35 65 41 53 
Farmers 37 19 38 60 22 62 
Size of market 
Large 83 51 41 61 29 71 
Small 70 33 43 66 31 61 
^Significant at either one or five percent level of probability; 
all numbers rounded. 
The distribution of significant coefficients for the other variables 
was not significantly associated with size of market. 
The general tendency for coefficients of variables other than 
grade to test significant concomitantly with the grade coefficient 
was established by tabulating, and converting to percentage, the 
number of significant coefficients for Xg, Xg, X. and X^  present in 
the 66 equations with a significant grade coefficient. The percentages 
of significant coefficients derived in this manner were larger than 
the percentages derived from all 153 equations.* This relationship 
*As used here, "significant" refers to either the one or five 
percent level of significance for the respective b^'s. 
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suggests that the buyers simultaneously considered and evaluated 
several factors in determining the prices to pay for the animals. 
The proportion of significant coefficients in the 66 equations where 
the grade coefficient was significant was: carcass weight, 61 percent; 
dressing percentage, 68 percent; liveweight, 38 percent; and time, 
82 percent. 
Other interesting relationships among regression coefficients 
in equations with significant grade coefficients were: 
(1) All dressing percentage coefficients for steers and 83 
percent for slaughter calves and dairy cows were significant; 
(2) All time coefficients for either beef or dairy cows and 
approximately 90 percent of those for heifers and steers were 
significant; 
(3) The weight coefficients for mixed veals were significant 
80 percent of the time, but less than 15 percent were significant on 
beef cows and heifers. 
The usual chi-square test for association among variables in 
contingency tables was used to determine whether there was a difference 
in the relative number of significant coefficients for Xj_, Xg, Xg and 
X4 in the equations with a significant grade coefficient as compared 
to the equations where grade was not significant.* A significant 
chi-square value indicates a stronger joint association among the 
*Ostle, op. cit., pp. 68-73. There is only one degree of freedom 
since each comparison involved is a 2 x 2 contingency classification. 
If the calculated chi-square exceeds the tabular value, the null 
hypothesis is rejected; there is strong evidence that a difference 
exists. 
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coefficients in the equations with significant grade coefficients. 
The chi-square results were; (l) carcass weight, highly significant 
(7(QS= 6.63 < 7.73); (2) dressing percentage, not significant 
= 3.84>1.18);* (3) liveweight, not significant but close 
Qf* = 3.847> 3.43) ; (4) time, highly significant (XgS = 6.63<9.7l). 
A practical appraisal and evaluation of the regression coefficient 
was made - to complement the statistical interpretation - based on the 
following criteria:^ (l) Buyers placed significant emphasis on 
quality in pricing animals described by those equations where either 
bj or bg was significant; (2) Buyers were very discriminating with 
respect to quality in pricing animals described by equations in which 
bj, bg and bg (or any combination including b^) were significant; 
(3) On the other hand, animals were priced primarily on the basis of 
factors other than quality in those equations where b^, bg and bg were 
non-significant. 
There were 30 equations which satisfied the second criteria, 
indicating a strong emphasis on quality; and exactly the same number 
satisfied the third criteria, indicating that little emphasis was 
placed on quality in pricing the animals. Of the 30 equations 
satisfying the second criteria, 15 were equations describing purchases 
by packers and 12 of the remaining 15 equations involved order buyers. 
*The lack of significance for dressing percentage is probably 
a reflection of the high correlation between these two variables. 
2 As previously indicated, the statistical interpretation was 
complicated by the complex of correlated variables. 
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Only three of the 54 equations related to purchases by either 
management or farmers produced significant coefficients for X^, Xg 
and Xg. In fact, 17 of the 54 equations involving farmers and 
management buyers did not contain a significant b^, bg or bg, indicating 
that the prices paid for animals were not greatly dependent upon their 
quality. 
The proportion of equations which met a combination of the first 
and second criteria varied by market and by market class as shown in 
Table 24. Generally, quality was accorded relatively more emphasis at 
the larger market. Among the market classes, less emphasis was placed 
on quality in evaluating heifers and cows. 
Table 24. Percentage of Significant Regression Coefficients for 
Grade and/or Yield by Market Class and Market3 




classes 11 31 12 13 14 15 25 
Percent0 
Large 
17 100 100 100 100 100 67 100 95 
20 50 100 75 67 67 75 100 75 
21 100 50 100 100 67 100 100 90 
24 Nonec 100 50 50 50 50 100 75 
Small 
18 100 100 100 None0 0 Nonec 25 60 
19 67 50 100 100 33 75 33 65 
22 100 100 100 100 0 100 0 74 
23 100 50 100 75 75 67 67 76 
Averaqe 87 82 88 83 54 75 67 76 
^Includes all equations satisfying within the first or the second 
criteria outlined on page 119. Yield equals dressing percentage. 
^Rounded to nearest whole number. 
cNo equations for the class at the market. 
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Price Variation Explained by Regression 
2 
The coefficient of determination, symbolized as R in this 
analysis, is a measure of the price variation explained by the 
multiple regression equation. More accurately, it is "the proportion 
of the sum of squares of the dependent variable which is explained by 
1 2 the regression equation." The R values for the 153 basic equations 
are presented in Appendix Table 50, along with the degrees of freedom, 
the regression coefficients and the residual variances. 
The multiple regression model was considerably more effective 
than the single variable model in explaining price variations, as 
2 
illustrated in the comparison of the proportionate distribution of R 
values presented in Table 25. An additional tabulation showed that 
2 
whereas 90 of the multiple variable R 's exceeded .50, only 23 of the 
2 
single variable R 's attained that value. Only four of the multiple 
R^'s were less than .20; yet, 47 of the single variable R^'s or about 
31 percent failed to explain as much as 20 percent of the variations 
2 in price. Thirteen of the multiple regression equations, of which 
eight involved either beef or mixed-type veals, accounted for more 
than 80 percent of the observed variation in price. But only two 
single variable R^'s, both involving mixed-type veals, were as large 
3 s •80 * 
^Ostle, op. cit., p. 215. 
^Three of the four R^'s of less than .20 failed to test signifi­
cant at the five percent level. 
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Table 25. Proportionate Distribution of R by Market Class Groups for 
Single Variable and Five-Variable Regression Equations 
Market Value of coefficient of determination 








S_ M_ S_ M_ 
Beef veals 15 27 7 60 40 13 40 0 13 100 
.Mixed veals 17 12 6 47 24 29 35 12 35 100 
Beef calves 25 100 64 0 28 0 8 0 0 100 
Beef steers 24 83 16 17 42 0 42 0 0 100 
Beef heifers 24 71 25 29 54 0 16 0 5 100 
Beef cows 24 67 21 29 33 4 39 0 8 100 
Dairy cows 24 75 21 21 42 4 29 0 8 100 
All animals 153 67 25 26 38 6 29 2 8 100 
aS refers to single-variable equations; M refers to five-variable 
equations. 
o 
Generally, the R values differed between market classes, markets 
and types of buyers; but the widest differences were observed among 
the different classes, as shown in Table 25 and Figure 10. The values 
2 
of the R 1 s ranged from a low of .10 for slaughter calves purchased 
by the auction management at large market 24 to .97 for dairy cows 
purchased by the auction operator at small market 18. A statistical 
test of the individual R^ values showed that only 10 of the 153 equa­
tions failed to "explain" a significant amount of the price variation 
in the observed prices of animals in the sample.^ Interestingly, 
•'•The standard F-test procedures were used in testing the R^ 's, 
with k(= 5) and n-k-1 degrees of freedom. 
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none of those equations had a significant regression coefficient for 
grade, and neither b%, bg nor bg was significant in five of the 
p , 
equations with non-significant R values. 
2 
Approximately 40 percent of the R 's were valued between .50 and 
.70, but nearly 25 percent were below .40 with only eight percent 
exceeding .80. There was a slight tendency, as shown in Figure 9, 
o 2 
for larger R s in the small markets. All five of the R 's of .90 or 
more, but only one of the four valued less than .20, described sales 
at small markets. 
2 Multiple R values by market class 
2 As reflected by the distribution of R values, shown in Figure 
10, the multiple regression model was relatively more effective in 
"explaining" the observed variations in prices of veal calves than 
for the other market class-breed groups. The reverse pattern applied 
2 to slaughter calves. 
2 
Veals. The R 's for equations describing either beef or mixed 
veals ranged from .30 to .96, but 88 percent of the equations for those 
groups accounted for more than 50 percent of the variation in observed 
p 
prices. As shown in Table 25, 35 percent of the R 's for mixed veals 
Only 241 animals, about one percent of the sample, were involved 
in the 10 equations with non-significant R^'s, which included four 
groups of slaughter calves and three groups of heifers. 
2 
The same general conclusions apply to the single-variable model, 
as shown in Figure 3, page 72. 
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exceeded .80; but less than 10 percent of the equations for -heifers 
or cows attained that value. 
Market 17 was the only auction at which farmers purchased mixed-
type veals in sufficient quantity to be included in the regression 
analysis, and this was the only equation for that class which failed to 
account for at least half (R^ = .30) of the variation in prices.* It 
should be noted, however, that approximately half of the highest valued 
2 
R 's for veal calves were associated with equations describing fewer 
o 
than 15 sales lots, while three of the four equations with R less than 
.50 described more than 66 sales lots, which in terms of veal observa-
o 
tions represented relatively large numbers. The relative uncertainty 
and/or instability of estimates based on a small number of observations 
may be, in part, a reason for the large R^ associated with some of the 
veal equations. However, where the practice of graded pen-lot sales 
3 
was followed, most of the single lot sales represented "out calves"; 
and, generally the variation in prices was quite wide within the same 
grade for veals sold as "singles." 
^Farmers also purchased limited numbers of beef veals during one 
of the fall visits at markets 17 and 19, but the values exceeded 
.80 for those equations. 
^Since most of the veals were sold in graded pen lots, the 
number of observations (n) was small relative to the number of animals 
involved. 
^The term "out calves" as applied to veals in the Appalachian 
area refers to animals that because of age, weight or other indications 
such as length of hair were not qualified for graded pens. 
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Slaughter calves. Factors not included as variables in the 
multiple regression model account for the majority of price variations 
for slaughter calves, as indicated by the failure of 64 percent of the 
equations to explain as much as 40 percent of the price variation ob­
served in this study. Only five of the 25 equations involving slaughter 
calves were able to account for more than half of the price variation. 
The proportion of price variation accounted for by regression ranged 
from a low of .10 for management purchases at market 24 to a high of 
.61 for purchases by packer buyers at market 23. Despite the relatively 
poor performance, however, a comparison of the frequency distribution 
Q 
of the R values shown in Figures 3 and 10 shows that the multiple 
regression equations were able to explain a considerably larger amount 
of the price variation, for the most "successful" single variable 
equation was able to explain only 33 percent of the price variation. 
2 Steers. The R values for equations describing steer purchases 
were distributed over a narrower range than for any other market class. 
The multiple regression model was much more effective in explaining 
price variation for steers than the single single-variable model, as 
shown by the fact that one-third of the R^ values for the single variable 
model were less than .20 and none were as large as .50; whereas, none 
were lower than .25 for the five-variable equations and 71 percent 
exceeded .50. None of the equations involving steers at market 17, 
2 
which accounts for three of the four lowest valued R 's, explained more 
2 
than 38 percent of the variation in price» Generally, the R values were 
smaller for purchases by farmers than for other types of buyers. How­
ever, the extremes of the range were represented by packer purchases at 
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2 2 
market 17 (R = .25) and farmer purchases at market 20 (R = .71). 
Since the variables included in the model were expected to apply more 
directly to meat values, it is not surprising that less price variation 
was explained by equations associated with farmers' purchases. 
Heifers. As was true for slaughter calves, the five variables 
failed to account for a large part of the variation in the heifer 
2 
price data. About 60 percent of the R values for heifer equations 
2 
were less than .50. Three of the R 's for heifers failed to test 
significant at the five percent level, and an equation for packer pur­
chases at market 22 failed to account for 20 percent of the variation 
in price. The additional variables greatly improved the performance 
of the equations in accounting for the observed variation in heifer 
prices, as shown by the data in Table 25 or Figures 3 and 10. However, 
there was no pattern of consistency in the improvement either among 
buyers or markets. 
Cows. The amount of price variation explained by the regression 
for cows ranged from a low of .13 for purchases of dairy-type cows by 
farmers at market 24 to a high of .97 for dairy cows purchased by the 
o 
management at market 18. As would be expected, the R values for 
equations describing cow purchases by farmers were generally lower 
than for other•types of buyers. Conceptually at least, farmers would 
place greater emphasis on other factors such as milking qualities, 
conformation, etc., than on most of the variables measured in the 
regression equation. The four equations that accounted for 80 percent 
or more of the variations in price involved a relatively small number 
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of observations, and three of them described purchases by management 
buyers. The auction management purchased cows at four of the markets; 
2 
and the lowest valued R was .78, indicating that in deciding what prices 
to pay they depended to a great extent on the variables included in the 
multiple regression model. The management reported they were purchasing 
cows either on order for slaughter plants unable to assign a buyer to 
their market or were selling their purchases on predetermined prices 
based, on carcass grade and yield. 
2 
Multiple R values by markets 
Nearly a third of all equations explaining more than 80 percent of 
the price variation were associated with sales of veal calves at large 
markets 17 and 24, which were located in the extreme southwestern part 
of the Appalachian area and most distant from the eastern slaughter 
2 
areas. The R values ranged from less than .20 to more than .80 for 
equations describing purchases at market 17, but 11 of the 20 equations 
for that market failed to explain as much as 40 percent of variation in 
price. Two equations at market 24 tested non-significant, and eight 
others explained less than 40 percent of the variation in price. Market 
2 20, with 55 percent of the R 's exceeding .60, topped all markets in 
2 
this respect. The modal R 's for markets 20, 22 and 23 were approximate­
ly .70. 
2 
Generally, the largest number of medium to high valued R 's in 
both an absolute and relative sense were found in the small markets. 
Moreover, those markets with the largest number of equations for veals 
and cows and with the smallest number of farmer equations generally had 
o 
a larger number of higher valued R's. A comparison of the relative 
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performance of the two regression models by markets is afforded by the 
data in Table 26. These data indicate that markets 20, 21 and all of 
the small markets experienced the largest relative improvement from the 
multiple regression model. 
2 Table 26. Proportionate Distribution of R by Market for Single 
Variable and Five-Variable Regression Equations 
Value of coefficient of determination 
Market Equation 0-, .19 .20--.39 .40--.59 .60--.79 .80--.99 Total 
Number S M S M S M S M S M 
Percent in value classification3 
Large 
17 20 30 5 45 50 15 20 10 15 0 10 100 
20 20 25 0 25 15 40 30 10 50 0 5 100 
21 20 10 0 65 10 25 70 0 20 0 0 100 
24 23 52 8 26 35 17 35 5 13 0 9 100 
Small 
18 10 10 0 60 10 30 40 0 30 0 20 100 
19 20 25 0 25 20 30 40 15 20 5 20 100 
22 19 53 5 15 11 32 37 0 47 0 0 100 
23 21 28 0 38 19 24 33 5 38 5 10 100 
aS refers to single-variable equations; M refers to five-variable 
equations. 
o 
Multiple R values by type of buyer 
Packer buyers, followed closely by order buyers, had the largest 
number of equations that failed to "explain" at least 40 percent of the 
observed variation in prices. However, farmers had relatively more 
equations with R^'s less than .40. About a third of the equations for 
both farmers and packers accounted f r more than 60 percent of the price 
variations. The modal value of R for packer, order and management 
buyers was between .40-.59 and slightly below .40 for farmers. But as 
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o 
previously stated, the R values apparently were more closely associated 
with market class. Thus, the relatively better showing made by manage­
ment may be explained, at least partially, by their concentration of 
purchases in veals and cows. - . 
o 
Table 27 shows the percentage of R ' s with specified values by 
type of buyer for both the single and multiple regression models. The 
tabled data indicate that the additional variables were relatively more 
important in explaining price variations in farmer and management 
purchases than for packer or order buyers. 
o 
Table 27. Proportionate Distribution of R" by Type of Buyer for 
Single Variable and Five-Variable Regression Equations 
Value of coefficient of determination 
Buyers Equation 0-.19 .20-.39 .40-.59 .60-.79 .80-.99 Total 
N u m b e r  S  M  S  M  S M S  M  S  M  
Percent in value classification3 
Packer 47 30 2 40 23 24 43 6 28 0 4 100 
Order 52 17 4 38 15 37 38 4 35 4 8 100 
Management 17 47 6 18 11 24 35 11 24 0 24 100 
Farmer 37 43 0 36 35 16 33 5 24 0 8 100 
aS refers to single-variable equations; M refers to five-variable 
equations. 
o 
Summary of R 's for pooled equations 
The relative effectiveness of the multiple regression model in 
accounting for price variations for the individual market class groups 
2 
at each of the sample markets is reflected in the R values contained in 
Tables 28 and 29. The data show the market-to-market differences in the 
performance of the model, ignoring the type of buyer classification. 
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Table 28. Coefficient of Determination R^ by Market and Market Class, 
Large Markets 
17 20 21 24 
Market 
class df R2 df R^ df df R2 
Beef veals 18 .2814** 107 .5144** 105 .5449** - -
Mixed veals 98 .7527** 115 .6662** 75 .5874** 61 .6075** 
Beef calves 470 .1025** 373 .3107** 345 .2468** 219 .2173** 
Steers 608 .3097** 274 .5831** 649 .4869** 154 .4309** 
Heifers 331 .3362** 154 .4786** 303 .3739** 198 .3624** 
Beef cows 430 .2978** 323 .5486** 305 .4247** 193 .2968** 
Dairy cows 428 .4447** 259 .4624** 167 .4601** 350 .2350** 
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In other words, the R ' s relate to equations in which all of the 
observations for a market class at an individual market were pooled 
"over" or "across" all types of buyers. Market-to-market differences 
were reasonably large, and no single market had a monopoly on large 
2 
valued R 1s. These data tend to support the hypothesis that there is 
no one "best market" for all classes and species of livestock even 
within a rather restricted geographic area. 
A subsequent analysis, not included in the thesis, showed that, 
p 
in some cases, R 's were reduced considerably from fitting a "pooled" 
equation for each class at a market rather than a single equation for 
each type buyer purchasing the class at the market.^ Equations for 
slaughter calves were more adversely affected, and veal calves were 
least affected by pooling. However, the largest single reduction in 
o 2 9 
R among classes was for beef veals at market 17. The R 's for 
slaughter calves were reduced by more than .21 at three markets, and 
the reduction was .138, considering all markets. The average effect 
of pooling was most pronounced at markets 22 and 24, which suggests 
that the buyer effect was greatest at those markets. Pooling caused 
the least effect at markets 18, 20 and 21, which suggests relatively 
small differences in buyers' actions at those markets. 
•'"The analysis of the effect of pooling on the residual varian­
ces is presented in a following section. The analysis is similar to, 
though not as complete and elaborate as, that used for the single 
variable model. 
2 9 
The R was reduced from .651 to .281 by fitting a single 
equation for beef veals sold at market 17 rather than by using separate 
equations for each type of buyer. 
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o 
The R 1 s shown in Table 30 relate to equations for each market 
class purchased by a specified type of buyer, pooled over all markets. 
These data indicate that the model applied more generally to purchases 
by packer and order buyers than to purchases made by the management or 
farmers. However, in determining the price to pay for heifers and 
especially cows, management buyers relied on the factors considered in 
the multiple regression equation to a greater extent than the other 
buyers. The R^ for management purchases of dairy cows was more than 
2 twice that for either packers or farmers. The slaughter calf R for 
packers, on the other hand, though small, was 50 percent larger than 
for farmers and more than three times larger than for management. 
2 The reduction in R caused by fitting an equation pooled over all 
markets rather than a separate equation for each market was greatest 
for farmers (.17) and least for order buyers (.10). The pooling ad-
2 
versely affected R to the greatest extent for buyers by class as 
follows: packers, heifers (.14); order, slaughter calves (.16); 
management, beef cows (.28); and farmers, beef veals (.24). Considering 
all buyers, heifers and slaughter calves were most affected by pooling 
(.15). 
2 The R values for equations relating to purchases by each type of 
buyer at individual markets pooled over market class groups are pre­
sented in Table 31. The amount of variation "explained" by the pooled 
equations ranged from 41 percent for farmers at market 17 to 89 percent 
2 for management at market 19. However, the R for order buyers at 
market 18 ranked a close second and involved a reasonably large number 
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o 
Table 30. Coefficient of Determination R by Type of Buyer and 
Market Class 
Packer Order Management Farmer 
Market 
class df R^ df R^ df df R2 
Beef veals 243 .5374** 240 .7102** 83 .3298** 12 .6786** 
Mixed veals 260 .6078** 236 .7068** 162. .4697** 10 .3041 
Beef calves 761 .3113** 847 .1795** 45 .0978 347 .2024** 
Steers 647 .4434** 1079 .4606** 80 .3437* 442 .3504** 
Heifers 679 .3916** 485 .3752** 25 .4329** 221 .3542** 
Beef cows 662 .3840** 685 .4060** 51 .5836** 144 .3187** 
Dairy cows 808 .3899** 572 .4618** 46 .7914** 105 .3115** 
2 Table 31. Coefficient of Determination R by Type of Buyer and Market 
Packer Order Management Farmer 
jvidx rvc; u g p p O 
number df R_ df R df R df R 
17 960 .6245** 1106 .5850** - - 341 .4081** 
20 434 . 5467** 1078 .7453** 18 . 6809** 93 . 5451** 
21 1203 .5269** 572 .5976** 7 .5359 185 .5290** 
24 567 .6839** 289 .5317** 142 .6264** 189 .5015** 
18 13 .5301 177 .8358** 247 .6323** 2 .6684 
19 248 .6908** 163 .6393** 11 .8913** 196 .5245** 
22 232 .4845** 415 .6195** 51 .4905** 73 .4433** 
23 497 .6886** 338 .6346** 16 .6085** 196 .5115** 
of observations, principally veal calves. The R 's for packers were 
highest among the buyers at markets 17, 23 and 24; similarly, equations 
for order buyers accounted for the largest share of variations at 
markets 18, 20, 21 and 22. In nearly all cases, packer and order 
2 buyers ranked first and second in terms of higher R values. On the 
other hand, the R 's were smaller for farmers than any other type of 
buyer at all markets except 21 where they ranked second, barely nosing 
O 
out packers. The strong class effect is shown by the reduction in R 
of .17 from pooling even when all buyers and markets were considered 
as compared to a similar reduction of .11 from pooling over markets and 
.09 from pooling over buyers. Thus, the type of buyer purchasing 
several divergent classes of animals would suffer relatively greater 
from pooling than if the purchases were made in only a few classes. 
This phenomenon probably accounts for some of the relatively low R^'s 
recorded in Table 31 for packer and order buyers as compared to buyers 
for the auction management who, at most markets, centered their 
purchases on either veal calves or cows. Similar reasoning would hold 
for markets. For example, the pooling of data into a single equation 
2 
reduced the R value at market 22 by .26, or about four times larger 
than at market 18. The proportion of total sales in each market class 
was more evenly distributed at market 22 than at any other market. 
In contrast, 74 percent of the sales at market 18 were veals, which 
2 
was twice the average for all markets. The reduction in R 1 s from 
pooling over market class was highest at market 22 for all buyers 
excepting management. The reduction was greatest for management buyers 
at market 24 where they actively engaged in buying all classes consigned. 
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Residual Variation from Multiple Regression^ 
More than 80 percent of the residual variances (s^e) were less 
than 6.000. However, as shown in Appendix Table 50, the residual 
variance for the individual basic equations ranged from less than 
1.000 to more than 12.000. But only nine equations had variances 
larger than 10.000 as opposed to 25 equations with variances smaller 
than 2.000. Thus, the standard error (sg) for about 80 percent of the 
equations was less than 2.45; in fact, 40 percent of the equations had 
2 
standard errors smaller than 1.73. 
The variances generally were smaller for both breeds of cows and 
larger for veals than for the other classes. Actually, more than 80 
percent of the variances for steer, heifer and cow equations were less 
than 4.000. Only 33 percent of the variances for veals and slaughter 
calves were less than 4.000, while 25 percent exceeded 8.000. The 
variances were slightly smaller at the small markets for veals and 
cows, but the large markets tended to have smaller variances for steers 
and heifers. There was no apparent difference in the variance for 
slaughter calves associated with the size of market. Considering all 
153 equations, the pooled variance was 3.985 at the large markets and 
4.277 at the small markets. 
*The terms residual variance or variance as used in this thesis are 
considered analogous to the mean square for error as defined in 
statistical texts, i.e., Sum of Squares for Error. 
n- k-1 
'^ The standard error is the/ SS£~ = v/3.000 = 1.73. About 
Vn-k-1 V 
68 percent of the observations would be expected to fall within + one 
standard error from the mean. 
138 
The average "pooled" variance generally was smaller where the 
grade coefficient was significant. The pooled variance for all classes 
where grade was significant was 3.931 compared to 4.388 where grade was 
not significant. Where grade was significant, the pooled variances by 
classes were: beef veals, 8.088; mixed veals, 5.449; slaughter calves, 
4.105; steers, 3.557; heifers, 3.859; beef cows, 3.046; and dairy cows, 
2.928. 
The variances shown in Table 32 represent the estimated variance 
for each market class purchased by type of buyer, if the observations 
from all markets were combined into a single equation for each market 
class by buyer group. Except for beef veals and slaughter calves in 
which they ranked first and third respectively, farmers ranked fourth 
or largest in terms of the size of the variance. Packer buyers had 
the smallest variance for mixed veals and slaughter calves. Management 
buyers had the smallest variance for steers, heifers and dairy cows. 
In terms of the smallest variance, packers ranked first at markets 
17 and 18, fourth at markets 20 and 23 and second at all other markets.* 
The estimated variances for each type of buyer at the individual 
markets combined over all market classes are presented in Table 33. 
Tables 34 and 35 contain the estimated variances for each market 
class of animals sold at the individual market irrespective of the 
type of buyer making the purchase. A ranking of the markets from one 
through eight, in order of the increasing magnitude of the variance, 
^Packers actually ranked second at market 18; but since there 
only two degrees of freedom for farmer purchases at the market, 
they were ignored in the ranking. 
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Table 32. Variance of Prices Paid for Cattle and Calves by Type of 
Buyer and Market Class 
Packer Order Management Farmer 
Market 
class df s2e df s^ e df s2e df s^ e 
Beef veals 243 10.1059 240 7. 9534 83 6.3087 12 4.0999 
Mixed veals 260 7.6587 236 7. 9258 162 8.4458 10 12.7023 
Beef calves 761 3.8512 847 5. 1198 45 10.4047 347 7.8614 
Beef steers 647 3.9681 1079 4. 1380 80 2.5661 442 5.6622 
Beef heifers 679 4.7989 485 3. 9164 25 2.1273 221 5.9217 
Beef cows 762 3.8989 685 2. 6318 51 2.8352 144 3.5604 
Dairy cows 808 3.4940 572 2. 8627 46 0.2217 105 4.5868 
Table 33. Variances of Prices Paid for Cattle and Calves by Type of 
Buyer and Market 
Packer Order Management Farmer 
Market 
number df s2e df df S2= df =2= 
17 960 6.5609 1106 6.9864 - - 341 9.0381 
20 434 7.8573 1078 4.3880 18 4.6279 93 5.9018 
21 1203 7.3102 572 7.6414 7 5.1146 185 10.5284 
24 567 5.9097 289 5.4620 142 8.5448 189 6.4311 
18 13 3.7562 177 6.6348 247 6.8873 2 1.6970 
19 248 4.6512 163 5.9196 11 0.6557 196 5.8064 
22 232 7.8478 415 8.4181 51 2.1937 73 7.8875 
23 497 8.4684 338 6.7717 16 2.9317 196 7.6771 
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Table 34. Variance of Prices Paid for Cattle and Calves by Market 
and Market Class, Large Markets 
17 20 21 24 
Market 
class df 2 5 e df 
2 
5 e df s^e df =
2e 
Beef veals 18 6.2014 107 7.6319 105 10.4724 - -
Mixed veals 98 8.2289 115 8.1968 75 8.6643 61 9.0192 
Beef calves 470 5.3688 373 4.2352 345 5.1193 219 5.2332 
Steers 608 4.6754 274 3.4333 649 3.8424 154 3.6301 
Heifers 331 4.4424 154 3.3703 303 4.6720 198 2.9999 
Beef cows 430 4.0706 323 2.3739 305 3.3299 193 3.6509 
Dairy cows 428 3.3833 259 2.7895 167 2.7878 350 3.9996 
Table 35. ' Variance of Prices Paid for Cattle and Calves by Market 
and Market Class, Small Markets 
18 19 22 23 
Market 
class df 2 5 e df s^e df df 
Beef veals 154 4.9867 31 5.2117 71 6.5496 74 13.4253 
Mixed veals 205 6.9481 37 5.8565 16 5.1305 37 4.0922 
Beef calves 16 6.0299 200 5.1749 206 5.3843 147 7.9794 
Steers - — 68 3.2386 210 3.2929 267 5.6943 
Heifers 6 2.5081 85 2.9620 101 3.6290 208 5.8990 
Beef cows - - 112 3.2749 117 2.5853 144 2.2997 
Dairy cows 52 2.4111 67 2.7280 32 2.3740 152 3.1421 
141 
showed wide differences in the relative scores for the markets with 
respect to the various market class-breed groups. For example, market 
23 had the smallest variance for both beef and dairy cows and the 
largest variance for all other classes. Market 19, with no rank above 
four, had the most consistent pattern of small variances but was 
pushed for the honor by markets 20 and 22. 
As shown in Table 36, the variances for the multiple regression 
equations were considerably lower than those resulting from the simple 
variable equations with grade as the independent variate. The addi­
tional variables were relatively more effective in reducing the 
unexplained variation in steer prices than for any other class, as shown 
by the fact that 17 of the 24 variances for the multiple equations ver­
sus only three for the single variable equation were less than 4.000. 
Table 36. Frequency Distribution of Residual Variances 
Beef Mixed Slaughter Beef Beef Beef Dairy 
Variances veals veals calves steers heifers cows cows 
S M S M S M S M S M S M S M 
Number in specified size3 
0-1.99 0 1 0 2 0 2 1 2 0 1 3 7 6 10 
2.00-3.99 2 3 2 3 6 8 2 15 12 16 9 13 10 11 
4.00-5.99 2 2 1 3 6 7 13 5 9 6 12 4 6 2 
6.00-7.99 4 3 2 6 5 3 6 2 2 1 0 0 2 1 
8.00-9.99 2 2 8 1 3 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
10.00-11.99 2 4 2 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12.00-plus 3 0 2 1 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 
equations 15 15 17 17 25 25 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
aS refers to single-variable equations; M refers to five-variable 
equations. 
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Relative Reduction in Variation by Stratification 
An analysis of variance was performed using the grand total 
equation containing all sample observations to determine the reduction 
in price variation contributed by each of the stratification variables, 
or factors, over and beyond that removed by the regression variables. 
All possible permutations of the three factors were analyzed to 
determine the effect of the order of introduction on the amount of 
reduction contributed by each factor. However, the only statistical 
results presented represent the "best" ordering of the factors and the 
"poorest" arrangement as shown in Tables 37 and 38 respectively. 
Irrespective of the order in which they were considered, each of 
the variables made a highly significant contribution to a reduction in 
variation. Since the market class and market contributed most to a 
reduction in variance, any statistic related to a combined equation 
for these two factors would be more meaningful than another combination. 
In other words, the omission of the type of buyer classification would 
have the least adverse effect on the statistical results. 
An analysis was made, similar to that performed for the single 
variable equation, to determine the feasability of using one regression 
for all observations within a classification group combined "over" or 
"across" one of the stratification variables.As an example of the 
procedure, consider the variance shown in Table 32 for the purchase of 
steers by packer buyers combined at all markets, i.e., irrespective 
*Ostle$ op= cit., pp. 133-138. The general procedure applied 
to this thesis was outlined on pp. 
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Table 37. Reduction in Variation by Five-Variable Regression 
Sequentially Eliminating Breed-Class, Markets and 
Type of Buyer Stratifications 







Total3 10,244 212,823.38 20.78 
Regression over all 
stratifications 5 127,017.06 25403.41 3031 .43 
Error 1 10,239 85,806.32 8.38 
Additional regression 
due to breed-classes 36 34,404.42 955.68 189 .62** 
Error 2 10,203 51,401.90 5.04 
Additional regression 
due to markets 276 6,469.58 23.44 5 .17** 
Error 3 9,927 44,932.32 4.53 
Additional regression 
due to type of buyer 600 7,102.77 11.84 2 .92** 
Error 4 9,327 37,829.55 4.06 
aFrom a single mean. 
Table 38. Reduction in Variation by Five-Variable Regression 
Sequentially Eliminating Type of Buyer, Markets and 
Breed-Class Stratifications 







„  , , a  
.total 10,244 212,823.24 20.78 
Regression over all 
stratifications 5 127,017.06 25403.41 3031. 43 
Error 1 10,239 85,806.32 8.38 
Additional regression 
due to type of buyer 18 4,379.75 243.31 30. 52** 
Error 2 10,221 81,426.57 7.97 
Additional regression 
due to markets 162 12,797.20 79.00 11. 58** 
Error 3 10,059 68,629.37 6.82 
Additional regression 
due to breed-classes 732 30,799.82 42.08 10. 36** 
Error 4 9,327 37,829.55 4.06 
aFrom a single mean. 
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the markets at which they were purchased. The estimated variance for a 
single equation describing that combination was 3.968. When separate 
equations were fitted for packer purchases of steers at each individual 
market, the average "pooled" variance from the equations was 3.298, as 
shown in Appendix Table 51. The F-ratio between the residual variances, 
or mean squares, (5.38**) was larger than the tabular value (1.74) for 
F(oi) with appropriate degrees of freedom (30,617). Thus, in this 
example combining the data into a single equation is not justified on 
the basis of the statistical criteria employed. The statistical 
results of the analysis are presented in Appendix Tables 51, 52 and 53 
as applied to combining over all markets, all market classes and all 
buyers. Approximately 75 percent of the time the hypothesis would have 
been rejected with respect to combining the purchases of a specific 
class at an individual market, disregarding the type of buyer making the 
purchase. The results of the analysis reported in Appendix Table 52 
show that the possibility for legitimately pooling observations of all 
types of buyers into a single equation at the respective markets was 
greatest for beef veals, as market 23 was the only market showing a 
highly statistical significance between buyers of beef veals. With 
minor exceptions, significant differences existed between buyers for 
the other market classes at the individual markets. 
The results in Appendix Table 53 reveal that the differences in 
the regressions describing purchases of the respective market classes 
purchased by management buyers were not statistically significant 
except at markets 22 and 24. 
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RESIDUAL ANALYSIS 
Residual analysis may be viewed as a two-stage regression 
procedure in which the objective in the second stage is to estimate 
relationships between the dependent variable (Y). adjusted for the 
first set of regression variables, and a second set of factors. 
Residual analysis also may take other forms such as the analysis of 
variance. By treating the residuals as original data in the second 
stage, simple analyses can be performed to determine their relation­
ship with each of the selected factors in a singular fashion.* In 
this thesis the analysis of residuals was confined to a simple 
analysis, by usual statistical techniques, of the relationship between 
the price residuals from the multiple regression model and other 
selected factors. 
Analytical Procedures 
The estimated price for each animal or sales lot was computed 
p , A 
by the usual methods. The estimated prices (Y^ ) were compared with 
the respective observed prices (Y^) to determine the price residuals 
A 
defined as Y^ - Y^. In the process, the price residual and the square 
of the residuals were calculated and punched on IBM cards along with 
all necessary identification data. The residuals were treated as 
*This process is known as screening. The inclusion of all 
factors believed to affect cattle prices in a single regression equa­
tion would have increased tremendously the computations and analyses 
involved. 
9 
Prices were estimated for each sales lot within each of the 
regression groups represented by the 153 basic multiple regression 
equations. 
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original data in subsequent analyses performed to determine their 
relationship with other selected factors believed to affect cattle 
prices. The usual t-test procedures were used in testing the 
hypothesis that the mean residuals were not different from zero at 
either the one or five percent level of probability. 
While residual analysis provides a relatively easy method of 
determining whether certain factors affect price, the method leads to 
biased results. Vail examined the possible biases in estimates and 
tests of hypotheses resulting from the use of residual analysis as 
opposed to a simultaneous analysis of all factors in a single re­
gression equation.1 Without stating, proofs, two of Vail1s most 
important findings which apply to methods used in this thesis may be 
summarized as follows. 
(1) In the special case where there is only one factor to be 
analyzed by residual analysis, the estimates of the effect of this 
factor will be biased downward in the absolute sense. The estimate 
will have the same sign but have a smaller value than the actual effect. 
(2) Tests of hypotheses concerning these effects are quite 
conservative. That is, some factors which do affect the dependent 
variables may not test statistically significant. 
Since all residuals, by least squares definition, must add to 
zero, the sign of the mean residual (3) for a specific classification 
indicates whether, on the average, the group of animals under 
"''Richard W. Vail. Problems in residual analyses. Unpublished 
M. S. Thesis. Blacksburg, Virginia, Virginia Polytechnic Institute. 
1957. 
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consideration was priced above or below the general average for all 
animals with similar characteristics. A large or significant positive 
residual indicates that the animals in the classification group were, 
as a whole, overpriced, and the reverse is true where a negative 
residual exists. On the other hand, a small residual indicates that 
the animals generally were priced according to the multiple regression 
model. The variance, which indicates the variability of prices about 
the residual mean, may be considered as a measure of relative pricing 
efficiency. Under this concept, relative pricing efficiency would be 
inversely related to the magnitude of the variance.'*' 
Non-Linearities in Grade-Price Differentials 
The linear multiple regression model, used in this study, 
specifies constant or equal price differentials between adjacent 
grades throughout the range of grade quality represented in the observed 
data. While a constant grade-price differential may be subject to 
question on a theoretical basis, the linear model - as is often done -
was used as a first approximation of the relationship principally 
because the computations and interpretations were relatively easier. 
Another consideration was that there were insufficient price data 
available at the local market level to provide an empirical basis for 
specifying a more complex non-linear relationship between grade and 
price for cattle sold at auctions in the Appalachian area. Moreover, 
once the linear estimates were obtained, indications of departures 
^Obviously, the mean price must also be considered in any 
evaluation of over-all pricing efficiency. 
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from the linear model could be investigated by means of residual 
analysis. Any large, or significant, departure from a random 
variation in the positive and negative residuals would suggest that 
some form of non-linear relationship would more accurately describe 
the actual grade-price relationships observed in the sample data. 
To investigate the possibility of non-linear relationships in 
the grade-price data, all of the individually determined residuals were 
sorted into five market classes. For this aspect of the analysis, beef 
and mixed-type veals were considered jointly as a single class; beef 
and dairy cows were aggregated in a similar manner. Within each of the 
five market class groups, the data were aggregated from a one-third 
grade basis into respective whole grades. For example, the residuals 
for top, average and low choice grade steers were combined into a 
single choice grade group. The average residual and the standard error 
of the mean were calculated for each market class grade subset of the 
data."®" A significant departure from linearity in grade-price differ­
entials was indicated when the average residual tested significantly 
different from zero. The average residuals for each whole grade by 
market class are shown in Table 39 with the corresponding level of 
significance indicated in the usual manner. 
Veals 
The pattern of average residuals for the six grades of veals 
indicates that the linear model provided a reasonably accurate 
^The standard errors are not shown but were used to perform 
the t-test for significance. 
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description of the actual price differentials for all grades of veals 
other than those grading prime. The actual price paid for prime grade 
veals averaged 73 cents per hundred pounds below the estimated price; 
this difference, as shown in Table 39, tested highly significant. 
Generally, the extreme top and bottom quality grades were relatively 
underpriced, indicating a tendency to depart from a linearity at both 
ends of the quality range. However, in most cases very few animals 
were involved, and the majority of them were sold individually rather 
than in graded pen lots. About 50 percent of the sales lots, including 
56 percent of the veals, were graded either good or commercial; and, 
the residuals for both grades were positive, indicating that they were 
relatively overpriced according to the regression model. 
Table 39. Average Price Residual by Grade within Market Classes 
Grade Veals Calves Steers Heifers Cows 
Average residual - dollars per hundredweight 
Prime -.73** + .24 - - -
Choice -.02 + .07 -.09 -.05 -
Good + .24 -.04 + .02 +.27** + .18 
Commercial + .05 + .04 -.01 -.22** + .10 
Utility 
-.22 0.00 + .09 + .07 -.10 
Cutter3 
-. 12 -.45* -.67* -.23 + .02 
Canner - - -1.37 +1.23* -.03 
aRefers to cull grade for veals and slaughter calves. Single 
asterisk denotes significance at the 5% level; double asterisk 
indicates significance at 1% level of probability. 
Slaughter calves 
While there was evidence of slight overpricing for the top grades 
of slaughter calves, the average residuals did not test significant. 
However, there were only few animals represented in either the top or 
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bottom grades. The only evidence of departure from linearity was 
represented by the cull grade calves. This result was not surprising 
since the quality within the cull grade is extremely variable, ranging 
from animals of fair quality but carrying very little flesh to those 
that are deformed or show evidence of nutritional disorders. 
Steers 
Except for the cutter and canner grades, which included only a 
few animals5 the average residuals for steers were quite small and 
showed no evidence of serious departure from a linear relationship for 
grade and price. The residual for cutter grade steers was significant 
at the five percent level, and the residual for canner grade steers was 
nearly significant. On the average, choice grade steers were relatively 
underpriced by nine cents per hundredweight. The desire of farmers to 
purchase good quality animals carrying only moderate flesh probably 
accounts for the relatively overpricing of utility grade steers. 
Heifers 
The residuals for heifers showed more evidence of a non-linear 
relationship than either of the other classes. As shown in Table 39, 
good grade heifers were relatively overpriced by 27 cents per hundred­
weight while commercial grade heifers were relatively underpriced by 
22 cents per hundredweight. The average residuals for both grades were 
significant at the one percent probability level. In contrast to the 
pattern for calves and steers, the residual for canner grade heifers 
(+1.23) was positive and significant. 
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Cows 
While the residuals for cows ranged from a positive 18 cents for 
good grade to a negative of three cents for canner grade, none of the 
residuals tested significant. As was true for the other classes, very 
few animals were represented in the top quality grades, but relatively 
large numbers of cows were graded either cutter or canner. 
Non-Linearities in Weight and Price Relationships 
Limited observations made prior to and during the time of the 
study indicated the possibility that weight would be more appropriately 
considered as a discontinuous or discrete variable - within certain 
weight ranges. Animals within a specified market class and quality 
group often were further divided into various weight classifications 
at auctions in the area. Moreover, market news reports emanating from 
the local markets and the larger central markets usually quote prices 
for different ranges in weights, particularly for certain classes. 
Similarly, carcass prices generally are reported on the basis of weight 
in addition to other characteristics. 
An analysis similar to that performed on grade and price was 
made to investigate the possibility of non-linear relationships between 
weight and price. In the first stage of the analysis, the individual 
residuals for each of the seven market class-breed groups were 
aggregated into specified weight ranges. The weight ranges assigned 
were based in part on those popularly used in market news reports. 
However, the practices generally followed at the sample markets, 
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particularly with respect to pen-lot sales, were given major considera­
tion. All animals were classed into the following weight classifica­
tions. 
Market class Weight group designation Range in weight 
(Pounds) 
A. Veals 1 Less than 175 
2 175 through 219 
3 220 through 250 
B. Slaughter calves 1 Less than 300 
2 300 through 399 
3 400 through 499 
C. Steers, heifers and cows 1 Less than 600 
2 600 through 749 
3 750 through 899 
4 900 through 1099 
5 1100 or more 
The weight group numbers indicated above are important in 
interpreting historgrams of the weight residuals shown in Figures 
11 through 14. The average residual and the variances for weight 
classifications are presented in Appendix Table 54. 
Veals 
The average residuals for both beef and mixed-type veals showed 
a rather consistent curvilinear pattern. Generally, the lighter weight 
veals were relatively underpriced, the medium weights were overpriced 
and the heavy weights were underpriced. Indications are that the 
heavier veals at times were discounted rather sharply. Quite often 
heavy weight choice grade veals at Virginia auctions fail to command 
a better price than standard grade medium weight veals. Despite the 
curvilinear pattern of the residuals, none tested significant although 
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Figure 12. Average Price Residuals for Specified Weight Classifications 
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Slaughter calves 
The residuals for slaughter calves also exhibited a curvilinear 
pattern, but the shape of the curve was the reverse of that for veals. 
Both the lightweight and heavy weight slaughter calves were relatively 
overpriced and the medium weights were underpriced. At four of the 
markets the average residual for the medium weight calves was signifi­
cantly below the estimated average price from the linear model. The 
average negative residual for the medium weight groups testing signi­
ficant ranged from 31 cents at market 17 to 40 cents at market 24. The 
data are plotted on Figures 11 and 12 and tabled in Appendix Table 54. 
Many of the lightweight calves may have been substituted for heavy 
veals by some buyers, which would account in part for their relatively 
higher prices. 
Steers 
Steers weighing less than 600 pounds were relatively underpriced, 
though not to a significant extent, and those weighing 600-649 pounds 
were relatively overpriced at all markets excepting market 22 which 
exhibited a reverse pattern. The extremely heavy steers were relatively 
overpriced at markets 17, 21 and 24, which are located in a grass-
fattening area where three-year-old steers are not uncommon. However, 
the only residual that tested significant was for 1100 pound or heavier 
steers that sold for an average discount of 63 cents per hundred at 
market 20. 
The inconsistencies in the pattern of residuals for steers 
suggest that the demands for the various weights of steers were 
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different at the individual markets. However, generally speaking, 
the linear model provided a fair description of the weight-price 
relationships. 
Heifers 
The residuals for heifers at most markets, as shown in Figures 13 
and 14, generally exhibited a non-linear pattern. However, in most 
cases the residuals did not depart significantly from the linear 
estimate. Most frequently heifers weighing less than 600 pounds were 
relatively underpriced; and in all cases, excepting market 22, the 
heavier weights were underpriced by a fairly large amount. Only 
three weight groups of heifers, as shown in Appendix Table 54, tested 
significant. All of the significant groups were sold at the three 
West Virginia markets (21, 22, 23) and in all cases involved relatively 
few observations. 
Cows 
The residuals for cows were not presented in graphic form; 
however, the statistical results of the analysis are presented in 
Appendix Table 54. The average residual for lightweight dairy cows 
at market 20 (-73 cents per hundredweight) was the only group of cows 
that tested significant. The pattern of residuals for cows, as was 
especially true for heifers and steers, differed among markets. Most 
generally, however, cows weighing from 600-749 pounds and those 
weighing 1100 pounds or more were slightly overpriced. The majority 
of the residuals for cows varied from the linear estimate by less than 
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Figure 14. Average Price Residuals for Specified Weight Classifications 
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Residuals by Market, Market Class and Season 
Approximately two-thirds of the coefficients for the time 
variable (visit effect) in the multiple regression equations tested 
significant. However, the proportion testing significant varied 
considerably among the stratification groupings. To investigate the 
pattern of residuals with respect to seasonal differences over and 
beyond those linearly associated, the individually determined residuals 
were sorted into the seven market class-breed groups within each market. 
Then, the data were reduced from eight visits to four seasonal 
groupings. The average residuals resulting from the process are shown 
in Table 40. While the pattern was not consistent at all markets or 
for all classes, there was a rather definite non-linear trend apparent 
in the data. 
Veals 
The pattern of residuals for seasonal relationships was quite 
similar for both breeds of veals. Excepting at market 20, veals were 
relatively overpriced during the fall of 1953; they were relatively 
underpriced in the spring of 1954 with the exception of beef veals 
sold at markets 17 and 20. However, as shown in Table 40, the relative 
size of the residuals varied between breeds of veals and markets. At 
most markets the linear model overestimated prices for the 1954 fall 
season and underestimated them during the spring of 1955. The residuals 
suggest that a "doorstep" or "saw tooth" curve would provide a more 
accurate description of the seasonal price relationships for veal calves. 
160 
Table 40. Average Price Residuals by Market Class, Market and Season 
Market 
Class 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Dollars per hundredweight 
Beef veals 
Fall 1953 + .08 +2.64 + .31 -.25 + .41 + 1.41 + 1.20 -
Spring 1954 + .21 -.50 - +1.19 -.71 —. 37 -1.82 -
Fall 1954 -.17 + .48 -.38 -.23 -.27 + .40 - .43 -
Spring 1955 + .60 + .08 +4.08 + .36 + .90 +2.32 + .55 -
Mixed veals 
Fall 1953 + 1.52 + .78 + .74 + 1.11 + .70 +2.32 + .28 + .33 
Spring 1954 -.48 -1.18 -.51 -.53 -1.48 -4.28 -.20 -.09 
Fall 1954 -1.14 + .52 -1.13 -1.37 -.13 -.22 + .20 -.70 
Spring 1955 + .95 + .14 +1.98 + .87 + .65 + .44 -.12 + .38 
Slaughter calves 
Fall 1953 + .21 - + .17 
-.02 -.03 -.02 + .22 + .15 
Spring 1954 +2.29 +1.53 +1.20 + 1.62 +2.55 +1.06 + .39 -
Fall 1954 -. 49 -.90 - .33 -.49 -.19 -.09 -1.35 -.15 
Spring 1955 +4.16 +4.02 +4.41 +2.66 +4.80 +3.06 +3.23 -
Steers 
Fall 1953 + .26 - + .21 + .68 - .06 + .01 -.05 -.11 
Spring 1954 + .90 — 
-.69 + .18 + 1.46 +1.26 + 1.06 + 1.07 
Fall 1954 -.50 - — .34 -.29 -.13 -.09 -.82 -.07 
Spring 1955 +3.50 - +2.71 +3.75 +1.78 +2.76 +1.87 -
Heifers 
Fall 1953 + .22 +.82 + .21 
-.02 -.29 + .04 + .36 + .19 
Spring 1954 + 1.16 - + .75 +1.07 +2.61 + .82 +1.34 +2.85 
Fall 1954 - .62 - -.65 -.65 -.68 -.30 -1.27 -.31 
Spring 1955 +1.60 — .62 +1.87 +2.06 + 1.45 +4.18 + .84 +3.45 
Beef cows 
Fall 1953 + .40 - + .15 + .07 
-.32 + .02 + .10 + .17 
Spring 1954 + 1.66 - +1.13 + 1.21 +2.13 + 1.38 + .86 + 1.87 
Fall 1954 
-1.24 - -.92 -.65 -.32 -.56 -.77 -.75 
Spring .1955 +2.68 - +2.18 +1.88 +2.52 +2.53 + .90 +3.05 
Dairy cows 
Fall 1953 -.00 -.09 - .08 -.27 + .01 -.09 -.16 + .29 
Spring 1954 + .95 + .59 + 1.17 + .87 + 1.04 +1.17 + .83 + 1.47 
Fall 1954 
-1.98 - .68 -.79 -1.09 -1.12 -.69 -1.13 -1.60 
Spring 1955 + 1.30 + .93 +1.51 +1.49 +1.64 + .54 + 1.03 +2.60 
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Slaughter calves 
The residuals were reasonably small during the fall of 1953 but 
were approximately equally divided among the markets with respect to 
the sign of the residual. During the spring of 1954, the residuals 
had positive signs and were fairly large at all markets. All of the 
residuals were negative in the fall of 1954, indicating that prices 
were relatively low. A sharp upturn in prices is indicated by the 
large positive residuals for the 1955 spring season. As a matter of 
fact, the actual average prices of slaughter calves in the area were 
approximately $4.00 per hundredweight higher in the spring of 1955 
than in the previous fall even though the animals averaged two-thirds 
of a grade lower in quality. Thus, it appears that the "doorstep" 
description also would apply to the seasonal price relationship for 
slaughter calves. 
Steers 
The residuals for steers exhibited the same general pattern as 
that for slaughter calves. However, the residuals generally were 
smaller for steers than for either slaughter calves or mixed veals. 
As was true for all classes, the relatively large positive residuals 
for the spring of 1955 reflect the improvement in cattle prices which 
began in the latter part of the previous fall. The actual observed 
average prices for steers in the spring of 1955 exceeded those of the 
previous fall by nearly $3.00 per hundredweight. 
Heifers 
With minor exceptions, the residuals for heifers were positive 
during the 1953 fall season and the spring of 1954. However, the 
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residuals were considerably larger for the spring season. On the other 
hand, the residuals at all markets were negative and ranged from 30 cents 
to $1.27 in the fall of 1954. Except at market 18, all residuals were 
positive and fairly large in the 1955 spring season. An examination 
of the residuals for heifers presented in Table 40 shows the magnitude 
of the seasonal residual varied fairly widely among markets. 
Cows 
In the fall of 1953 there was a tendency for the residuals for 
dairy cows to have negative signs, and the residuals for beef cows tended 
to have positive signs. During all other seasons the patterns of the 
residuals basically were the same for both breeds of cows although the 
residuals generally were larger for the beef cows. Generally speaking, 
the magnitude of the residuals strongly suggests that cows' prices 
exhibit a non-linear relationship with respect to time and that the 
nature of the curve is quite similar to that for the other classes. 
Seasonal Residuals by Size of Market and Type of Buyer 
The residuals for the individual markets were combined into two 
groups representing the large and the small markets, respectively. By 
subsequent sorting and aggregation the data were segregated into 
market class-buyer-season groups.* The average residuals and variances 
were computed for each subset of data. While the variances are not 
shown, they were used to determine the level of significance of the 
average residuals shown in Table 41. 
•'•For this phase of the analysis both breeds of veals and cows 
were treated as singular groups. 
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Table 41. Average Residual by Size of Market, Type of Buyer and Season 
Market size Type of buyer and season 
and class Packer Order Management Farmer 
Fall Spring Fall Spring Fall Spring Fall Spring 
Large3 
Veals 
-.11 .15 -.15 .25 .05 -.42 -.10 .61 
Calves 
-.24** 2.51** -. 13 2.26** -.04 1.36 -. 30 2.90** 
Steers -.07 .93* -.09 1.18** 0.00 - -.37** 2.16** 
Heifers -.35** 1.75** -.28** 2.03** 0.00 - - .44* 1.29** 
Cows 
-.83** 1.48** -.50** 1.88** -.09 .78* -.48** 1.25** 
Small 
Veals .45 - .46 .13 -.09 .89** -.82** -.01 .03 
Calves 
-.17 2.49** - .26 2.07** 0.00 - - .16 1.30 
Steers -.24 .98** -.23 1.65** -.06 1.55 -.21 1.95* 
Heifers -.86** .92** -.33* 1.43** - .06 .13 -.51* 1.62** 
Cows -.71** .99** -.32** 1.25** -.02 .19 -.49** 1.19** 
a
* denotes significance at 5/o level • ** equals signi ficance at I/o 
level o f probability. 
The signs of the residuals for veals purchased by management were 
opposite (contra-seasonal) to those for other types of buyers in both 
size of market groups. None of the residuals for veals were signifi­
cant except for management purchases at small markets. Packers had 
the narrowest range in residuals for seasonal differences (.26) at the 
large markets and one of the widest ranges at the small markets (.91). 
In contrast, the range in magnitude of the residuals for farmers was 
greatest at the large markets and smallest at the small markets. 
The seasonal difference in magnitude of the residuals for all 
buyers was greater for slaughter calves than any other class at the 
large markets; a similar relationship held for packer and order buyers 
at the small markets. The residuals for calves generally were signifi­
cant in the spring season for all buyers, excepting management at both 
market size groups and farmers at the small markets. 
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The residuals for steers purchased in the spring were significant 
for all buyers other than management at both the large and the small 
markets. However, for the fall season the only group of residuals that 
tested significant pertained to steers purchased by farmers at the large 
markets. Farmers, followed closely by order buyers, had the largest 
seasonal variation in the size of residuals for steers. 
A consistent seasonal pattern was noted for heifers purchased 
by all types of buyers. Heifers, on the average, were relatively 
underpriced in the fall and overpriced in the spring. In the majority 
of cases the residuals were significant; however, the residuals for 
management were not significant. 
The pattern of residuals for cows irrespective of market size or 
type of buyer showed a negative sign for the fall residuals and a much 
larger residual with a positive sign for the spring season. In nearly 
all cases the residuals for both the spring and the fail seasons tested 
highly significant. 
Relationship between Price and Size of Sales Lot 
Where the supply of reasonably homogeneous animals is sufficiently 
large, it is rather common practice at Appalachian auctions to combine 
similar animals and sell them as a single sales lot. At most markets 
certain classes, notably veal calves, are graded and closely sorted 
on the basis of weight by an official state grader or an experienced 
market employee and assigned to pens, irrespective of ownership. How­
ever, ownership identity normally is maintained for steer, heifer and 
cow consignments when they are sold in multiple animal lots. Except at 
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special sales, the aggregation of larger cattle into multiple animal 
sales lots generally is restricted to the number of reasonably homo­
geneous animals offered for sale by a single consignor. 
Most of the auction operators, the livestock marketing specialists 
and the farmers in the area generally believe that pen-lot selling is a 
desirable practice. Some of the possible advantages of pen-lot selling 
include: (l) Buyers desiring relatively large numbers (say a truck 
load) of animals of the same class, grade and within a limited range in 
weights are provided an opportunity to secure enough animals to 
satisfy their orders with one or a small number of purchases, thereby 
reducing some of the uncertainties involved in buying single animals; 
(2) Buyers can examine and appraise the animals with greater care; and, 
if a good job of grading and sorting is done, the appraisal can be made 
more accurately and relatively easier; (3) The speed of the sale can be 
increased, which may reduce operating costs and at the same time shorten 
the buyers' time required to fill orders; (4) The management and other 
order buyers may solicit telephone bids from distant packers or 
feeders. One possible disadvantage of selling in large lots is that if 
certain small volume buyers are eliminated competition may be reduced. 
Although pen-lot sales were most prevalent for veal calves, some 
animals in all of the other classes were sold in that manner. However, 
cows were eliminated from the residual analysis because relatively few 
of them were sold in groups, and market 18 was not considered for the 
same reason. 
The residuals for all market class-breed groups excepting cows sold 
at each of the remaining markets were aggregated into various pen-lot 
size groups. The pen-lot size classifications were: 
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Market class 
Number of animals 
Size classification included 













100 or more 
B. Slaughter calves, steers 







11 or more 
The results of the analysis including the number of lots observed 
in each size category, the average residual and the variances are shown 
in Appendix Table 55. The average residuals are presented graphically 
in Figures 15 through 19. While the pattern of residuals was not 
consistent for all classes and markets, the results generally supported 
the hypothesis that price advantages are gained by selling reasonably 
homogeneous animals in groups rather than as individuals. Apparently 
the relationship was non-linear as prices generally increased with 
the size of lot to a point and then turned downward as the size of lot 
approached the upper end of the range in pen-lot size. 
Beef veals 
The residuals shown in Figure 15 suggest that the relationship 
between size of lot and price differs widely between markets. The 
nature of the buyers' demands probably accounts for most of the differ­
ence between markets. The relatively large negative residuals for lot 
size 4 at markets 22 and 23 and the positive residual for lot size 3, 
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Figure 15. Average Residual in Price for Beef Veals by Size of Sales 
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Figure 16. Average Residual in Price for Mixed Veals by Size of Sales 
Lot and Market 
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would be a desirable size of lot at those markets. On the other hand, 
the residuals at large markets 20 and 21 were positive and reasonably 
large for lots including up to 35 animals. 
Mixed veals 
'While the pattern of residuals for mixed veals was somewhat 
erratic, prices at most markets generally improved with the size of 
lot until 35 or more animals were sold as a group. The residuals 
generally were negative when the number of animals exceeded 35; 
however, this was not true at markets 17 and 24 which handled rela­
tively large numbers of veals. As shown in Figure 16, the residuals 
for lots containing two to five animals were negative at three of the 
markets; they were significantly low at markets 23 and 24 even though 
larger sized lots at those markets showed a relative improvement in 
price. 
Slaughter calves 
The residuals for slaughter calves were positive, indicating 
a positive price effect from group sales at all markets so long as the 
number in the lot did not exceed 10 calves. At four of the seven 
markets the residuals for lots containing from two to five animals 
tested significant. The residuals for lots of more than 10 animals 
also were positive at the large markets. These results, shown in 
Figure 17, indicate that the practice of selling slaughter calves closely 
sorted on grade and weight in medium size groups generally increases 
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Figure 17. Average Residual in Price for Slaughter Calves by Size 
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LEGEND : I = single lot sale ; 2- 2-5 animals ; 
3 =6-10; 4=11 and up. 
Figure 18. Average Residual in Price for Steers by Size of Sales 
Lot and Market 
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Figure 19. Average Residual in Price for Heifers by Size of Sales 
Lot and Market 
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Steers 
Except at market 17 which registered a negative residual for pens 
of steers containing more than 10 animals, all residuals were positive. 
Moreover, the residuals at large markets 20 and 24 were largest when 
the sales lots contained more than 10 animals."'" More than a third of 
the residuals for steers tested significant indicating a positive price 
advantage for steers sold in groups. 
Heifers 
As shown in Figure 19, heifers generally commanded relatively 
higher prices when sold in groups. However, group selling of heifers, 
particularly in lots of more than five animals, was not as extensively 
practiced as it was for steers, calves and veals. The probability of 
unobserved pregnancy in heifers and the buyers' fears of such 
occurrences were cited by auction operators as a major deterrent to 
selling heifers in large sized lots. The only residuals testing 
significant were for size group two at market 20 and size group three 
at market 23. 
In summary, pen-lot selling generally appears to be a desirable 
marketing practice. The possibility of bias outlined by Vail may 
p  
account for the relatively small number of significant residuals. 
^These results are consistent with the findings of a "quickie" 
analysis made by the author of the Virginia Feeder Calf Program sales 
data for the years 1953 and 1954 which showed that the average price of 
feeder steers sold in lots averaging 43 head was $2.25 per hundred 
higher tin an comparable grade steers sold in lots containing from two 
to five steers. 
^Vail, op. cit., p. 32. 
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ANALYSIS OF PRICE VARIATION WITHIN AND BETWEEN GRADES 
Variation in prices between and within adjacent one-third grades 
was examined as the final stage in the over-all analysis. Assuming 
that Federal grade standards adequately describe and delineate the 
qualities of animals consistent with the market or consumers' demands, 
and further, that the graders properly interpreted the standards which 
were understood and accepted by the buyer; then, a large proportion of 
significant differences between average prices for adjacent grades -
with a minimum of price variation within grades - would reflect a 
desirable element of pricing efficiency. 
Perhaps the most critical differential is between the adjacent 
one-third grades that define or delineate the "breaks" or change between 
whole grades. For example, in terms of pricing efficiency the price 
differential between top good and low choice grade (6-7) probably has 
more economic significance than the differential between low to average 
choice grade (5-6). Moreover, the economic significance of the differ­
entials which separate whole grades likely will attain increasing 
importance as the volume of beef sold on the basis of Federal carcass 
grade standards increases, unless the larger chain stores resort to 
specifying quality on a one-third grade basis. 
Computational and Analytical Procedure 
Within each market class group the data cards for the individual 
animals or sales lots were arranged by one-third grades in order of 
declining grade quality. All market class-grade groups containing only 
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a single observation were removed from consideration. In addition, 
the beef and mixed-type veals were pooled and treated as a single 
market class as were the beef and dairy cows. 
The corrected sum of squares, the weighted average prices (X) and 
the variance (s2) were computed for each remaining market class and 
grade group. The price differentials between a specified grade and an 
adjacent lower grade were computed. Standard "pooled t-test" procedures 
were used to test the hypothesis that the adjacent means were equal.^ 
When the calculated t-value exceeded the tabular t-value, differentials 
2 between the adjacent grades were considered significantly different. 
Seasonal Differences in Grade-Price Relationships 
Weighted average prices were computed on a one-third grade basis 
for all cattle and calves observed in the study, irrespective of market 
class, market, type of buyer or season. These weighted averages were 
plotted against their respective grades, as shown in Figure 20. The 
distribution of the points along the "free-hand fitted" straight line 
indicated that the most serious departures from a linear relationship 
occurred at both ends of the grade quality scale. However, approximately 
70 percent of the animals observed in the study ranged in grade from 
top good (7) to low utility (15). And, within that range in grade the 
•*"Ostle, op. cit. See pp. 98-99 for details of the procedure. 
p 
All calculations were made on an IBM 602-A calculating machine. 
Since the square root routine is slow and difficult to program on 
that machine, the F-test procedures were used instead of the t-test. 
The results are identical since F with 1 and n degrees of freedom equals 
t2 with n degrees of freedom. 
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Figure 20. Average Prices of Cattle and Calves, by Grades, Sold at 
Selected Appalachian Auctions - Pooled over Market Classes, 
Markets, Buyers and Visits 
relationship was linear to an amazing degree. The tendency for the 
average prices of the poor grade animals to "flatten-out" and depart 
from the general linear trend may be explained in part, at least, by 
the fact that a disproportionate number of animals in those grades 
were cows and for which the general level of prices was relatively low. 
Similarly, a disproportionate number of veals in the choice and prime 
grades probably accounts for a major share of the change in the 
relationship for the top quality animals. 
Weighted average prices also were calculated in a similar manner 
for all animals sold in the 1953 and 1954 fall seasons. When the 
average prices were plotted against their respective grades, as por­
trayed in Figure 21, they exhibited a pattern closely approximating 
a linear relationship and were quite similar for both years. Prices 
for the choice and prime grade animals exhibited the strongest tendency 
to depart from the general linear trend. 
Composite average prices by one-third grade for all classes of 
cattle sold in the 1954 and 1955 spring seasons are shown in Figure 22. 
While price variations were greater for the spring data than for the 
fall observations, a generally linear trend also was indicated. The 
commercial grade animals in the spring of 1954 and the good grade 
animals in the 1955 spring season showed relatively stronger tendencies 
to depart from the linear trend. Average prices for the two lowest 
quality grades sold in the spring, in contrast to the fall observations, 
tended to fall closely along the "free-hand fitted" straight line. 
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Figure 21. Average Prices of Cattle and Calves, by Grades, Sold at 
Selected Appalachian Auctions, Fall Seasons, Pooled over 
All Markets, Market Classes and Buyers 
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Figure 22. Average Prices of Cattle and Calves, by Grades, Sold at 
Selected Appalachian Auctions, Spring Seasons, Pooled over 
All Markets, Market Classes and Buyers 
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Veals 
The average prices by thirds of grades for veals disregarding 
markets, types of buyers and seasons, shown in Figure 23, exhibited 
a slight non-linear relationship which was convex to the origin. 
Grade-price differentials tended to narrow between the extreme top 
quality grades and to widen for the extremely low quality grades. 
The average differentials between adjacent one-third grades of 
veals for the four seasons are presented in Appendix Table 56. In 
nearly all cases, average prices were higher for the higher grade 
animals, and the price differentials and the standard error of the 
prices generally were smaller for the choice and prime grade veals. 
Except during the fall of 1953, the buyers paid significantly higher 
average prices for low utility grade veals than they did for the cull 
or lowest grade of veals. Generally, the number of significant price 
differentials was larger during the spring season. The average 
differential for the fall season was approximately $1.20 per hundred­
weight or about 50 percent greater than the average differential of 
$0.82 for the spring season. 
Slaughter calves 
The grade-price relationships for slaughter calves showed a tendency 
toward non-linearity, particularly for the good grade or better quality 
animals. The relationship resembles a diminishing marginal rate of 
substitution curve. As shown in Figure 24, a linear relationship 
apparently describes the grade-price relationship for calves in the 
commercial and utility grades. 
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Figure 23. Average Prices of Veal Calves, by Grades, Sold at Selected 
Appalachian Auctions - Pooled over All Markets, Buyers and 
Visits 
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Figure 24. Average Prices of Slaughter Calves, by Grades, Sold at 
Selected Appalachian Auctions - Pooled over All Markets, 
Buyers and Visits 
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Appendix Table 57 contains the average grade-price differentials 
for slaughter calves by seasons. The differentials averaged about 
$0.55 during the fall seasons and $1.20 per hundredweight during the 
spring seasons; the standard error of prices averaged about $2.10 in 
the fall and $2.50 in the spring. The price differentials tended to 
be wider and the standard errors larger at either end of the grade 
scale. Although the number of significant grade-price differentials 
was small for slaughter calves, most of them occurred in the fall 
season. Buyers paid significantly higher prices for low utility 
grade calves in both fall seasons and for low good grade calves in the 
fall of 1953. 
Steers 
The distribution of the average prices for middle good to low 
utility grade steers suggests a linear relationship between grade and 
price within those grades. Average prices for the average choice grade 
steers were less than for the low choice grade steers during both fall 
seasons. At the other end of the scale, average and top canner grade 
steers sold for higher average prices than low cutter grade steers. 
However, the plotted data for steers, as shown in Figure 25, follows 
a linear relationship to a greater extent than for any other class. 
The results of the analysis of grade-price differentials for 
steers by seasons are presented in Appendix Table 58. The average 
differential between grades was about $0.75 and was more consistent 
between seasons than for any other class; however, the number of 
significant differentials was considerably larger in the fall than in 












o <i i i » i » i i i i I i i I i l J——i—i—L 
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 
GRADE 
Figure 25. Average Prices of Steers, by Grades, Sold at Selected 
Appalachian Auctions - Pooled over All Markets, Buyers 
and Visits 
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During the fall season the differentials between the adjacent one-third 
grades that defined the whole grade "breaks" between the good, 
commercial and utility grades were significant. 
Heifers 
The distribution of the average prices by one-third grades for 
heifers, presented in Figure 26, exhibited a "snake-like wigglë' around 
a linear trend line. The prices for cutter and canner grades generally 
were above the line while the prices for the commercial grade were 
generally below the line indicating relative overpricing and under-
pricing respectively for those grades relative to a linear trend. 
The number of grade-price differentials for heifers testing 
significant showed less seasonal variation than for the other classes. 
Moreover, as shown in Appendix Table 59, buyers consistently paid 
higher prices for the lower one-third grade level of good, commercial 
and utility grades than they did for the top one-third level of the 
adjacent lower quality whole grade. The average price differential 
between grades was about twice as wide in the spring as in the fall, 
and the standard error for spring prices averaged about 50 percent 
larger than in the fall. 
Cows 
Figure 27 shows that, except for the cutter grade, cows generally 
exhibited a linear relation between price and grade. 
During the fall seasons buyers generally paid significantly higher 
prices for each one-third grade improvement in quality for cows ranging 
from the bottom grade through the low commercial grade. As shown in 
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Figure 26. Average Prices of Heifers, by Grades, Sold at Selected 









Figure 27. Average Prices of Cows, by Grades, Sold at Selected 
Appalachian Auctions - Pooled over All Markets, Buyers 
and Visits 
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Appendix Table 60, the significant differentials during the spring 
pertained to the lower quality grades. The differentials and the 
standard errors tended to be larger at either end of the range in 
grade. The average differential between grades was $0.53 in the fall 
and $0.68 in the spring. 
Grade-Price Relationships for Veal Calves by Types of Buyers 
The average observed price of veals by one-third grades and the 
average differential between adjacent grades with the level of 
significance noted on the price differential is shown for all types 
of buyers in Appendix Table 61. The composite average prices ranged 
from $12.16 for the cull grade to $24.60 for the few veals grading 
middle prime.^ Average prices for adjacent one-third grades were 
significantly different for 57 percent of the comparisons made. Whole 
grades were separated in a highly significant manner except for the 
difference between the good and choice grades. The average 
differential between one-third grades was $0.82; however, the differ­
ential tended to narrow as the grade quality improved. 
Packer buyers 
The average price paid by packers ranged from $12.44 for cull 
grade veals to $25.07 for the top choice grade. Packer buyers tended 
to pay more than other buyers for both the top quality and lowest 
quality animals. The average premiums paid over the nearest price 
^All averages and differentials are stated in terms of liveweight 
prices per hundred pounds. The composite average refers to the average 
for all animals sold irrespective of type of buyer. 
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competitor ranged from about $1.00 per hundredweight for the top choice 
grade to about $0.50 for the low utility grade. There was no evidence 
of a consistent pattern in the grade-price differentials paid by 
packer buyers. 
Order buyers 
In nearly all cases order buyers ranked either first or second 
among the buyers in average prices paid. Over 40 percent of the 
average prices were statistically significant from those of adjacent 
grades. Differences between the three lowest whole grades were 
significant. 
Management buyers 
Generally, management ranked either third or fourth in average 
prices paid; however, they paid the highest average price for the 
cull, top utility and top commercial grades of veals. Management 
buyers and farmers were the only buyers that paid a significantly 
higher price for low prime grade over top choice grade veals, yet 
they did not distinguish between the low utility and cull grades to 
the extent of other buyers. 
Farmers 
Farmers generally paid lower average prices and paid wider 
differentials between grades than the other buyers. These results 
suggest that farmers, as would be expected, were not assigning 
similar weights to the characteristics considered by the packer and 
order buyers in deciding what prices to pay for veals; farmers 
probably were evaluating the animals for a different end use. 
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Grade-Price Relationships for Slaughter Calves 
by Types of Buyers 
Composite average prices ranged from $10.60 for the cull grade 
animals to $21.75 for the few low prime grade calves. The average 
price for approximately 50 percent of the grades was significantly 
different from the average price of adjacent higher quality grades. 
Whole grades, with the exception of the "break" between the commercial 
and good grades, were separated by significant average prices. The 
differential between one-third grades averaged $0.57 but varied within 
whole grades from about $0.25 for the good grade to $0.95 for the 
choice grade. 
Packer buyers 
The majority of the low choice to low prime calves were purchased 
by packer buyers at slightly higher prices than paid by other types of 
buyers. However, packers paid lower average prices than other buyers 
for animals in the lower grades. In most cases, packers distinguished 
between whole grades. The differential between adjacent one-third 
grades averaged about 60 cents. However, as shown in Appendix Table 62, 
the differentials were wider for the grades representing either end of 
the grade quality scale. 
Order buyers 
The average prices paid by order buyers for cull, low utility end 
low good grade calves were lower than the prices paid by other buyers. 
In contrast, they paid the highest prices for top utility calves and 
ranked either second or third with respect to prices paid for the other 
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grades. The average differential between grades most frequently 
purchased was about 40 cents. 
Management 
Relatively small numbers of slaughter calves were purchased by 
management buyers. The differentials between grades were erratic and 
inconsistent. More than half of the differentials carried positive 
signs, indicating that higher average prices were paid for an adjacent 
lower grade quality. For example, the average price for top commercial 
grade calves was $15.61 as compared to only $14.85 for calves in the top 
good grade. The average price paid by management for most grades of 
calves was the lowest among buyers; however, their average price for 
cull and top commercial grade calves exceeded all others. 
Farmers 
The average prices paid by farmers for calves grading low choice, 
top commercial, top utility and cull were slightly lower than the 
highest price paid; but for all other grades between the cull and low 
choice grades the average prices paid by farmers exceeded those of 
other buyers by about 75 cents. For example, within that quality 
range the average premium paid by farmers over the prices paid by 
packer buyers was 88 cents. Generally, the premium paid by farmers 
increased as the grade quality declined. Two of the most plausible 
explanations for this phenomenon are: first, since farmers were 
purchasing the animals for further finishing rather than for slaughter, 
they most likely placed relatively less emphasis on finish and 
evaluated the animals more on the basis of conformation, weight, breed, 
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sex and other "quality characteristics;"* secondly, it is commonly 
believed that farmers are generally not as adept in the art of bidding 
or in evaluating the grade of animals as professional buyers. 
Grade-Price Relationships for Steers by Types of Buyers 
Composite average prices by grades ranged from $10.42 to $19.60. 
The differential between grades averaged 70 cents; and excepting the 
differential between the low and average choice grade and between 
the low cutter and top canner grades, all differentials were positively 
correlated with changes in grade quality. The data for steers are 
presented in Appendix Table 63. 
Packer buyers 
Packers paid the highest average price for top choice grade steers, 
but in terms of prices paid they generally ranked either third or 
fourth among the buyers for the other grades. Nearly 75 percent of the 
steers purchased by packers were graded either good or commercial, and 
within that quality range the differential between adjacent one-third 
grades averaged $1.00. About a third of the comparisons between 
thirds of grades tested significant. 
Order buyers 
Order buyers paid higher average prices for low choice grade 
steers than they did for either the average or top choice grade animals; 
*Sex was not considered in classifying the slaughter calves; 
however, observations made during the sales showed that farmers tended 
to be more aggressive bidders for the male calves. 
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in fact, the average price paid for top choice was only 14 cents above 
the average price paid for the top good grade. Order buyers generally 
ranked second among the types of buyers in the level of prices paid 
except that they paid the lowest prices for commercial and low utility 
grade steers. The differential between adjacent one-third grades 
averaged about 65 cents, but the differential ranged from 23 cents 
for the canner grade to more than $1.00 for the good grade. 
Management 
Average prices paid by management buyers for average and low 
utility grade steers exceeded the prices paid by other buyers, but 
management generally ranked third or fourth in terms of prices paid 
for the other grades of steers. The differential between grades was 
smallest within the commercial grades and widest within the good grade, 
and only one of the nine comparisons tested significant. 
Farmers 
For more than two-thirds of the grades purchased, the average 
prices paid by farmers exceeded those paid by other buyers. None of 
the grade-price comparisons involving purchases by farmers tested 
significant except between the average and top third of the good 
grade. Average prices for about 20 percent of the grades were higher 
than the prices paid for the adjacent higher grade quality. The 
differential between grades tended to widen and the average price 
premium paid relative to other buyers tended to increase as the grade 
quality declined. 
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Grade-Price Relationships for Heifers by Types of Buyers 
The composite average price paid for heifers by grade ranged from 
$6.99 for the low cutter grade to $16.43 for the average choice. As 
shown in Appendix Table 64, average choice grade heifers sold for a 
higher average price than the top choice grade. The differential 
between grades was wider at both ends of the grade quality scale. Only 
about a third of the between-grade comparisons, fewer than for any 
other market class, tested significant. 
Packer buyers 
The average prices paid by packers for 13 of the 18 one-third 
grades purchased exceeded the prices paid by other buyers. This was 
a reversal of their relative position with respect to prices paid for 
steers and slaughter calves. About a third of the differentials 
carried a positive sign, indicating that changes in prices paid were 
inversely related to improvement in grade quality. The price premium 
paid by packers ranged from about 30 cents for average utility to $1.88 
for low cutter grade heifers. 
Order buyers 
Order buyers paid the highest average prices for choice grade 
heifers; but they ranked second or third in average prices paid for 
most of the other grades. Average prices paid by order buyers were 
significant for the adjacent one-third grades separating all whole 
grades from cutter through good. An interesting observation is that 
for grades below the utility grade,order buyers paid higher average 
prices for each successively lower one-third grade. Obviously, factors 
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other than grade assumed relatively greater importance in determining 
the prices paid for the extremely low quality heifers» 
Management 
Average prices paid by management were highest among the buyers 
for heifers ranging in grade from top utility through average commercial. 
On the other hand, average prices paid for the other grades generally 
ranked either third or fourth. Generally, the price differentials 
between grades were smallest for management buyers, and none of the 
grade-price comparisons tested significant. Moreover, nearly 25 
percent of the differentials were inversely related to changes in grade 
quality. 
Farmers 
Relative to prices paid by the other buyers, the average prices 
paid by farmers generally ranked third or fourth. However, farmers 
ranked first in terms of prices paid for average cutter grade heifers 
and second in prices paid for the top cutter and low utility grades 
of heifers. Grade-price differentials paid by farmers generally were 
larger than for other buyers, and only one (13-14) tested significant. 
Grade-Price Relationships for Cows by Types of Buyers 
Composite average prices paid for cows ranged from $6.10 for the 
low canner grade to $12.90 for the average good grade. The only 
positive differential, indicating a higher average price for the 
adjacent lower grade, was between the average good and the top good 
grade. About 70 percent of the differentials for cows - more than for 
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any other market class - tested significant. Moreover, the grade-price 
differentials for cows were less variable and more consistent with 
respect to changes in grade quality. For example, differences in 
average prices were significant for all "breaks" between whole grades. 
Packer buyers 
With the exception of low commercial and average cutter, the 
packers paid higher average prices for all grades of cows than the 
other buyers. As would be expected, the price premiums paid tended to 
become smaller as grade quality declined. The proportion of 
differentials testing significant was lower for packers than for 
management or order buyers. 
Order buyers 
Average prices paid by order buyers for the better grades of 
cows ranked second to the prices paid by packers. However, the average 
prices paid for the lower grades of cows generally ranked third, 
averaging less than the prices paid by either packers or farmers. The 
differentials averaged 50 cents, and more than half of them tested 
significant. Yet, the only whole grade "break" that tested significant 
was between the utility and commercial grades. 
Management 
Relative to prices paid by other buyers, management buyers paid 
the highest average price for top utility and the lowest price for all 
other grades. The price differential between grades averaged slightly 
more than $1.00, which was larger than for the other buyers. 
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Farmers 
In pricing cows, farmers apparently did not place as much 
emphasis on grade as the other buyers. Approximately a third of the 
differentials carried positive signs, indicating an inverse relation­
ship between changes in prices and grade quality. Only two of the 
twelve comparisons made tested significant, but both of these 
separated whole grades. The average price paid by farmers averaged 
55 cents below the average price paid by packers; however, the discount 
was smaller within the cutter and utility grades. 
Grade-Price Relationships by Markets 
All observations for each market class of animals sold at each 
of the individual markets were pooled over all buyers and seasons. 
Since the results were not very consistent or meaningful and because 
of the space requirements, the statistical results are not presented 
in detail. There was a tendency for a larger proportion of significant 
grade-price differentials for steers at those markets where steers 
represented a relatively larger share of the total consignments. 
Similar relationships were not evident for the other classes. The 
proportion of significant grade-price relationships, considering all 
classes, were larger at three of the large markets. 
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SUMMARY 
The analysis of cattle prices at Appalachian auctions was 
performed in four successive and closely related stages. First, 
single variable regression equations were used to investigate the 
singular relationship between grade and price. Secondly, multiple 
linear regression equations with grade, carcass weight, dressing 
percentage, liveweight and time (visit number) were employed in the 
analysis. Third, an analysis was made of the relationship between 
the price residuals from the multiple regression phase and selected 
other variables. Fourth, regular analysis of variance techniques 
involving pooled t-test procedures were used to investigate grade-
price relationships, thereby avoiding the linear restrictions imposed 
by the two regression models. 
In both regression phases, separate equations were fitted for 
153 groups representing all possible combinations of the data strati­
fied on the basis of market, market class and type of buyer. Both 
the single and multiple regression equations were fitted by the 
method of least squares. Also, they were unweighted. The statistical 
analysis was based on 10,245 sales observations collected on eight 
visits, representing two visits each fall and spring season over a 
two-year period, to eight selected auctions in the Appalachian area. 
Since grade generally is considered the best single expression 
of quality in slaughter cattle, one of the first steps in over-all 
analysis was to investigate, by means of single variable regression 
equations, the relationship between grade and price. 
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Most of the single variable equations with grade as the independent 
variable failed to account for a large part of the variation in price, 
even though the reduction in variation was statistically significant 
for a high percentage of the equations. Only 23 of the equations, 
including 14 associated with veals, were able to account for 50 percent 
or more of the variation in observed prices. These results indicate 
that during the period of time covered by this study the buyers placed 
considerable emphasis on other variables in addition to grade in evalua­
ting cattle sold at the sample auctions. The fact that most of the 
veal calves were graded prior to the sale and sold in relatively 
homogeneous pen lots may partially account for the relatively better 
performance of the veal equations in "explaining" price variation. 
Nearly all of the grade coefficients indicated a positive increase 
in price with an improvement in grade quality. In fact, only eight 
coefficients for grade, all of which were fairly small and represented 
less than two percent of the observations, had signs indicating an 
inverse relationship between price and grade changes. 
The values of the regression coefficients generally were largest 
for the veals, especially the mixed-type, and smallest for the slaughter 
calves. In most cases a whole grade improvement in grade quality 
would have resulted in an estimated increase in liveweight price of 
about $2.50 for veals, $1.00 for slaughter calves, $1.25 for cows and 
$1.50 for steers and heifers. 
The estimated differential between grades, as reflected by the 
size of the average grade coefficient, was frequently larger for order 
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buyers than for the other buyers. Moreover, the for order buyers' 
purchases pooled over markets generally was largest among the buyers 
for four of the market classes and ranked second in all others. 
Analysis of variance techniques were used to test the hypothesis 
that the regressions for the various classifications were the same, 
i.e., a single regression equation could replace the several equations 
within the stratified groups. With a few minor exceptions, the hypothe­
sis was rejected. A further analysis was made to test the validity of 
a companion hypothesis that the slopes (bj_) of the several regressions 
were the same. Again the hypothesis was not acceptable for most groups. 
However, the results showed that grouping all buyers into a single 
equation for a specified market class was statistically justifiable at 
some markets. Pooling all veals into a single equation was justifiable 
at most markets; however, market 24 was the only market at which the 
slopes of the regression lines for steers were not significantly differ­
ent between the types of buyers. Incidentally, most of the grade 
coefficients for steers that had improper signs (+) were found at 
market 24. The 153 regression groups were retained intact, however, 
because the variation was inconsistent among markets with respect to 
the various classes. 
In the next stage of the analysis, multiple linear regression 
equations with grade, carcass weight, dressing percentage, liveweight 
and time (visit) as independent variables were computed by the method 
of least squares for each of the 153 groups. In addition, certain 
"pooled" equations were calculated. 
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The multiple regression model was considerably more effective 
than the single variable model in accounting for price variation as 
shown by the fact that 90 of multiple R2ls exceeded .50, as compared 
to only 23 for the single variable equations. The widest differences 
among R2 values were associated with class. For example, 88 percent 
of the R2,s for veals and 71 percent of the R2's for steer equations 
exceeded .50; in contrast, only about 20 percent of the equations for 
slaughter calves were able to match that performance. 
The R2ls for steers and dairy cows were increased relatively more 
than was true for the other classes as a result of adding the four 
additional variables. Similarly, among the markets the greatest 
relative improvement in the value of the R2» on the average, occurred 
at markets 18 and 23. The relative gains in R values were approxi­
mately equal for all types of buyers. 
Relative to the other classes, the variances generally were 
largest for veals and smallest for cows. The variances tended to be 
slightly smaller for veals and cows sold at the small markets. How­
ever, considering all sales, the variances at the large markets were 
smaller than at the small markets. Generally, the variances were larger 
for equations describing farmer purchases than for the other types of 
buyers. 
High correlations between several of the variables, especially 
between grade and dressing percentage, complicated the interpretation 
of the individual regression coefficients. Most of the grade coeffi­
cients indicated an increase in price with an increase in grade 
quality. Slightly more than half of the coefficients for carcass weight 
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indicated higher prices for an increase in carcass weight. The 
number of dressing percentage coefficients carrying a negative sign 
was approximately equal to the number with positive signs; however, 
most of the coefficients with negative signs were relatively small 
and were associated with relatively large grade coefficients. This 
phenomenon may be attributed, in part, to the high correlation between 
grade and dressing percentage. The weight coefficients were approxi­
mately equally distributed with respect to signs and in most cases 
were relatively small. 
The coefficient for time was significant in about two-thirds of 
the equations. Most of the time coefficients indicated an increase in 
price of from 33 cents to 66 cents between visits. There was a slight 
tendency toward a relatively larger proportion of significant coeffi­
cients for time in those classes showing the greatest seasonal 
variation in marketings. 
Packer buyers had the largest percent of significant coefficients 
for grade and dressing percentage, indicating a general tendency to 
consider "quality" more frequently than the other types of buyers in 
determining prices to pay. On the other hand, farmers and management 
buyers had the fewest number of significant grade and dressing percent­
age coefficients. 
The proportion of the equations with grade coefficients testing 
significant was significantly greater at the large markets, but this 
was not true for the coefficients of the other variables. In fact, 
except for the time coefficient, the proportion of significant 
203 
coefficients for the other variables was slightly larger at the small 
markets. 
An analysis of the differences in the regressions for the 
respective groups, similar to that performed on the data for the single 
variable equations, firmly established that, with few exceptions -
mainly involving either management buyers or farmers, there was no 
legitimate statistical basis to justify aggregating the data into 
fewer regression groups. In other words, significant differences 
existed between buyers, markets and market classes. These results 
suggest that the level and variability of prices for a given class 
of animals were affected by the market at which they were sold and the 
complex of active buyers present or represented at the market. More­
over, they tend to support the hypothesis that there is no single 
"best market" for all species and classes of livestock even within 
a rather restricted geographical area. The adverse effect of pooling 
was not uniform among the markets. Differences between regression 
equations for the various buyers were relatively smaller at markets 
18 and 20 and relatively larger at markets 22 and 24. Wide differences 
between buyers for a given class of animals at an individual market 
suggest an element of market imperfection. Other results of the 
multiple regression analysis suggest that pricing was relatively poor 
and inconsistent at markets 22 and 24 for most market classes. 
The analysis of the residuals from the multiple regression equations 
revealed very few instances of significant departures from a linear 
relationship for grade over and above that previously removed. The 
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prices of heifers exhibited the strongest tendency to depart from a 
linear relationship. Prime grade veals were the only top quality 
animals that were relatively underpriced. In fact, contrary to the 
often quoted hypothesis concerning livestock pricing at Southern 
markets, there was slight tendency toward overpricing of the top 
quality grades at the markets included in this study. 
The residuals for weight showed a relatively strong tendency to 
depart from linearity. However, there was considerable variation 
between markets in the pattern of residuals for the various classes, 
which suggests a difference in buyers' weight preferences at the 
various markets. 
There was a definite, though not consistent, non-linear seasonal 
effect reflected by the residuals for the fall and spring seasons. 
The signs of the residuals for veals purchased by management were 
contra-seasonal to the other buyers. 
Pen-lot selling of accurately graded animals that have been 
closely sorted by weight appears to be a desirable marketing practice. 
However, in most cases, the price advantage diminished or became 
negative for the relatively large lots. The pattern of residuals 
suggests that the determination of the optimum size lot is an individual 
market problem. 
The analysis of grade-price differentials revealed a surprisingly 
strong linear trend toward grade and price for all classes of cattle 
included in the study. Average grade-price differentials were approxi­
mately the same for steers and heifers in the fall seasons, but the 
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differential for heifers was about 50 percent greater than for steers 
in the spring seasons. The grade-price differentials for cows were 
smaller, on the average, and varied less seasonally than the differen­
tials for the other classes. 
Veals were the only class for which the seasonal pattern of grade-
price differentials supported the hypothesis that price differentials 
would be wider in the fall than in the spring. The hypothesis was based 
on the belief that the larger number of animals consigned in the fall 
relative to the number consigned in the spring sales would provide 
buyers an opportunity to be more discriminating. 
A general appraisal of certain marketing practices or operating 
procedures common to auctions in the Appalachian area suggest that 
pen-lot sales of graded animals closely sorted by weight and condition 
and the maintenance of a regular sales order in which all animals of a 
given class or type with the same general characteristics are sold in 
successive order tend to contribute to pricing accuracy and marketing 
efficiency. Both practices tend to reduce the buyers' uncertainty 
especially with regard to quality and also act to minimize the variation 
in prices for reasonably homogeneous animals in that buyers are able to 
make animal-to-animal comparisons in a more continuous manner. 
Selling animals on the basis of "on arrival" weight instead of 
weight at time of sale and the practice of non-firm or "free-wheeling" 
opening bids coupled with "by bidding" on the part of consignors and the 
auction management acts to increase buyer uncertainty and would tend to 
reduce pricing accuracy. 
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1940 and 1941. Voluntarily entered the U. S. Air Force in 1941 and 
honorably discharged December 1945. Entered University of Georgia and 
earned B.S.A. and M.S.A. degrees. 
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Appendix Table 42. Form Used to Record Individual Animal ox Lot Data at Appalachian Auctions 
IDENTIFICATION NUMBER 
(animal or lot of animals) 
PEN NUMBER 
NUMBER IN LOT 





















GRADE OF ANIMAL 








(of animal or average of 
lot) 
CUTTER 
High 01 % 
Medium 02 
Low 03 WEIGHT 
(or average of lot) 
High 04 
Medium 05 PRICE $ 
Low 06 (per hundred) 
High 07 TYPE OF BUYER 
Medium 08 
Low 09 Packer buyer 1 
Local Slaughterer 2 
High 10 Order buyer 3 
Medium 11 Management 4 
Low 12 Other 5 
Speculator 6 
High 13 
















Appendix Table 43. Auction Management Schedule 
1. Date this record taken Enumerator 
2. Auction 
3. Name and address of person supplying information _____ 
4. Date of sale to which data below applies 
5. Time of sale: Began selling cattle and calves _______ 
Finished selling cattle and calves 
6. Usual order of sales (Check applicable item) 
No specific order 
First delivered, first sold 
Variable order from week to week 
Definite order that buyers and sellers can depend on _________ 
7. Bidding by auction management personnel (including auctioneer) 
Slaughter-type animals of specified class 
Practice of operator bid on bv operator in manner indicated 
Veal Slaughter 
calves calves Steers Heifers Cows 
Number of animals3 
No biddina 
Firm opening bid onlv 
Firm opening bid and 
additional biddina 
Suaaestive onenina bid onlv 
Suggestive opening bid and 
additional biddina 
Unable to determine 
Other (specifv) 
Total graded 
^Convert all percentage estimates to numbers. 
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Appendix Table 43. (Continued) 
8. List of buyers on market by name and type of buyer. 
9. Reason for purchases by auction management 
Slaughter-type animals of specified class 
bought by operator for reason indicated 
Reason for buying 
Veal Slaughter 
calves calves S teers Heifers Cows 
Number of animals3 
Bought on order 
Speculative 
To supply other markets 
under same ownership 




^Convert all percentage estimates to numbers. 
10. Number of cattle and calves sold on day of sale. 
(a) Number of all cattle and calves sold 
(b) Number of slaughter-type cattle and calves sold 
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Appendix Table 44. Number of Cattle of Specified Grade and Market Class 
Purchased by Type of Buyer at Selected Appalachian 
Auction Markets, 1953-1955 
P,rj,me Choice Goçd i Commercial - Utility Cutter3 Cannei 
Igais 
Buyer 1 9 1700 1604 1398 657 180 -
2 20 787 627 841 267 127 -
3 12 185 448 214 99 60 — 
4 — 1 to 21 %8 _i£ -
Total 41 2673 2689 2474 1051 412 — 
Slauohter calves 
Buyer 1 8 274 550 530 241 57 -
2 1 106 462 598 276 95 -
3 2 8 66 76 21 8 -
4 - n 16$ 276 as; -52. -
Total 11 399 1243 1480 689 213 — 
Steers 
Buyer 1 1 96 372 418 141 19 8 
2 99 494 679 629 70 10 
3 - 5 53 109 21 3 -
4 — 22 153 
_am 286 
Total 1 222 1072 1536 1077 136 30 
Heifers 
Buyer 1 1 73 248 339 288 79 20 
2 - 31 195 298 214 65 23 
3 - - 20 27 17 9 1 
4 4 67 199 _JÉQ. _3& -22, 
Total 1 108 530 802 659 188 66 
Cows 
Buyer 1 - — 50 207 606 597 494 
2 - - 27 146 452 488 486 
3 - 2 11 37 63 60 
4 — - 2 40 88 123 —21 
Total — — 81 404 1183 1271 1133 
All classes 
Buyer 1 19 2143 2824 2892 1933 932 522 
2 21 1023 1805 2562 1838 845 519 
3 14 198 589 437 195 143 61 
4 - 38 397 805 693 300 127 
aThe lowest grade for Veals and Slaughter Calves is cull; the 
proportion graded as "Culls" are included under the "Cutter" column in 
this table. 
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Appendix Table 45. Number of Cattle of Specified Grades, by Markets, 
at Appalachian Auctions, 1953-1955 
Market number 
_JLZ -18 JL2 -20 -2L _22 _22 -24 All markets 
Prime 
Buyer 1 3 - - 7 1 2 6 - 19 
2 - 17 - - 3 1 — - 21 
3 - 14 - - - - - — 14 
4 — — — — — — - - — 
Choice 
Buyer 1 867 1 141 189 97 33 133 682 2143 
2 420 60 106 270 79 58 12 18 1023 
3 - 127 43 - 6 16 - 6 198 
4 15 — 7 3 3 — 7 3 38 
Good 
Buyer 1 830 3 220 285 500 139 310 537 2824 
2 483 65 47 456 255 302 114 83 1805 
3 - 128 24 2 27 34 17 357 589 
4 78 1 54 35 60 42 90 37 397 
Commercial 
Buyer 1 580 15 179 344 684 132 438 520 2892 
2 606 76 79 485 347 290 261 418 2562 
3 - 103 16 22 33 89 15 159 437 
4 201 7 101 84 108 68 151 85 805 
Utility 
Buyer 1 545 31 143 245 373 72 274 250 1933 
2 513 52 111 563 205 87 138 169 1838 
3 - 64 13 15 4 13 17 69 195 
4 188 8 92 94 91 29 110 81 693 
Cull 
Buyer 1 101 9 30 27 42 3 17 8 237 
2 49 13 21 90 23 7 9 10 222 
3 — 32 8 10 - - - 18 68 
4 33 3 14 20 16 - 8 4 98 
Cutter 
Buyer 1 225 15 52 42 100 14 72 175 695 
2 168 9 47 207 53 38 67 34 623 
3 - 9 14 12 - 3 - 37 75 
4 39 5 24 14 26 13 32 49 202 
Canner 
Buyer 1 193 5 46 33 56 3 29 157 522 
2 137 20 33 227 19 18 44 21 519 
3 - 12 10 7 - 3 1 28 61 
4 25 4 14 27 12 2 18 25 127 
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Appendix Table 46. Values of Regression Coefficients, R2 and Standard 





N bo bl se 
r2 
17 1 1 1 15 23.37 -.5476 2.00 .476** 
17 1 1 2 180 18.37 -.4251 2.18 .215** 
17 1 1 3 67 18.38 -.1587 2.70 .024 
17 1 1 4 166 19.46 -.5199 1.98 .365** 
17 1 1 5 203 16.76 -.4653 2.43 .201** 
17 1 2 5 275 16.29 -.4129 1.95 .191** 
17 1 3 1 60 29.43 -.9433 2.27 .716** 
17 2 1 2 195 17.24 -.2440 1.86 .081** 
17 2 1 3 393 21.08 -.4904 2.05 .282** 
17 2 1 4 140 17.94 -.4934 2.03 .308** 
17 2 1 5 219 14.47 -.3759 1.69 .280** 
17 2 2 5 137 19.89 -.6912 1.92 .486** 
17 2 3 1 28 31.73 -1.2605 3.59 .721** 
17 4 1 1 9 17.66 -.0923 2.82 .090 
17 4 1 2 101 19.08 -.3275 2.94 .071** 
17 4 1 3 154 22.66 -.4927 2.24 .252** 
17 4 1 4 31 19.27 -.6028 2.35 .306** 
17 4 1 5 14 19.33 -.6566 1.82 .434** 
17 4 2 5 22 17.59 -.5410 1.40 .393** 
17 4 3 1 16 20.77 -.6352 3.48 .069 
18 1 2 5 19 18.44 -.5305 2.17 .227* 
18 2 1 1 71 27.83 -.5688 2.21 .380** 
18 2 1 2 22 16.99 -.2619 2.83 .069 
18 2 1 4 12 18.70 -.5669 2.10 .589** 
18 2 2 5 22 15.53 -.3888 1.36 .345** 
18 2 3 1 56 28.01 -.6496 2.55 .463** 
18 3 1 1 89 24.29 -.5631 2.53 .283** 
18 3 2 5 9 13.18 -.3611 .74 .376 
18 3 3 1 155 25.61 -.7312 2.84 .450** 
18 4 2 5 8 15.29 -.3937 1.10 .288 
19 1 1 1 15 25.16 -.8428 2.90 .630** 
19 1 1 2 83 17.94 -.4424 1.60 .339** 
19 1 1 4 44 16.70 -.3518 1.50 .301** 
19 1 1 5 49 7.09 +.1711 2.01 .043 
19 1 2 5 35 20.86 -.6861 1.93 .356** 
19 1 3 1 28 26.51 -.8319 2.98 .421** 
19 2 1 1 13 23.33 -.7420 1.77 .511** 
19 2 1 2 41 17.17 -.3189 3.08 .059 
19 2 1 3 19 30.02 -1.1407 2.58 .400** 
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N bo bl se R
2 
19 2 1 4 19 18.97 -.6370 1.74 .594** 
19 2 1 5 34 14.04 -.3589 1.15 .368** 
19 2 2 5 28 18.54 -.6164 1.45 .307** 
19 2 3 1 15 27.20 -1.0170 1.82 .817** 
19 3 1 5 17 20.69 -.7824 1.37 .581** 
19 4 1 1 9 21.10 -.5997 1.69 .678** 
19 4 1 2 82 18.74 -.3691 2.34 .131** 
19 4 1 3 55 22.41 -.5443 1.48 .499** 
19 4 1 4 28 16.62 -,3606 1.94 .170* 
19 4 1 5 18 13.25 -.2765 2.10 .145 
19 4 2 5 10 23.08 -.8791 1.52 .604** 
20 1 1 1 47 26.23 -.8103 2.73 .452** 
20 1 1 2 131 18.00 -.4081 2.18 .195** 
20 1 1 3 49 20.99 -.4217 2.12 .305** 
20 1 1 4 29 16.83 -.3716 1.92 .148* 
20 1 1 5 71 19.67 -.6716 1.80 .493** 
20 1 2 5 51 18.28 -.5027 2.02 .311** 
20 1 3 1 62 28.25 -.9326 3.20 .515** 
20 2 1 1 66 25.86 -.8354 2.81 .488** 
20 2 1 2 216 17.16 -.3186 2.22 .141** 
20 2 1 3 196 23.55 -.7063 2.05 .485** 
20 2 1 4 104 18.93 -.5955 1.97 .444** 
20 2 1 5 229 15.45 -.4169 1.56 .398** 
20 2 2 5 214 16.85 -.4836 1.72 .338** 
20 2 3 1 59 30.03 -1.0609 2.92 .685** 
20 3 1 2 9 12.73 -.0717 3.97 .003 
20 3 1 5 15 20.99 -.7043 2.07 .609** 
20 4 1 2 23 17.68 -.1732 1.92 .060 
20 4 1 3 35 22.44 -.5294 2.36 .361** 
20 4 1 4 27 21.28 -.7604 1.73 .511** 
20 4 1 5 14 17.17 -.5262 1.61 .559** 
21 1 1 1 77 27.19 -.8209 3.67 .353** 
21 1 1 2 202 15.75 -.1734 1.95 .041* 
21 1 1 3 358 21.70 -.5734 2.00 .276** 
21 1 1 4 202 20.49 -.6622 2.05 .357** 
21 1 1 5 206 15.54 -.4271 1.81 .361** 
21 1 2 5 115 15.23 -=3989 1.80 .287** 
21 1 3 1 49 30.39 -1.1627 2.84 .570** 
21 2 1 1 34 30.23 -1.1583 3.25 .588** 
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N bo bl se R
2 
21 2 1 2 124 17.85 -.3196 2.65 .081** 
21 2 1 3 220 22.54 -.6555 2.25 .388** 
21 2 1 4 59 19.02 -.5634 2.04 .275** 
21 2 1 5 64 18.66 -.6550 2.01 .452** 
21 2 2 5 45 18.60 -.5926 2.13 .348** 
21 2 3 1 32 31.13 -1.0575 2.84 .504** 
21 3 1 3 13 23.75 -.7828 2.32 .230 
21 4 1 2 25 23.84 -.8030 4.38 .226* 
21 4 1 3 64 26.21 -.8524 3.32 .282** 
21 4 1 4 48 21.72 -.6027 3.10 .221** 
21 4 1 5 41 18.60 -.6574 2.09 .332** 
21 4 2 5 13 17.48 -.5085 1.67 .449* 
22 1 1 1 32 26.33 -.8503 2.64 .494** 
22 1 1 2 57 13.64 -.0505 2.33 .002 
22 1 1 3 44 19.02 -.3781 2.12 .134* 
22 1 1 4 38 16.63 -.3640 2.33 a is* 
22 1 1 5 56 16.66 -.5070 1.97 .265** 
22 1 2 5 11 4.82 +.3241 2.66 .050 
22 2 1 1 45 27.46 -.8541 2.90 .453** 
22 2 1 2 113 20.43 -.6475 2.54 .240** 
22 2 l 3 110 23.59 -.8124 2.40 .281** 
22 2 1 4 50 17.57 -.4789 1.50 .429** 
22 2 1 5 54 14.69 -.4223 1.26 .432** 
22 2 2 5 27 10.90 -.2344 1.80 .122 
22 2 3 1 22 26.92 -.6989 2.46 .429** 
22 3 1 2 20 12.16 +.1782 1.11 .087 
22 3 1 3 37 16.91 -.0989 1.64 .007 
22 4 1 2 22 20.07 -.4282 2.73 .069 
22 4 1 3 25 16.00 -.0004 2.59 .000 
22 4 1 4 19 22.32 -.8960 2.06 .598** 
22 4 1 5 13 9.15 +.0061 2.10 .000 
23 1 1 1 63 29.61 -.9757 3.51 .421** 
23 1 1 2 43 23.20 -.8755 3.14 .264** 
23 1 1 3 102 24.75 -.8106 2.89 .312** 
23 1 1 4 112 23.50 -.7319 2.80 .417** 
23 1 1 5 83 17.95 -.5268 2.00 .335** 
23 1 2 5 65 20.03 -.6317 1.92 .402** 
23 1 3 1 35 35.09 -1.4570 2.90 .635** 
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N bo bl se R
2 
23 2 1 1 17 27.84 -1.0310 3.99 .447** 
23 2 1 2 51 17.72 -.4732 1.97 .206** 
23 2 1 3 80 23.37 -.7437 2.71 .286** 
23 2 1 4 64 19.44 -.6047 2.41 .302** 
23 2 1 ô 57 15.32 -.3723 2.10 .184** 
23 2 2 5 67 16.73 -.5269 1.39 .426** 
23 2 3 1 8 34.33 -1.3764 1.59 .847** 
23 3 1 3 12 12.23 +.4021 2.21 .098 
23 3 1 4 10 13.16 +.0425 1.63 .005 
23 4 1 2 59 19.45 -.3954 3.26 .091* 
23 4 1 3 79 24.84 -.7772 2.73 .305** 
23 4 l 4 28 18.50 -.3822 2.71 .206* 
23 4 1 5 10 14.59 -83568 2.03 .178 
23 4 2 5 26 18.53 -.5117 2.40 .142 
24 1 1 2 71 16.15 -.2090 2.19 .054 
24 1 l 3 33 12.46 +.1515 2.26 .046 
24 1 1 4 94 16.31 -.3713 1.92 .210** 
241 l 5 100 16.48 -.4744 2.25 .196** 
2 4 1 2  5  243 12.61 -.2771 2.22 .068** 
241 3 l 32 28.35 -.8524 2.88 .483** 
24 2 l 2 91 17.19 -.3895 1.71 .234** 
24 2 1 3 67 10.95 +.2420 2.49 .039 
24 2 1 4 43 19*19 -.6482 1.68 .357** 
24 2 l 5 34 18.40 -.6779 1.50 .530** 
24 2 2 5 38 10.21 -.1606 2.19 .021 
24 2 3 1 22 29.64 -1.0931 2.84 .392** 
24 3 1 2 22 18.68 -.5607 4.10 .082 
24 3 1 3 24 20.93 -.5883 1.40 .468** 
24 3 1 4 21 16.44 -.4325 1.63 .165 
24 3 1 5 25 12.80 -.2914 1.52 .185* 
24 3 2 5 43 13.15 -.3322 0.70 .472** 
24 3 3 1 13 35.85 -1.4395 3.46 .612** 
24 4 1 2 41 19.32 -.5768 2.72 .190** 
24 4 l 3 36 18.61 -.2943 2.43 .097 
24 4 l 4 46 13.64 -.2138 2.02 .089* 
24 4 1 5 40 15.95 -.4683 1.69 .392** 
24 4 2 5 32 22.70 -.7799 2.67 .257** 
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Appendix Table 47. Variances of Regression Coefficients, R and 
Standard Error for Specified Buyer-Market Class 
Combinations 







1 1 1  249 27.90 -.91023 .485 3.329 17.38 3 
2 11 246 29.60 -1.06139 .628 3.167 16.39 2 
3 11 89 33.01 -.56308 .283 2.537 8.73 1 
4 11 18 19.45 -.33984 .137 2.873 19.12 4 
All buyers 602 27.80 -.91136 .528 3.228 16.75 — 
13 1 266 29.28 -.99893 .556 2.921 15.69 2 
2 3 1 242 30.42 -1.07781 .665 2.988 15.70 3 
3 3 1 168 25.72 -.72543 .434 2.967 15.14 1 
4 3 1 16 20.77 -.63516 .069 3.485 31.12 4 
All buyers 692 28.51 -.95007 .569 3.087 16.40 — 
1 1 2  767 17.38 -.34535 .136 2.192 15.62 1 
2 12 853 17.61 -.34711 .126 2.330 16.59 2 
3 12 51 15.75 -.26213 .046 3.179 24.53 4 
4 12 353 19.08 -.37541 .089 2.979 19.94 3 
All buyers 2024 17.41 -.31813 .098 2.480 17.50 — 
1 1 3  653 20.88 -.48020 .194 2.389 14.71 3 
2 13 1085 21.91 -.58576 .318 2.283 14.67 2 
3 13 86 18.39 -.24919 .057 1.874 11.84 1 
4 13 448 22.59 -.54221 .230 2.578 15.66 4 
All buyers 2272 21.43 -.52022 .245 2.406 15.09 — 
1 1 4  685 19.41 -.53459 .280 2.375 17.30 3 
2 14 491 18.50 -.54829 .360 1.995 15.99 2 
3 14 31 21.76 -.90583 .010 1.179 9.28 1 
4 14 227 18.29 -.47062 .188 2.704 21.48 4 
All buyers 1434 18.91 -.52920 .283 2.352 17.95 — 
1 1 5  768 16.15 -.43843 .278 2.131 21.53 4 
2 15 691 15.44 -.42862 .346 1.703 18.75 1 
3 15 57 18.45 -.62269 .451 1.862 21.35 3 
4 15 150 15.78 -.43986 .291 1.899 20.31 2 
All buyers 1666 16.02 -.44934 .316 1.952 20.61 — 
12 5 814 16.27 -.43802 .205 2.128 24.63 3 
2 2 5 578 17.74 -.55836 .360 1.827 23.51 2 
3 2 5 52 13.35 -.34834 .464 0.724 10.27 1 
4 2 5 111 20.51 -.67195 .291 2.133 25.24 4 
All buyers 1555 17.18 -.50585 .268 2.031 24.62 — 
^Standard error of estimate. 
b e 
Coefficient of variation ~ __ . 
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Appendix Table 48. Values of Regression Coefficients, R and 
Standard Error for Specified Markets - Pooled 
over Buyers and Classes 
Market N bo bl R
2 
se C • Vo Rani 
17 2425 22,70 -.76388 .521 2.897 22.56 4 
18 463 27.87 -.98612 .638 3.381 17.81 1 
19 642 22.29 -.76254 .540 2.640 21.10 2 
20 1647 22.73 -.77368 .519 2.913 22.74 5 
21 1991 23.32 -.82760 .439 3.093 21.83 3 
22 795 22.77 -.81294 .412 3.230 23.24 7 
23 1071 25.67 -.96510 .453 3.246 23.09 6 
24 1211 21.17 -.67905 .513 2.854 23.69 8 
All markets 10245 23.54 -.83603 .531 3.123 23.37 -
Appendix Table 49. Values of Regression Coefficients, R^ and Standard 
Error for Specified Buyers - Pooled over Markets 
and Classes 
Buyer N bQ b^ R^ sg c.v. Rank 
1 4202 22.68 -.78169 .521 3.070 23.40 4 
2 4186 23.85 -.87086 .554 3.077 23.38 3 
3 534 26.37 -1.01621 .657 3.462 22.05 1 
4 1323 22.62 -.71118 .360 3.213 23.25 2 
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Appendix Table 50. Value of Regression Coefficient, Degrees of Freedom, Coefficient o 





bo bl3 b2 b3 b4 
17 1 1 Ie 38.70947 -.96068* -.10787 -.18544 .05031 
20 1 1 1 40.56561 -.33780 .47531** -.28578 -.2771 
21 1 1 1 39.89191 -.67639** .19527 -.17599 -. 1380: 
17 1 3 1 -5.79596 -1.02933** -.39450** .66839** .2070' 
20 1 3 1 -62.73880 -.05303 -.29955* 1.67599** .1205' 
21 1 3 1 40.08459 -1.17080** .17536** -.27676 -.1094 
24 1 3 1 -31.22960 -.53273* -.37751** .92429** .2117i 
17 1 1 2 11.04211 -.51323** -.07305 .23761** .0270' 
20 1 1 2 2.57219 -.28792* -.03972 .33760* .0063 
21 1 1 2 -28.09966 -.40599** -.24237** .86318** .1239 
24 1 1 2 -10.30565 -.62334** -.23521** .61536** .1133 
17 1 1 3 46.65580 -.13136 .14026* -.60446** -.0715 
20 1 1 3 48.40431 -.14311 .10816* -.64683** -.0530 
21 1 1 3 38.15688 -.47318** .05534** -.38804** -.0277 
24 1 1 3 8.39718 .47712 .10962** -.06320 -.0542 
17 1 1 4 29.12130 -.61792** .02065 -.20755 -.0085 
20 1 1 4 21.19965 -.22175 .04158* -.14570 -.0204 
21 1 1 4 13.77393 -.82929** -.03933 .10624 .0233 
24 1 1 4 36.08067 -.68737** .01202 -.32781 -.0085 
17 1 1 5 28.44424 -.59875** .01161 -.20687* -.0077 
20 1 1 5 -11.32431 -.56297** -.05556* .59567** .0254 
21 1 1 5 40.09143 -.84885** .00359 -.37964** -.0027 
24 1 1 5 -21.51842 -.27449 -.06281 .78082** .0272 
17 1 2 5 18.37447 -.42039** .00722 -.13397* -.0008 
20 1 2 5 -23.51277 .00348 -.04322 .59722** .0240 
21 1 2 5 16.09425 -.60984** -.02350* .00979 .0110 
24 1 2 5 -21.51842 .29564** .05548** -.08418 -.0201 
a0ne percent level of significance denoted by double asterisk; 5 percent level of 
^Number of observations (N) equals degrees of freedom plus six. 
cFirst two columns refer to market number, third to type of buyer, fourth to bree 
17 111 refers to packer purchasers of beef veals at market 17, and 17 125 refers to pa 
s of Freedom, Coefficient of Determination and Residual Variance by Market, 
b3 b4 b5 df
b R2 s2e 
-.18544 .05030 .05409 9 .546 4.9903 
-.28578 -.27711* .35234** 41 .577 6.3210 
-.17599 -.13802 .38243** 71 .463 11.8210 
.66839** .20700** .26467** 54 .754 4.7865 
1.67599** .12057 .05096 56 .657 7.7521 
-.27676 -.10947* -.01949 43 .588 8.4591 
.92429** .21176* .98225** 26 .819 3.3423 
.23761** .02707 -.05038 174 .278 4.4844 
.33760* .00630 .34880** 125 .447 3.3639 
.86318** .12392** .47652** 196 .274 2.9414 
.61536** .11337 .48835** 65 .313 3.7083 
-.60446** -.07157 .44761** 61 .252 5.9364 
-.64683** -.05306 .08867 43 .672 2.3067 
-.38804** -.02779** .46703** 352 .470 2.9726 
-.06320 -.05428** .56919** 27 .551 2.7593 
-.20755 -.00858 .17207** 160 .401 3.7873 
-.14570 -.02044 .20586** 23 .227 3.9061 
.10624 .02332** .25685** 196 .444 3.6931 
-.32781 -.00853 .46198** 88 .392 2.9525 
-.20687* -.00779 .44030** 197 .314 5.1897 
.59567** .02549 .50877** 65 .748 1.7035 
-.37964** -.00276 .11683** 200 .434 2.9747 
.78082** .02721 .16391 94 .273 4.7788 
-.13397* -.00085 .38199** 269 .347 3.1083 
.59722** .02407 .51212** 45 .709 1.8771 
.00979 .01108 .38191** 109 .529 2.2188 
-.08418 -.02012** .14869** 237 .285 3.8599 
àterisk; 5 percent level of significance denoted by single asterisk. 
DIUS six. 
:e of buyer, fourth to breed type and last column, market class. For example, 
17, and 17 125 refers to packer purchasers of dairy cows at same market. 
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Appendix Table 50. (Continued) 
Market 
buyer 
breed b0 bj b2 b3 b^ 
class code 
20 2 1 1 11.00248 -.92444** 
21 2 1 1 146.51705 -.45203 
17 2 3 1 -20.64931 -.54102 
20 2 3 1 29.26523 -.97019** 
21 2 3 1 35.18862 -.29344 
24 2 3 1 96.99730 -1.99875** 
17 2 1 2 42.28549 -.26617** 
20 2 1 2 .81877 -.08781 
21 2 1 2 42.26675 -.59446** 
24 2 1 2 25.30782 -.65609** 
17 2 1 3 40.69480 -.50319** 
20 2 1 3 31.22197 -.54379** 
21 2 1 3 38.51690 -.91289** 
24 2 1 3 
-14.98116 .27975 
17 2 1 4 35.41475 -.57304** 
20 2 1 4 .18159 -.56781** 
21 2 1 4 20.80977 -.64171** 
24 2 1 4 60.90498 -.85734* 
17 2 1 5 -3.85696 -.55320** 
20 2 1 5 15.12091 -.42549** 
21 2 1 5 .42863 -.62800** 
24 2 1 5 
-7.01878 .25136 
17 2 2 5 3.25584 -.62307** 
20 2 2 5 
-9.87039 -.16956 
21 2 2 5 
-20.46220 -.37577 
24 2 2 5 
-45.62976 .26086 
24 3 3 1 
-162.28821 -1.92475* 
20 3 1 2 126.98111 -.88218 
24 3 1 2 
-80.68944 .29955 
21 3 1 3 203.73514 -1.03675 
24 3 1 3 -20.57394 -.43540 
24 3 1 4 51.01484 .05368 
-.20746 .26275 .11 
1.20274** -2.10527** -.70 
-.08033 .91409* .01 
.03711 .04246 -.04 
.63228 -.17844 -.36 
.25996 -1.08530** -.15 
. 12078"** -.53894** -.05 
-.00263 .32857** -.01 
.07187** -.47520** -.03 
-.02608 -.12063 .01 
.05910** -.41175** -.02 
.03761 -.27362** -.01 
.00442 -.32659** -.00 
.03960** .43919** -.01 
.02893 -.31159** -.01 
-.04726* .29246* .02 
.00143 -.01282 -.00 
.09886 -.76483* -.05 
-.06021** .37873** .03 
.00198 -.06511 .OC 
-.04033 .34756 .01 
.04458 .26890 -.01 
-.03137** .26924** .01 
-.02649 .41955** .01 
-.07398 .78974** .02 
-.09052 1.09642** .04 
-2.19462** 4.26511** 1.05 
.47731 -2.15672 -.24 
-.25157 1.74115 .13 
.28228 -3.27459** -.15 
-.05561 .74963* .02 






















































































































































































-.75828 -.09965** .30884 15 .448 2.2120 
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Appendix Table 50. (Continued) 
Market 
buyer 
breed b^ b, b b, 
class code 
20 3 1 5 -44.16220 -.60771 -.16461** 1.31865* 
24 3 1 5 62.61254 -.37448 .11081** -1.01109** 
24 3 2 5 2.38136 -.16341* -.00024 .15771** 
17 4 1 1 405.55889 .49974 3.45580** -7.83213** 
17 4 3 1 -171.49874 -.33654 -1.71350 4.04521** 
17 4 1 2 31.82733 
-.36846* .09322* -.34499 
20 4 1 2 -49.35581 -.57645 -.49720* 1.50837** 
21 4 1 2 93.67934 -.93442 .38186 -1.43283* 
24 4 1 2 -29.07839 .21307 -.00808 .78472 
17 4 1 3 29.59395 -.21822 .07182* -.24871** 
20 4 1 3 6.14491 -.45684 -.02606 .23685 
21 4 1 3 70.47217 -.45675 .15692** -.97960** 
24 4 1 3 28.43848 -.32496 .04222* -.26147 
17 4 1 4 70.40201 -1.38926** -.03293 -.82030* 
20 4 1 4 35.83370 -.68829* .07201 -.30639 
21 4 1 4 6.93378 -.39805 .01107 .13361 
24 4 1 4 17.68044 -.20880 .03926 -.10008 
17 4 1 5 80.37109 -1.31053 .07934 -.88465 
20 4 1 5 4.01464 -.29801 .01139 .19912 
21 4 1 5 26.60336 
-1.42043** -.08182* .00462 
24 4 1 5 8.30010 -.30696 -.00094 .10999* 
17 4 2 5 50.96272 -.66163 .07851 -.75556** 
21 4 2 5 -42.82393 -.56966 -.18994** 1.49023** 
24 4 2 5 -29.35392 -.29037 -.09493 .92919** 
19 1 1 1 62.36274 -.91144 .30485 -.71322 
22 1 1 1 114.39745 -.98833** .54632** -1.51285** 
23 1 1 1 128.74762 -.64372* 1.06318** -1.79216** 
19 1 3 1 -46.33819 -.16417 -.21413 1.30569** 
23 1 3 1 81.80747 -1.04554** .68952** -1.15329** 
19 1 1 2 -60.82515 -.21159* -.37227** 1.53829** 
22 1 1 2 -20.15414 -.26660 -.15749 .74818** 
































































































































































































Appendix Table 50. (Continued) 
Market 
buyer 
breed bQ b^ bg bg 
class code 
22 1 1 3  64.58873 -.51377* .04791** -.93504** 
23 1 1 3  77.54998 -.73484** .14459** -1.12521** 
19 1 1 4  18.78179 -.30487 .01973 -.06444 
22 1 1 4  -30.72582 -.15555 -.08900 .82372 
23 1 1 4 52.79666 -.79190** .09301** -.65872** 
19 1 1 5 2.99143 -.44916** -.03744 .22256 
22 1 1 5  -14.85551 -.79716** -.07937* .70746** 
23 1 1 5  22.67296 -.66953** .01345 -.03766 
18 12 5 16.05123 -.35121 .04235 -.04804 
19 12 5 -31.71913 -.27360 -.07751 1.04857** 
22 1 2 5 15.97958 -.70439 -.05234 -.01561 
23 12 5 44.00553 -.36822 .09882** -.70083** 
18 2 11 66.89751 -.72880** .25932* -.83367** 
19 2 11 91.71049 -.81297 .65821 -1.29485* 
22 2 11 72.77436 -.66932* .53712** -.91535** 
23 2 11 -74.77213 .29514 -.05936 1.78532** 
18 2 3 1 81.28447 -1.03847** .28539** -1.04139** 
19 2 3 1 40.55617 -.54439 .33184 -.26477 
22 2 3 1 40.88920 -1.29400** -.20521* -.19748 
23 2 3 1 70.33771 -.63532 .83624 -.77809 
18 2 12 -166.12529 .54586 -.75620** 3.31653** 
19 2 12 28.28620 .33007 .38667* -.42317** 
22 2 12 -20.20580 -.52362* -.15507 .72444** 
23 2 12 -18.10346 -.59371 -.21236 .72777** 
19 2 13 -63.94599 -1.24176 -.30931 1.85808** 
22 2 13 37.27803 -.82002** .02187* -.38968** 
23 2 13 71.20104 -.99349** .06111 -.94319** 
18 2 14 6.55395 -.20028 .06375 .21518 
19 2 14 12.66726 -.45172 .02202 -.00821 
22 2 14 32.36008 -.27786 .10725** -.38186 
23 2 14 55.88964 -.42002* .14499** -.80471** 
19 2 15 -3.27454 .04800 .00964 .18200 
22 2 15 -50.35180 -.13973 -.09981** 1.27866** 
23 2 15 -10.98142 .22165 .01782 .40841** 
b5 df R" 
-.93504** -.02018** .55034** 38 .628 2.1384 
1.12521** -.07359** .90456** 96 .693 3.8724 
-.06444 -.00923 .03732 38 .310 2.4568 
.82372 .04878 .16068** 32 .161 5.7553 
-.65872** -.04675** .81015** 106 .631 5.1404 
.22256 .01939 .39145** 43 .528 2.1833 
.70746** .03804 .39505** 50 .420 3.2936 
-.03766 -.01104 .72607** 77 .668 2.0968 
-.04804 -.01964 .41132 13 .530 3.7562 
1.04857** .03080 .48405** 29 .562 2.8962 
-.01561 .02473 .88346 5 .733 3.5600 
-.70083** -.04307* .42938** 59 .589 2.6983 
-.83367** -.15112 1.40978 65 .630 3.0920 
1.29485* -.33329 -.31668 7 .696 3.0429 
-.91535** .29263** .63730** 39 .558 7.4905 
1.78532** -.01042 -.39131** 11 .749 9.8609 
1.04139** -.17110** 1.49387** 50 .708 3.8122 
-.26477 -.18520 -.55600 9 .907 2.4344 
-.19748 .13094* -.11929 16 .614 5.1306 
-.77809 -.44950 -1.02751 2 .960 1,9800 
3.31653** .39650** .09004** 16 .438 6.0300 
-.42317** -.19123 .37414* 35 .265 8.2831 
.72444** .07591 .65734** 107 .438 4.9639 
.72777** .10720 .14899 45 .246 4.0231 
1.85808** .15702 .43755* 13 .668 4.8192 
-.38968** -.00623 .79811** 104 .651 2.9148 
-.94319** -.02777 .33416** 74 .519 5.2385 
.21518 -.05087 1.43399** 6 .860 2.5083 
-.00821 -.00880 .59285 13 .792 2.0315 
-.38186 -.05203* .12211 44 .576 1.9064 
-.80471** -.07188 .23883 58 .431 5.0653 
.18200 -.00243 .13432 28 .520 1.1600 
1.27866** .04656** .35855** 48 .683 .9671 
.40841** -.01121 .25521** 51 .692 1.7955 
223 
Appendix Table 50. (Continued) 
Market 
buyer 
breed b0 bj b2 b^ 
class code 
18 2 2 5 -3.83638 ,29676 .03267 .17475 
19 2 2 5 -46.33819 -.10950 -.12075 1.32435** 
22 2 2 5 -11.12252 -.05197 -.01299 .31483 
23 2 2 5 -22.16870 -.34816** -.07527** .81168** 
18 3 1 1 -.03759 -.55684* -.17603 .39415 
18 3 3 1 -64.24197 -.17863 -.46837** 1.59275** 
22 3 1 2 -180.08616 .01600 -1.12805** 3.57358** 
22 3 1 3 -8.70713 -.18776 -.05085 .44963* 
23 3 1 3 -90.47560 .38188 -.21103 1.71279 
23 3 1 4 55.72904 -.10527 .09862 -.87086 
19 3 1 5 82.86362 -.55241 .17521** -1.56412** 
18 3 2 5 -67.00355 -.26637 -.19053 1.85443** 
19 4 1 1 -44.67116 -.17253 -.44779 1.22135* 
19 4 1 2 44.13423 -.13254 .25241** -.61387** 
22 4 1 2 -147.87358 -1.64076 -1.25956** 3.34218** 
23 4 1 2 116.71863 -1.21331** .35765** -1.78744** 
19 4 1 3 36.85212 -.49840** .04698 -.25428* 
22 4 1 3 234.79427 .03303 .68662** -4.04873** 
23 4 1 3 -4.59482 -.78554** -.09612* .51767* 
19 4 1 4 -101.00526 -.09193 -.33011** 2.26241** 
22 4 1 4 -14.44246 -.35235 -.03023 .53192 
23 4 1 4 44.80772 .01352 .18168 -.65401** 
19 4 1 5 -1.42179 -.37472 -.04189 .34830** 
22 4 1 5 -18.23570 .20720 .06136 .62377** 
23 4 1 5 11.65985 -1.44561 -.14315 .33857 
18 4 2 5 -222.06352 -.66922 -.69462 5.85018 
19 4 2 5 1.94849 -.35587 .00177 .33509 







































































































































































Appendix Table 51» Analysis of the Change in Residual Variance for 
Buyer-Market Class Groups from Fitting Single 
Equation Pooled over All Markets 
All 
Market class Packer Order Manaaement Farmer buvers d.f. 
Beef veals 
Residual variance I3, 10.106 7.953 6.309 4.100 8.542 578 
Residual variance IIb 9.553 6.532 - 2.063 7.700 512 
F-ratio 1.47 2.74** - 2.97 1.96** 66 
Mixed veals 
Residual variance I 7.659 7.926 8.446 12.702 8.019 668 
Residual variance II 5.950 6.445 7.113 - 60535 490 
F-ratio 3.49** 2.29** 6.06** — 2.95** 78 
Slaughter calves 
Residual variance I 3.851 5.120 10.405 7.861 5.232 2000 
Residual variance II 3.473 4.321 11.801 6.917 4.556 1874 
F-ratio 3.30** 4.73** .56 2.32** 3.36** 126 
Stççrç 
Residual variance I 3.968 4.138 2.566 5.662 4.333 2248 
Residual variance II 3.298 3.596 2.277 4.790 3.699 2128 
F-ratio 5.38** 5.52** 1.56 3.24** 1.96** 120 
Heifers 
Residual variance I 4.799 3.916 2.127 5.922 4.624 1410 
Residual variance II 3.891 3.536 2.257 4.690 3.859 1290 
F-ratio 5.40** 2.24** .76 2.61** 3.33** 120 
Beef cows. 
Residual variance I 3.899 2.632 2.835 3.560 3.307 1642 
Residual variance II 3.577 2.255 1.240 3.347 2.937 1522 
F-ratio 2.90** 4.18** 6.47** 1.25 2.67** 120 
Dairv cows 
Residual variance I 3.494 2.863 .222 4.587 3.235 1531 
Residual variance II 3.116 2.642 .223 4.785 2.945 1411 
F-ratio 3.33** 2.14** .95 .85 2.26** 120 
All classes 
Residual variance I 4.567 4.324 5.637 6.019 4.704 10077 
Residual variance II 3.939 3.686 5.241 5.289 4.056 9327 
F-ratio 3.76* 3.66** 1.62** 1.98** 3.15** 750 
aFrom fitting a single equation for each buyer by class group. 
kprom fitting separate equations for each buyer by class by market 
group. 
Appendix Table 52. Analysis of the Change in Residual Variance for Market Class and Market from 
Fitting Single Equation Pooled over All Buyers 
Market All 






































































































































































aFrom fitting a single equation for each market class by market group. 
^From fitting a separate equation for each market class by market group by type of buyer. 
Appendix Table 52. (Continued) 
Market All 
Market class 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 . buvers d.f. 
Beef cows 
Residual variance I 4.071 - 3.275 2.374 3.330 2.585 2.300 3.651 3.226 1624 
Residual variance II 3.839 - 2.041 2.098 3.133 2.233 2.007 3.342 2.937 1522 
F-ratio 3.16** — 4.76** 3.51** 2.60** 2.54** 2.75** 1.99* 2.56** 102 
Dairv cows 
Residual variance I 3.383 2.411 2.728 2.790 2.788 2.374 3.142 4.000 3.250 1507 
Residual variance II 2.983 2.211 2.282 2.480 2.544 1.610 2.650 3.807 2.945 1411 
F-ratio 5.79** 1.26 2.09* 6.38** 2.34** 3.53* 3.35** 1.98* 2.63** 96 
All classes 
Residual variance I 4.596 5.610 3.913 3.918 4.570 4.107 5.708 4.216 4.526 9927 
Residual variance II 4.076 5.396 3.601 3.601 4.223 3.480 4.760 3.821 4.056 9327 
F-ratio 4.90** 1.57* 1.68** 2.81** 3.05** 2.88** 3.44** 2.19** 2.34** 600 
227 
Appendix Table 53. Analysis of the Change in Residual Variance for 
Buyer-Market Groups from Fitting Single Equation 
Pooled over All Classes 




Residual variance Id 6.561 6.986 - 9.038 7.107 2407 
Residual variance IIb 4.232 3.567 — 5.399 4.076 2305 
F-ratio 15.68** 36.33** - 7.39** 18.55** 102 
Market 18 
Residual variance I 3.756 6.635 6.887 1.697 6.669 439 
Residual variance II - 3.437 6.793 - 5.396 403 
F-ratio - 7.86** 1.28 - 3.88** 36 
Market 19. 
Residual variance I 4.651 5.920 .656 5.806 5.281 618 
Residual variance II 3.139 3.847 - 3.897 3.500 522 
F-ratio 4.98** 3.44** - 4.21** 4.28** 96 
Market 20 
Residual variance I 7.857 4.388 4.628 5.902 5.405 1623 
Residual variance II 3.764 3.562 5.899 2.909 3.601 1521 
F-ratio 14.11** 6.95** .35 6.32** 8.97** 102 
Market 21 
Residual variance I 7.310 7.641 5.115 10.528 7.701 1967 
Residual variance II 3.759 4.355 - 7.114 4.223 1865 
F-ratio 34.01** 11.28** - 4.70** 16.88** 102 
Market 22 
Residual variance I 7.848 8.418 2.194 7.888 7.784 771 
Residual variance II 3.729 3,596 1.497 4.019 3.531 681 
F-ratio 9.54** 16.46** 4.96** 4.90** 11.32** 90 
Market 23 
Residual variance I 8.468 6.772 2.932 7.677 7.688 1047 
Residual variance II 4.620 3.843 2.929 6.888 4.791 939 
F-ratio 10.86** 8.15** 1.00 1.93** 6.86** 108 
Residual variance I 5.910 5.462 8.545 6.431 6.198 1187 
Residual variance II 3.773 3.317 4.082 4.590 3.821 1073 
F-ratio 11.70** 7.23** 6.17** 4.16** 7.48** 114 
All markets 
Residual variance I 7.002 6.362 6.503 7.856 6.823 10059 
Residual variance II 3.937 3.686 5.241 5.289 4.056 9309 
F-ratio 14.47** 11.89** 2.98** 4.56** 10.15** 750 
aFrom fitting a single equation for buyer by market group. 
kprom fitting separate equations for each market by market by 
market class group. 
Appendix Table 54. Effect of Certain Weight Groupings on the Average and Variance of Price 
Residual by Market Class of Animal and Market Location 
Market 






























































n 14 50 
s2 .1128 .8353 
a -.17 -.33 





















an = number of animals in stratification group. 
Ds^ = variance of residual. 
cd = mean of residual. 
^t = calculated value; a single asterisk indicates significance at 5%, double asterisk at 1% 
level of probability. 
Appendix Table 54. (Continued) 
Market 
17 20 21 24 18 19 22 23 
Mixed veals 
Weight 1 
% 25 35 34 29 52 14 11 29 
s2 .2198 .1145 .2389 .0874 .1356 .2026 .2184 .0395 
a .18 — « 10 .09 -.08 .17 -.16 -.08 .05 
t .384 .295 .184 .270 .462 .355 .171 .252 
Weight 2 
n 47 51 32 25 113 19 10 12 
s2 .1503 .0973 .1506 .2023 .0478 .3338 .2379 .0508 
a -.12 .55 . 16 .21 .24 .35 .59 .07 
t .310 1.763 .328 .467 1.097 • 606 1.210 .311 
Weight 3 
n0 32 35 15 13 46 10 - 2 
s2 .1033 .3048 .4342 .1400 .0893 .2161 - .7310 
d .04 -.71 -.56 -.24 .37 -.45 M -1.00 




n 69 124 69 46 9 46 30 31 
s2 .0721 .2580 .0359 .0753 .5673 .0705 .1566 .1442 
a .48 .15 .41 .53 .33 .32 .78 .03 
t 1.788 .295 2.165* 1.932 .438 1.205 1.971 .079 
Weight 2 
no 238 187 197 115 12 125 112 77 
s2 .0145 .0145 .0185 .0253 .2529 .0328 .0266 .0422 
d -.31 -.17 -.35 -. 40 -.45 -. 16 - .34 -.13 
t 2.575* 1.413 2.575* 2.513* .895 .884 2.086* .633 





































































































































































Appendix Table 54. (Continued) 
17 20 21 24 18 19 22 23 
Steers (Continued) 
Weight 5 
n 20 16 100 - 39 23 
s .2063 .0710 ,0171 - .0186 .0766 
d .28 - .63 .11 — — — — .05 —.28 
t .616 2.364* .841 - .367 1.012 
Heifers 
Weight 1 
n 134 66 
s 2 .0288 .0434 
d .04 -.04 
t .148 .192 
Weight 2 
n 109 41 
s .0259 .0711 
d -.15 -.13 
t .931 .488 
Weight 3 
n 67 27 
s2 .0491 .1030 
a .02 .30 
t .090, .934 
Weight 4 
n 26 20 
s2 .1130 .1021 
3 .42 .10 
t 1.249 .313 
92 97 9 
.0335 .0284 .1429 
-.29 -.02 .06 
1.584 .119 .159 
100 70 2 
.0384 .0284 .1162 
.11 - .01 - .20 







•06 -.46 — 
.139 1.115 
40 33 69 
.0535 .0723 .0542 
-.12 .10 -.30 
.519 .372 1.288 
29 36 85 
.0686 .0605 .0489 
.04 -.14 .41 
.153 .569 1.855 
13 31 41 
.0793 .1178 .0856 
.30 -.05 -.22 
1.065 .146 .752 
8 6 16 
.0624 1.0674 .3442 
.01 .74 .01 
.040 2.265* .017 
Appendix Table 54. (Continued) 
17 
Market 
20 21 24 18 19 22 23 
Heifers (Continued) 
Weight 5 
n - 6 5 
s - .3601 .0237 
d - -.17 -1.73 







no 4 4 
s2 1.0854 .4277 
3 .34 -.51 
t .326 .780 
Weight 2 
no 35 33 
s .0575 .0824 
d -.08 .18 
t .334 .627 
Weight 3 
149 95 
s2 .0224 .0151 
d .00 -.01 
t .060 .081 
Weight 4 
195 148 
s2 .0193 .0096 
d .01 -.08 































































Appendix Table 54. (Continued) 
Market 
17 20 21 24 18 19 22 23 
Beef cows (Continued) 
Weight 5 
n 53 49 59 12 - 9 19 18 
s .0441 .0283 .0324 .0468 - .0954 .1382 .0685 
a .01 .19 -.08 .03 - .24 -.28 -.31 
t .048 .708 .444 .095 - .777 .753 1.184 
Dairy cows 
Weight 1 
n 17 8 3 18 - 6 - 6 
s2 .0894 .0778 . 1346 .3846 - .2874 - .2321 
d .21 -.74 .05 .21 - -.17 - - • 40 
t .702 2.653* .107 .339 - .317 - .830 
Weight 2 
n9 112 33 27 93 10 16 - 31 
s2 .0205 .0496 .1015 .0454 .0782 .1170 - .1226 
3 -.02 -.13 .04 .16 -.03 .03 — .30 
t .140 .403 .126 .751 .107 .088 — .857 
Weight 3 
n9 164 78 69 158 30 34 17 60 
s2 .0146 .0238 .0285 .0147 .0376 .0452 .0331 .0300 
d -.05 .04 .11 -.12 -.11 .09 -.21 -.14 
t .226 .259 .409 .990 .567 .423 1.154 .808 
Weight 4 
n9 105 100 65 69 14 17 15 47 
s .0284 .0214 .0302 .0394 .0730 .0377 .0996 .0316 
d .05 .18 .11 -.07 — .40 —. 14 .32 .00 
t .297 1.230 .632 .234 1.481 .721 1.014 .022 
Appendix Table 54. (Continued) 
Market 
17 20 21 24 18 19 22 23 
Dairy cows (Continued) 
Weight 5 
n 36 46 9 18 3 3 14 
s2 .0697 .0468 .0130 .1800 .1484 - .0382 .0637 
d .04 -.23 .11 .23 .96 - -.43 .11 
t .110 .727 .960 .542 2.492 - 2.200 .436 
Appendix Table 55. Effect of Size of Sales Lot on the Average and Variance of Price Residual by 
Market Class of Animal and Market Location 
Market 

















































































an = number of animals in stratification group. 
bs2 = variance of residual. 
c3 = mean of residual. 
^t - calculated value; a single asterisk indicates significance at 5%, double asterisk at 1% 
level of probability. 
Appendix Table 55. (Continued) 
Market 
Beef veals fContinued! 
" Lot 4 
d 
t 












































































































































Appendix Table 55. (Continued) 
17 
Mixed veals (Continued) 
20 21 
Market 







































































































^Indicates that Lots 6 and 7 were pooled» 
Appendix Table 55. (Continued) 
Market 
17 
Slaughter calves (Continued) 
Lot 3 









































































































































































































































Lots 3 and 4 were pooled. 
9Lots 2 and 3 were pooled. 
240 




Grades Average , Average 
compared dfa difference se df difference se 
1 - 2 
2 - 3 - - - 3 0.17 1.75 
3 - 4 - - - 6 -0.73 1.53 
4 - 5 19 -1.02 2.48 30 0.19 2.94 
5 - 6 12 -1.49 1.98 32 -1.47* 2.19 
6 - 7 26 -0.36 2.79 27 -1.34 3.05 
7 - 8 41 -1.19 3.30 29 -0.21 3.55 
8 - 9 28 -0.29 3.55 30 -1.61 3.66 
9 - 10 35 -2.47** 3.64 59 -1.13 3.66 
10 - 11 38 0.59 3.46 52 -0.67 3.53 
11 - 12 42 -1.46 3.54 40 -1.09 3.46 
12 - 13 37 -2.11* 3.86 38 -1.24 3.23 
13 - 14 43 -1.50 3.74 42 -0.24 2.97 
14 - 15 30 -1.90* 3.09 53 -2.23** 2.79 
15 - 16 46 -1.24 3.02 113 -1.72** 3.13 
^Degrees of freedom equals (N]_ + Ng) - 2. 
^Dollars per hundred pounds liveweight. Significant difference between 
I/o level. 




sg df difference s df difference se 
1.75 7 -0.88 1.04 9 -0.07 0.63 
1.53 34 -1.08* 1.16 23 -0.12 0.80 
2.94 30 0.13 1.39 34 -0.46 0.94 
2.19 48 -1.20** 1.93 27 -0.53 1.45 
3.05 52 -0.49 8.38 33 -0.47 1.65 
3.55 43 -1.10 3.90 45 -0.18 1.49 
3.66 24 -1.52** 2.21 25 -0.11 1.48 
3.66 47 0.02 2.26 43 -1.54** 1.77 
3.53 44 -0.58 2.46 34 -2.21** 2.34 
3.46 30 -0.53 2.69 30 0.24 2.99 
3.23 17 -1.22 2.89 16 -0.69** 3.00 
2.97 27 -1.09 2.38 30 -1.13 2.65 
2.79 26 -0.10 2.39 22 -1.27 2.42 
3.13 36 -1.58* 2.55 42 -1.91** 2.36 
;nce between means denoted by one asterisk for b% level, two asterisks for 
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Appendix Table 57. Average Grade-Price Differential Paid for Slaughter Calve 
Grades by Visits 
Fall visits 
1953 1954 
Grades _ Average Average 
compared dfti difference*3 sg df difference sg 
1 - 2 — - - - - -
2 - 3 - - - - - -
3 - 4 " - - - - -
4 - 5 18 -1.62 3.00 26 0.00 3.04 
5 - 6 56 -0.27 2.11 52 -0.64 2.72 
6 - 7 95 -0.63 1.91 76 -0.60 2.27 
7 - 8 111 -0.28 1.84 125 -0.40 1.97 
8 - 9 118 -0.23 2.14 152 0.13 1.92 
9 - 10 130 -0.64* 2.27 237 -0.04 2.07 
10 - 11 106 -0.28 2.13 249 -0.99** 2.07 
11 - 12 97 -0.51 1.98 128 -0.16 1.97 
12 - 13 64 -0.35 1.83 117 -0.73** 2.04 
13 - 14 50 -1.19** 1.96 96 -0.36 2.09 
14 - 15 35 -0.17 2.15 76 -0.91** 2.14 
15 - 16 28 -2.10** 2.43 123 -1.86** 3.12 
^Degrees of freedom equals (N^ + Ng) - 2. 
^Dollars per hundred pounds liveweight. Significant difference between 
1% level. 
laughter Calves and Standard Error of Prices for Adjacent One-Third 
Spring visits 
: 1954 1955 
e Average Average 
ce sg df difference se df difference se 
3.04 - - - - - -
2.72 5 -1.38 2.36 - - -
2.27 4 0.38 2.48 - - -
1.97 6 1.04 1.75 11 1.29 2.00 
1.92 13 -2.45* 2.20 10 -0.14 3.12 
2.07 14 -0.66 2.49 11 -2.32 3.26 
2.07 13 -1.77 2.53 10 0.94 3.15 
1.97 21 0.91 2.41 7 -2.52 3.62 
2.04 12 -1.91* 2.28 7 1.50 2.85 
2.09 24 0.92 2.85 18 -0.94 3.01 
2.14 19 -1.63 2.85 16 -2.04* 2.71 
3.12 29 -0.40 2.52 30 -0.99 2.05 
rence between means denoted by one asterisk for b% level, two asterisks for 
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Appendix Table 58. Average Grade-Price Differential Paid for Steers and Standard 
Fall visits 
1953 1954 
Grades Average Average 
compared dfa difference se df difference se 
1 - 2 _ 
2 - 3 - - - - - -
3 - 4 - - - - - -
4 - 5 - - - - - -
5 - 6 39 1.20 2.38 34 1.20 2.09 
6 - 7 75 -2.78** 4.43 65 -0.17 2.06 
7 - 8 116 0.85 3.63 102 -0.59 1.91 
8 - 9 130 -1.05** 2,14 147 -0.64* 1.92 
9 - 10 140 -0.61* 2.23 186 -0.74** 2.02 
10 - 11 162 -0.91** 2.33 157 -0.11 1.83 
11 - 12 137 -0.71* 2.32 143 -0.99** 1.87 
12 - 13 124 -0.31 2.17 159 -0.74** 2.14 
13 - 14 77 -0.15 2.13 136 -0.77** 2.05 
14 - 15 59 -0.96* 2.24 89 -0.45 1.94 
15 - 16 35 0.05 2.33 27 -1.09* 1.93 
16 - 17 6 -0.45 2.29 22 -1.92** 2.00 
17 - 18 7 -1.89* 1.36 16 0.23 2.40 
18 - 19 2 -1.70 1.65 10 -0.27 3.00 
19 - 20 5 2.00 2.02 - - -
20 - 21 - - - - • — 
^Degrees of freedom equals (Nj[ + Ng) - 2. 
^Dollars per hundred pounds liveweight. Significant difference between mean; 
1% level. 




sQ  df difference s0 df difference sg 
- 9 2.04 2.18 - - -
2.09 9 0.36 1.62 5 0.27 2.14 
2.06 6 -0.97 1.87 9 1.18 1.63 
1.91 10 -1.34 1.45 7 -1.10 1.62 
1.92 13 0.14 1.36 13 0.18 1.90 
2.02 18 -1.37* 1.74 6 0.53 2.22 
1.83 18 -0.64 1.82 16 -1.40 2.96 
1.87 16 0.60 2.14 6 -0.98 3.70 
2.14 18 -1.45 2.52 10 -0.00 3.80 
2.05 20 -0.89 2.63 18 -0.82 2.37 





?nce between means denoted by one asterisk for 5% level, two asterisks for 
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Appendix Table 59. Average Grade-Price Differential Paid for Heifers and Standarc 
Fall visits 
1953 1954 
Grades Average Average 






- - - -
3 - 4 - - - - - -
4 - 5 - - - 11 0.25 1.44 
5 - 6 5 -1.17 1.92 32 -0.31 1.44 
6 - 7 26 -0.12 2.22 40 -0.38 1.76 
7 - 8 40 -0.98 2.21 58 -0.66 1.62 
8 - 9 71 -0.76 2.20 92 0.04 1.46 
9 - 10 80 -0.76* 1.92 119 -1.08** 1.60 
10 - 11 75 -0.53 1.70 119 -1.03** 1.73 
11 - 12 65 -0.59 1.84 109 -0.19 1.81 
12 - 13 61 -0.73* 1.90 93 -0.76** 1.83 
13 - 14 52 -0.06 2.00 101 -0.75** 1.93 
14 - 15 45 -1.28** 2.00 72 -0.78** 1.90 
15 - 16 29 -2.65** 2.84 30 -0.36 1.69 
16 - 17 10 0.65 3.54 19 -0.86 1.54 
17 - 18 8 0.36 1.58 12 -0.46 1.57 
18 - 19 5 -0.51 1.21 16 -0.44 1.63 
19 - 20 3 1.20 0.99 - - -
20 - 21 3 -3.53 1.91 - - -
aDegrees of freedom equals + Ng) - 2. 
^Dollars per hundred pounds liveweight. Significant difference between means 
1% level. 
Heifers and Standard Error of Prices for Adjacent One-Third Grades by Visits 
Spring visits 
'54 1954 1955 
'age Average Average 
•ence sg df difference se df difference se 
> 1.44 - - - - - -
1.44 4 -0.32 0.40 6 1.50 1.66 
1.76 7 -2.87* 1.55 10 -0.22 2.13 
1.62 9 -0.45 2.20 19 -1.32 1.97 
1.46 22 -0.67 2.26 11 1.52* 1.81 
;** 1.60 24 -4.93** 5.75 21 -2.54** 1.68 
!** 1.73 13 2.35 6.32 21 -1.19* 1.73 
1.81 32 -2.95 5.28 17 -0.05 1.77 
,** 1.83 30 2.35* 4.54 23 -1.07* 1.38 
i** 1.93 19 -0.70 1.67 22 -0.66 1.12 
J** 1.90 26 -1.07 1.78 31 0.57 1.58 
1.69 23 -0.76 1.65 14 -1.41* 1.68 
1.54 7 -0.21 1.39 12 -1.45* 1.72 
1.57 16 0.00 1.23 7 0.09 2.03 
i- 1.63 11 -0.83 1.94 6 0.03 1.54 
- 11 -2.78* 2.71 9 -1.34 1.43 
- -
-
- 2 -0.13 1.51 
rference between means denoted by one asterisk for 5% level, two asterisks for 
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Appendix Table 60. Average Grade-Price Differential Paid for Cows and Standard 
Fall visits 
1953 1954 
Grades Average Average 
compared dfa difference'3 sQ  df difference se 
1 - 2 ~ - - - — -
2 - 3 - - - - - — 
3 - 4 — - - - - -
4 - 5 - - - - - -
5 - 6 - - - - — 
6 - 7 - - « - - -
7 - 8 8 0.68 1.98 - - — 
8 - 9 24 -0.54 1.99 18 -1.73 1.83 
9 - 10 25 -0.98 1.82 41 -1.19* 1.66 
10 - 11 38 -0.80 1.68 41 -0.09 1.73 
11 - 12 53 -0.46 1.55 82 0.26 1.56 
12 - 13 91 -0.55* 1.43 156 -1.07** 1.46 
13 - 14 96 -0.35 1.32 156 -0.87** 1.40 
14 - 15 131 -0.47** 1.16 194 -0.29* 1.26 
15 - 16 137 -0.38** 1.10 194 -0.51** 1.07 
16 - 17 136 -0.35* 1.16 171 -0.15 1.10 
17 - 18 123 -0.42** 1.11 150 -0.49** 1.13 
18 - 19 114 -0.40** 0.97 185 -0.22** 1.00 
19 - 20 118 -0.46** 1.07 183 -0.70** 1.11 
20 - 21 62 -1.10** 1.24 92 -1.25** 1.34 
^Degrees of freedom equals (N^ + Ng) - 2. 
^Dollars per hundred pounds liveweight. Significant difference between me; 
I/o level. 
Zows and Standard Error of Prices for Adjacent One-Third Grades by Visits 
Spring visits 
: 1954 1955 
je Average Average 
ice se df difference sg df difference sQ  
1.83 10 3.07 2.41 - - -
1.66 18 -1.77* 1.80 12 -0.44 1.18 
1.73 26 -0.56 1.49 12 -0.01 1.02 
1.56 27 -0.91 1.65 21 -0.39 0.94 
1.46 66 -1.40 3.42 42 -0.68* 1.18 
1.40 62 0.65 2.97 44 0.03 1.12 
1.26 71 -0.53* 1.26 69 -0.82** 1.05 
1.07 73 -0.29 1.11 44 -0.23 1.10 
1.10 43 -0.60* 1.24 49 -0.29 1.00 
1.13 54 -0.43 1.22 44 0.00 1.04 
1.00 71 -0.62** 1.05 56 -0.71** 1.16 
1.11 66 -0.52* 1.22 91 -0.99** 1.21 
1.34 36 -1.37** 1.31 44 -1.51** 1.53 
irence between means denoted by one asterisk for 5% level, two asterisks for 
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Appendix Table 61. Average Price Paid for Specified Grades of Veal Calves by Tv 
Adjacent One-Third Grades 
Packer Order Management 
Average _ _ Average _ _ Average . _ _ 
Grade3 df price X^-Xg^ df price Xj-Xg df price X^-X^ 
Dollars per hundrec 
1 
2 • 
3 - - 11 24.45 0.28 9 24.11 -0.22 
4 - - - 24 24.05 -0.40 27 23.08 -1.03* 
5 30 24.77 -0.30 36 24.16 0.11 46 23.32 0.24 
6 28 22.53 -2.24** 33 23.20 -0.96** 58 22.40 -0.923 
7 40 21.91 -0.62 47 22.41 -0.79 49 21.98 -0.42 
8 65 21.40 -0.51 47 22.50 0.09 43 21.29 -0.69 
9 35 20.48 -0.92 35 20.77 -1.73** 37 20.67 -0.62 
10 71 19.39 -1.09 73 19.21 -1.56* 36 19.49 -1.18 
11 73 18.55 ~0.84 57 19.05 -0.16 33 17.77 -1.72: 
12 40 18.40 -0.15 58 17.90 -1.15 38 18.13 0.36 
13 53 15.93 -2.47** 32 16.13 -1.77* 21 17.67 -0.46 
14 51 16.01 0.08 54 15.22 -0.91 25 15.66 -2.01 
15 57 14.34 -1.67** 46 13.82 -1.40* 17 12.99 -2.67: 
16 67 12.44 -1.90** 97 11.80 -2.02** 43 12.82 -0.17 
aEach number represents one-third grade and is coded as follows: Top prim-
and Cull = 16. 
^Degrees of freedom - number of observations in two adjacent grades compar 
cXj-X2 is the difference in average price between the grade opposite the e. 
is of Veal Calves by Type of Buyer and Average Price Differential between 
Management Farmer All buyers 
df 
Average 
price iq-%2 df 
Average 
price Xi-Xg df 
Average 
price Xl-%2 
Dollars per hundred 
9 24.11 -0.22 
- - -

























































































43 12.82 -0.17 30 11.78 -1.42 237 12.16 -1.73** 
as follows: Top prime = 1; Middle prime = 2; Low prime = 3. . .Low utility - 15 
adjacent grades compared minus 2. 
e grade opposite the entry and the adjacent grade above (smaller number). 
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Appendix Table 62. Average Price Paid for Specified Grades of Slaughter Calve 








df price X^-Xg 
Management 
Average „ . 




Dollars per hundrc 
4 4 17.28 -4.27 - - - — — — 
5 37 17.08 -0.20 17 16.69 -0.40 ~ - -
6 56 15.79 -1.29* 44 15.15 -1.54 - - -
7 87 14.87 -0.92* 68 14.83 -0.32 5 12.52 -2.: 
8 109 14.64 -0.23 99 14.81 -0.02 10 13.98 i.^  
9 122 14.55 -0.09 123 14.49 -0.32 12 14.63 0.6 
10 146 13.97 -0.58 170 14.32 -0.17 15 15.61 0.9 
11 135 13.43 -0.54* 169 13.74 -0.58* 10 11.99 -3.6 
12 100 13.35 0.08 90 13.03 -0.71* 8 12.25 0.2 
13 95 12.68 -0.67* 68 13.05 0.02 7 12.91 0.6 
14 60 12.41 -0.27 78 12.91 -0.14 4 10.88 -2.C 
15 40 11.95 —0.46 65 11.19 -1.72** 4 12.38 1.5 
16 57 10.71 -1.24* 94 9.90 -1.29* 6 11.64 -0.7 
aEach number represents one-third grade and is coded as follows: Top pri 
and Cull = 16. 
"Degrees of freedom - number of observations in two adjacent grades compa 
^X^-Xg is the difference in average price between the grade opposite the 
t 
; of Slaughter Calves by Type of Buyer and Average Price Differential 
Management Farmer All buyers 
Average Average •» * Average 
df price xrx2 df price Xl-%2 df price X1-X2 
Dollars per hundred 






10 17.36 -4.50* 
~ - - - - — 57 17.03 -0.33 
- -
- 7 15.70 0.15 113 15.49 -1.54** 
5 12.52 -2.33 17 15.51 -0.19 177 14.85 -0.64* 
10 13.98 1.46 35 15.26 -0.25 253 14.77 -0.08 
12 14.63 0.65 36 15.99 0.73 293 14.71 -0.06 
15 15.61 0.98 61 14.96 -1.03 392 14.34 -0.37 
10 11.99 -3.62** 64 13.94 -1.02* 378 13.62 -0.72** 
8 12.25 0.26 55 14.49 0.55 253 13.45 -0.17 
7 12.91 0.66 30 12.74 -1.75** 200 12.82 -0.63** 
4 10.88 -2.03 46 13.46 0.72 188 12.84 0.02 
4 12.38 1.50 37 13.42 -0.04 146 12.00 -0.84** 
6 11.64 -0.74 53 11.61 -1.81** 210 10.60 -1.40** 
is follows: Top prime = lj Middle prime = 2; Low prime - 3. . .Low utility - 15 
Ijacent grades compared minus 2. 
grade opposite the entry and the adjacent grade above (smaller number). 
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Appendix Table 63. Average Price Paid for Specified Grades of Steers by Typ 
One-Third Grades 
Packer Order Management 
3rade3 dfb 
Average 
price XrV df 
Average 











- - - - - -
5 19 17.61 -2.94* 18 19.21 0.81 - -
6 32 18.51 0.90 40 19.62 0.41 - — 
7 70 16.18 -2.33* 60 18.26 -1.36** 4 17.59 0 
8 108 17.25 1.07 96 17.56 -0.70* 8 16.58 -1 
9 102 16.83 -0.42 138 16.49 -1.07** 13 15.41 -1 
10 115 16.39 -0.44 159 15.56 -0.93** 24 15.70 0 
11 92 15.32 -1.07** 154 15.18 -0.38 20 15.57 -0 
12 88 14.50 -0.82* 146 14.19 -0.99** 18 15.53 -0 
13 54 13.50 -1.00* 175 14.13 -0.06 10 13.70 =1 
14 27 13.29 -0.21 145 13.83 -0.30 4 14.94 1 
15 18 13.02 -0.27 110 12.94 -0.89** 2 14.43 -0 
16 10 11.66 -1.36 33 11.96 -0.98* _ -
17 3 9.20 -2.46 22 10.91 -1.05 - — 
18 6 8.98 -0.22 10 10.72 -0.19 - -
19 6 8.90 -0.08 5 10.55 -0.17 o> -
20 - - - 4 10.25 -0.30 — -
21 
aEach number represents one-third grade and is coded as follows; Top p] 
and Cull = 16. 
^Degrees of freedom = number of observations in two adjacent grades com; 
°Xj-X2 is the difference in average price between the grade opposite th< 
ss of Steers by Type of Buyer and Average Price Differential between Adjacent 
Management Farmer All buyers 
Average Average Average 
df price Xl-%2 df price Xl-%2 df price ~xi-x2 
Dollars per hundred 
- - — - -
-
- ~ - - -
43 18.53 -1.13 
- — 
- 11 19.00 -0.90 87 19.00 0.47 
4 17.59 0.78 21 18.95 -0.05 155 17.40 -1.60** 
8 16.58 -1.01 23 17.31 -1.64** 235 17.36 -0.04 
13 15.41 -1.17 50 17.46 0.15 303 16.72 -0.64** 
24 15.70 0.29 52 16.62 —0.84 350 16.00 -0.72** 
20 15.57 -0 • 13 87 16.20 -0.42 353 15.49 -0.51** 
18 15.53 -0.04 50 15.88 -0.32 302 14.64 -0.85** 
10 13.70 =1.83* 72 14.99 -0.89 311 14.21 -0.43* 
4 14.94 1.24 75 14.41 -0.58 251 13.96 -0.25 
2 14.43 -0.51 35 14.12 -0.29 165 13.22 -0.74** 
_ _ 
- 19 12.57 -1.55 62 12.10 -1.12** 
- — 
- 11 13.27 0.70 38 11.36 -0.74 
- -
-- 6 11.29 -1.98 23 10.24 -1.12 
— 5 13.25 1.96 16 10.78 0.54 
- -
-
- - - 6 10.42 -0.36 
as fellows! Top prime - 1; Middle prime - 2; Low prime - 3. . . Low utility - 15 
idjacent grades compared minus 2. 
i grade opposite the entry and the adjacent grade above (smaller number), 
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Appendix Table 64. Average Price Paid for Specified Grades of Heifers by 
One-Third Grades 
Packer Order Management 
Average _ _ Average _ _ Average 
Grade3 df*3 price df price Xj-Xp df price 





5 11 15.98 1.48 : 
6 31 16.40 0.42 15 15.01 -1.36 - -
7 46 16.32 -0.08 27 15.11 0.10 - ~ 
8 67 15.25 -1.07* 40 14.29 -0.82 6 13.20 
9 99 14.95 -0.30 70 13.97 -0.32 6 12.27 
10 129 13.33 -1.62** 80 12.62 -1.35** 8 12.39 
11 94 12.76 -0.57 92 11,90 -0.72* 4 12.88 
12 106 12.03 -0.73 73 11.78 -0.12 9 12.45 
13 99 12.12 0.09 63 11.01 -0.77* 7 12.26 
14 93 11.69 -0.43 - 63 10.39 -0.62 4 11.38 
15 70 11.20 -0.49 60 9.93 -0.46 2 9.04 
16 41 10.68 -0.52 37 8.11 -1.82** 2 8.50 
17 20 9.77 -0.91 13 8.23 0.12 3 9.52 
18 18 10.45 0.68 14 8.86 0.63 4 7.25 
19 11 9.35 -1.10 15 8.92 0.06 -
20 7 9.67 0.32 7 9.32 0.40 - -
21 2 9.93 0.26 - - - - -
aEach number represents one-third grade and is coded as follows: Top 
and Cull = 16. 
^Degrees of freedom - number of observations in two adjacent grades c 
C —* 
Xj-X2 is the difference in average price between the grade opposite 
ies of Heifers by Type of Buyer and Average Price Differential between Adjacent 
Management Farmer All buyers 
Average Average Average 
df price Xl"%2 df price xrx2 df price Xl-%2 







20 16.43 1.50 
- - -
- - - 47 16.03 -0.40 
- - - - _ 83 15.60 -0.43 
6 13.20 -0.35 13 15.14 1.49 126 14.84 -0.76* 
6 12.27 -0.93 21 14.19 -0.95 196 14.43 -0.41 
8 12.39 0.12 27 13.38 -0.81 244 13.07 -1.36** 
4 12.88 0.49 38 12.76 -0.62 228 12.41 -0.66** 
9 12.45 -0.43 35 11.84 -0.92 223 11.93 -0.48 
7 12.26 -0.19 38 11.80 -0.04 207 11.73 -0.20 
4 11.38 -0.80 34 10.30 -1.50** 194 11.02 -0.71** 
2 9.04 -2.34 - - - 174 10.71 -0.31 
2 8.50 -0.54 16 10.24 -0.87 96 9.57 -1.14** 
3 9.52 1.02 12 9.54 -0.70 48 9.28 -0.29 
4 7.25 -2.27 7 11.44 1.90 43 9.80 0.52 
-
« - 12 8.57 -2.87 38 8.93 -0.87 
-
- - 8 8.43 -0,14 23 8.93 0.00 
2 3.68 -4.75 5 6.99 -1.94 
as follows: Top prime - 1; Middle prime = 2; Low prime = 3. . . Low utility = 15 
adjacent grades compared minus 2. 
; grade opposite the entry and the adjacent grade above (smaller number). 
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Appendix Table 65. Average Price Paid for Specified Grades of Cows by Type of 
One-Third Grades 
Packer Order Management 
Average Average _ _ Average _ _ 
Grade3 df price df price X^-Xg df price Xi-X2 
Dollars per hundred 
8 10 13.23 1.03 - - - - — -
9 37 12.92 -0.31 17 12.04 -0.31 - - -
10 57 12.09 -0.83 26 11.83 -0.21 - -
11 66 11.58 -0.51 39 11.30 -0.53 - -
12 84 11.29 -0.29 73 10.60 -0.70* - - -
13 162 10.35 -0.94* 155 9.94 -0.66* 10 12.15 2.22 
14 193 10.02 -0.33 131 9.51 -0.43 13 9.18 -2.9T 
15 252 9.67 -0.35 160 8.95 -0.56* 14 8.57 -0.61 
16 202 9.00 -0.67** 185 8.73 -0.22 20 8.26 -0.31 
17 197 8.62 -0.38 143 8.18 -0.55** 21 7.48 -0.78 
18 179 8.45 -0.17 129 7.72 -0.46* 22 7.89 0.41 
19 193 8.20 -0.25 163 7.53 -0.19 28 7.27 -0.62 
20 215 7.88 -0.32 187 6.89 -0.64** 21 6.51 -0.76 
21 84 6.91 -0.97** 123 5.57 -1.32** 11 5.53 -0.984 
aEach number represents one™third grade and is coded as follows; Top prime 
and Cull = 16. 
^Degrees of freedom = number of observations in two adjacent grades compare 
cXi~X2 is the difference in average price between the grade opposite the er 
s of Cows by Type of Buyer and Average Price Differential between Adjacent 
Management Farmer All buyers 
Average Average _ _ Average 
df price X^-X2 df price X^-X2 df price Xj-X2 
Dollars per hundred 
- — - - -
- 16 12.90 0.95 
- - -
- - - 57 12.81 -0.09 
- -
- 9 10.04 -7.14* 96 11.72 -1.09** 
- - — 11 10.99 0.95 117 11.43 -0.29 
- - - 20 11.40 0.41 183 10.98 -0.45 
10 12.15 2.22 28 9.58 -1.82** 355 10.16 -0.82** 
13 9.18 -2.97** 21 9.89 0.31 358 9.79 -0.37* 
14 8.57 -0.61 39 9.47 -0.42 465 9.37 -0.42** 
20 8.26 -0.31 41 8.64 -0.83 448 8.82 -0.55** 
21 7.48 -0.78 38 8.95 0.31 399 8.44 -0.38** 
22 7.89 0.41 41 8.33 -0.62 371 8.15 -0.29* 
28 7.27 -0.62 42 7.99 -0.34 426 7.86 -0.29* 
21 6.51 -0.76 35 7.53 -0.46 458 7.38 -0.48** 
11 5.53 -0.98* 16 6.39 1.14 234 6.10 -1.28** 
s follows; Top prime = 1; Middle prime = 2; Low prime - 3. . . Low utility - 15 
jacent grades compared minus 2. 
grade opposite the entry and the adjacent grade above (smaller number). 
